Iraq: What Is To Be Done?
By Anthony H. Cordesman

It may not be as apparent in the United States as it is in the Arab world, but several weeks of travel in the region indicate that the course of the fighting in Fallujah and Najaf are perceived in much of Iraq and the Arab world as a serious U.S. defeat. This is not simply a matter of shattering an aura of U.S. military invincibility; it is a growing shift in political attitudes and in the prospects for political change in Iraq.

In fact, this follows a pattern that makes the very term "post-conflict operations" a stupid and intellectually dishonest oxymoron. As we have seen in Afghanistan, Somalia, Lebanon, Cambodia, and many other cases, asymmetric wars do not really end. Nation building must take place on an armed basis without security and in the face of adaptive and innovative threats. The reality is that this is a far more difficult aspect of "transformation" than defeating organized military resistance and one for which the United States is not yet prepared.

Senior U.S. officials have been in a continuing state of denial about the depth of support for this conflict. They have misused public opinion polls like the Zogby and ABC polls, and they have ignored the fact that the ABC poll conducted in February found that roughly two-thirds of Sunnis and one-third of Shi’ites opposed the United States and British invasion and found it to be humiliating to Iraq. Senior U.S. officials have ignored the fact that roughly one-third of Sunnis and two-thirds of Shi’ites support violence against the Coalition and want the Coalition forces to leave Iraq immediately. They talk about a small minority of Iraqis because only a small minority have so far been actively violent -- a reality in virtually every insurgent campaign and one that in no way is a measure of support for violence.

A year into the "war after the war," far too many U.S. officials are still in a state of denial as to the political realities in the Middle East. They do not see just how much the perceived U.S. tilt towards Israel and Sharon alienates Iraqis and Arabs in general. They do not admit the near total failure of U.S. information operations and the fact that Iraqis watch hostile Arab satellite TV stations and rely on papers filled with misinformation and conspiracy theories.

They talk about "success" in aid programs measured in terms of contracts signed, fiscal obligations and gross measures of performance like megawatts, not about actual progress on the ground, the kind that can really win hearts and minds. They cannot understand that United States calls for "liberty," "democracy" and "reform" have become coupled to images of U.S. interference in Arab regimes, the broad resentment of careless negative U.S. references to Islam and Arab culture, conspiracy theories about control of Iraqi oil, "neoimperialism," and serving "Zionist" interests.

The fact these perceptions are not fair is as irrelevant as U.S. tactical military victories that are often political defeats. The present mix of armed nation building and low intensity conflict takes place in a region shaped by such perceptions. This is why the photographic evidence of U.S. mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners is so devastating. For many in the region, it validates every criticism of the United States and vastly strengthens the hand of Islamic extremists, Sunni insurgents, Shi’ite insurgents, and hostile media and intellectuals in both the Arab world and Europe.

The time has come to face this reality. There was never a time when neoconservative fantasies about the Middle East were anything but dangerous illusions. Those fantasies have killed and wounded thousands of American and Coalition allies and now threaten the United States with a serious strategic defeat. It may not be possible to avoid some form of defeat, but the United States must make every effort to do so, and this means junking the neoconservatism within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Vice President’s office and the National Security Council (NSC) and coming firmly to grips with reality.

Why the United States Has Already “Lost” Some Aspects of Its Battles in Fallujah and with Sadr

The United States is scarcely defeated in either a military or a political sense, but it is suffering serious reversals.  The Iraqi insurgents do not have to win battles in a tactical sense; they merely have to put up a determined enough resistance, with enough skill and courage, to show their fellow Iraqis and the Arab world that they are capable of a determined, strong and well-organized effort. Many of their fellow Iraqis will perceive any determined resistance as a "victory" against the world’s only superpower.

If the Sunnis in Fallujah and Sadr in Najaf continue to show they can survive a U.S. military threat -- and that they can force the United States and the Coalition into a posture of containment and compromise -- they will be able to change the rules of the game in nation building as well as in the fighting. They will score a major victory at the political level while they effectively create "no go" areas and sanctuaries. They will do so even if they do have to end open confrontation and turnover some weapons and activists. 

Solutions like the "Fallujah Brigade" are de facto defeats for the United States in both military and political terms. They signal a coming struggle for power in which hostile elements of both Arab Sunnis and Shi’ites will be much stronger than the United States and its allies previously estimated. They also create a national political climate in which the Coalition is perceived as lacking any clear plan or goals; the Interim Governing Council (IGC) is divided and lacking in legitimacy; the Iraqi security forces are seen as ineffective; and the UN becomes both a tool for insurgent pressure and a potential target.

Losing a War of Attrition in a “Perfect Storm” of Negative Images?

The fighting during April 2004 has also created a climate in which the United States and its allies are seen as being in the middle of a war of attrition that they are losing. The totals of U.S., allied and friendly Iraqi killed and wounded have already reached the point where Iraqi insurgents and foreign extremists have every reason to perceive the Coalition as politically and strategically vulnerable -- an image reinforced by the steady loss of support for the war and a continued effort in Iraq in U.S. and allied public opinion polls.

Hostile Iraqi losses to date can be sustained indefinitely. As a result, the mix of Coalition and friendly Iraqi casualties, sabotage and paralysis of the aid process and growing political uncertainty at the edge of the transfer of sovereignty act as a virtual road map for future battles in Iraq and later battles against U.S. military and nation building operations in the rest of the world. The end result is to show that an Arab asymmetric force can delay and possibly checkmate the strongest Western military power, that Arabs are not weak or passive and that Arabs can "take back their homeland."

It will take a new public opinion poll to determine just how much the "perfect storm" of negative events since February has changed opinion inside Iraq, but it seems almost certain that events in Fallujah and dealing with Sadr have sharply cut support for the United States among moderate Iraqi Arabs. (The fact the Kurds have nowhere else to go -- and have to be friendly -- means they should be largely excluded from polls analyzing how Iraqi attitudes are affecting the war.) 

It seems equally certain that this drop is compounded by the flood of Arab images of Iraqi civilians suffering in the fighting, the images of mistreatment of Iraqi POWs and newscasts that claim every U.S. use of a modern weapon is a careless use of excessive force. These images are clearly having a powerful impact throughout the Sunni world -- strongly reinforced by Israeli military action and statements that make the constant Arab media linkage between the United States and Israeli occupations steadily more damaging. Furthermore, similar images are being portrayed in Iran and it seems likely that Iranian opinion is turning away from the United States.

The Lack of Coalition and IGC Political Legitimacy

The last few weeks of resistance have sharply undercut the already low political legitimacy of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S. approach to nation building and the Interim Governing Council. Iraqis and the region perceive the United States as lacking any credible plan of action and as being "forced" to turn to the UN.

The "pro-American" Iraqis have been divided and weak and have been unable to rally the Iraqi people. The end result is that the U.S. ability to convey "legitimacy" has been sharply undercut at precisely at the time the United States needs legitimacy for its June 30 turnover. In addition, U.S. ties to some members of the IGC are becoming steadily more damaging -- particularly the image of U.S. ties to "losers" like Chalibi.

Turning a Non-terrorist Threat into a Real One

Iraq has become a natural battleground for Islamic insurgents and "volunteers" of all persuasions. There is no meaningful evidence that Iraq was a focus of terrorism before the war, or a primary focus early in the fighting. Over the last few months, however, the outside presence and support for insurgents has increased. 

Over the last few weeks, it has become all too clear that such support is paying off well in terms of American and allied casualties and in boosting the image of Islamic resistance as being able to take on the United States. Iraq was never a magnet for terrorism before the war and only a limited magnet before Fallujah and Sadr. It has become a major magnet now.

Paralyzing Much of the Effort to Win Hearts and Minds

A Negotiated Solution Means Limiting the Scale of Defeat

The end result is close to a no-win situation for the United States. Any negotiated solution effectively legitimizes the Sunni and Shi'ite hard-line opposition, while weakening the IGC -- exposing the fact the United States is now trying to turnover power to "mystery men" on June 30, who cannot have legitimacy because they have no identity.

This compounds the problems inherent in the Brahimi approach, which effectively says that the government of June 30 will not have legitimacy until a popular council takes place and that a real government and constitutional base must be voted on by the Iraqis and not from the legacy left by the CPA/IGC.

In effect, the period of political illegitimacy or non-legitimacy is now extended long beyond June 30, and the period in which Iraqis must compete for power by both political and violent means will now extend through all of 2004 and much of 2005.

This political struggle has several key characteristics:  

• The game has no clear rules. There are "maybe" milestones and objectives that are undefined.

• Federalism and power sharing is up in the air, and even if an interim allocation of power to a President, Prime Minister and Vice Premiers takes place, it is only for an interim period and does not affect struggles over money, power, land, etc. The ethnic divisions between Arab, Kurd, Turcoman, and other minorities are not really resolved. The same is true of divisions between Sunni and Shi’ite and religious and secular.

• There is no economic underpinning for political stability, and far too many jobs are dependent on aid and paid security positions. Iraq now has a "bubble" economy, not real reconstruction, and Iraqis know this. Some 70% expressed fear over their future job security in the ABC poll in February.

• No Iraqi leaders now have broad popular political support in public opinion polls, including Sistani. Most have powerful negatives -- often more negative than positive. There is usually intense competition within given factions, and leaders have a growing incentive to show their independence from the Coalition. A near political vacuum exists, where there are strong incentives to seek support from ethnic or religious factions and demagogue the way to victory.

• No political party has significant popular support, and nearly 70% of Iraqis opposed political parties in the ABC poll in February, largely because of the heritage of the Baath.

• More Iraqis support a strong leader as an interim solution than "democracy," although no one is clear on who such a strong leader will be.

• No Iraqi leader is as yet organizing for the series of elections to come, aggressively trying to create popular political parties or making efforts to capture the media. The peaceful political struggles necessary to create the ground work for democracy are being subordinated to political struggles within the IGC, efforts to game Brahimi’s political efforts and challenges from the outside.

• Many potential Iraqi leaders have every reason to fear losing in the coming struggle for power, and no clear plans exist to co-opt the Sunni insurgents and Shi’ite "Sadrs" into the system. Hostile areas and factions are largely excluded from the political process under the illusion they are too small to really matter. The United States still seems to be trying to stage-manage the creation of a secular democracy of friendly moderates, but true legitimacy is the government Iraqis want, not the one the United States and Western reformers want.

• There is no meaningful chance of "security first." The political and nation building process will almost certainly have to go on in the midst of terrorism and low intensity conflict through 2006. Elections will be extremely difficult, hostile areas will continue to exist and governance will be under continued attack.

• The rush to create Iraqi armed forces and security forces suitable for a post-conflict Iraq has left tens of thousands of untrained and poorly equipped men recruited locally on an ethnic, religious and tribal basis. No clear plan seems to exist for giving them the training, equipment and facilities they need on a timely basis. The rule of law is erratic and often local.

• Politics may fascinate politicians, but Iraqis live with governance. The creation of 25-27 functioning ministries, governorates and urban governments will affect every aspect of daily life and security.  The plans to create effective governance will lag far behind the transfer of sovereignty on June 30  -- and extend well into the winter of 2004 and beyond.

No Military Solution Can Now Work

The United States can defeat any given group of Iraqi insurgents and largely secure any area it occupies with sufficient strength. However, any military solution that involves serious combat with a Sunni or Shi’ite faction is now likely to be the kind of "victory" that creates a new firestorm over excessive force, civilian casualties and collateral damage. At the same time, the United States cannot hope to use such combat to kill or arrest all of the Sunni, Shi’ite and foreign insurgents that exist now and many tactical victories are likely to create more insurgents than they destroy. As the United States learned in Vietnam, tactical military victory without political victory is largely irrelevant.

As in Vietnam, the United States also cannot afford to loose the largest ethnic faction. In Vietnam, the United States arguably lost the war when it lost the Buddhists. In Iraq, the key is to avoid losing the Shi’ites. Any U.S. arrest or killing of Sadr at this point means creating an instant martyr that will have a powerful impact on many young Shi'ites in Iraq and militant Shi'ites all over the world -- pushing them towards some form of alignment with Sunni insurgents. A serious fight from a now cold start against a well organized resistance in Najaf would be a disaster, triggering much broader Shi'ite alignments against the United States.

What the United States Should Do Now

At this point, the United States lacks good options -- although it probably never really had them in the sense the Bush Administration sought. The option of quickly turning Iraq into a successful, free-market democracy was never practical and was as absurd a neoconservative fantasy as the idea that success in this objective would magically make Iraq an example that would transform the Middle East.

The key to the success the United States can now hope to achieve is to set realistic objectives. In practice, these objectives are to create an Iraqi political structure that will minimize the risk of civil war, develop some degree of pluralism and help the Iraqis take charge over their own economy.

This, in turn, means a major shift from trying to maintain U.S. influence and leverage in a post-sovereignty period to a policy where the United States makes every effort to turn as much of the political, aid and security effort over to Iraqis as soon as possible and focuses on supporting the UN in creating the best compromises possible in creating Iraqi political legitimacy.

The United States should not abandon Iraq but rather abandon the effort to create an Iraq in its own image.

Other measures are:

• Accept the fact that a universal, nation-wide "security first" policy is stupid and impractical and that the United States needs to isolate and bypass islands of resistance and focus on creating a legitimate Iraqi government that can unify Iraqis and allow nation building to work. This means relying on containment in the case of truly troubled and high insurgent areas and focusing on security in friendly areas.

• Accept the fact there is no way to "drain the swamp." At this point, there simply is no way to eliminate cadres of insurgents or to disarm the most threatening areas. Fallujah and similar areas have too much popular support for the insurgents, there are too many arms that can be hidden and too many points of vulnerability. This does not mean the United States should give up fighting the insurgents or its efforts to disarm them. It does mean the United States must accept that it cannot win in the sense of eliminating them or turning hostile areas into secure and disarmed areas.

• Rush aid to the Iraqi security forces and military seeking more friendly Arab aid in training and support and provide as broad a base of Iraqi command as possible. Forget contract regulations on buying equipment. Deliver everything necessary and worry about the details later.

• Continue expanding the role of the Iraqi security forces. Understand that their loyalties will be divided, that putting them in charge of hostile areas does not mean they can be expected to do more than work out a modus vivendi with the insurgents, and that the end result will often be to create "no go" or limited access areas for Americans. The United States cannot afford to repeat the Israeli mistake of assuming that any Iraqi authority in hostile areas can be counted on to provide security for Americans.

• Walk firmly and openly away from the losers in the IGC like Chalibi. Open up the political structure and deal with Shi’ite oppositionists, Sunni insurgents and ex-Baathists to the maximum degree possible. Drag in as many non-IGC leaders as possible and give Brahimi's council idea the strongest possible support. Lower the U.S. profile in shaping the political future of Iraq as much as possible and bring in as broad a UN international team as possible.

• Focus on all of the Shi’ites, not just the friendly ones. Make this a critical aspect of U.S. diplomatic efforts. Let the Iraqi Shi’ites deal with Sadr and stay out of internal Shi’ite disputes, except to help insure security. Quietly reach out to Iran to create whatever kind of dialogue is possible.

• Push Sunni Arab states into helping Iraq’s Sunnis and in helping to deal with the political issues involved by quietly making it clear that they will have to live with the aftermath of failure and that the U.S. presence and commitment is not open-ended.

• Zero-base the failed contracting effort for FY2004 U.S. aid to put Iraqi Ministries and officials in charge of the aid process as soon as possible, with Iraqis going into the field and not foreign contractors.

• Reprogram funds for a massive new Commanders' Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) program to enable U.S. military commanders to use dollars instead of bullets at every opportunity. Make the focus of U.S. control over aid whether Iraqis spend the money honestly and effectively, and not on U.S. control, plans and objectives.

• Zero-base the U.S. embassy plan to create the smallest staff practical of proven area experts, with the clear message to the Iraqis that not only are they going to be in charge, but non-performance means no U.S. money and no continuation of U.S. troops and support. End the image of a U.S. end of an occupation after the occupation.

• Develop a long-term economic and military aid program as leverage to try to influence Iraqi decision-making over time. Have the ministries manage the process, not USAID or contractors. Focus on whether the Iraqi efforts are honest and produce real results. Do not try to use aid to force Iraq into U.S. modes and methods.

• Accept the near total failure of U.S. information operations. Stop giving all CPA/CJTF-7 press conferences and put an Iraqis on the stage with the U.S. spokesmen. Stop all proconsul-like press conferences where the United States seems to be dictating. Make an Iraqi spokesman part of all dialogue and give them the lead as soon as possible. Subordinate U.S. and Coalition spokesmen as soon as possible to Iraqis in press conferences and briefings that are held in Arabic.

• Look at the broader failures of U.S. policy in the region. Revitalize the Road Map and the Quartet in the light of Sharon’s problems. Deal with the reality that there are two failed sets of political elites in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that settlements should be unacceptable and not just terrorism.

• Abandon the Greater Middle East Initiative in its present form. Do not add another strategic and policy blunder to the present situation by appearing to call for regime change and seeking to dominate the region. Focus on a broad cooperative initiative worked out with the European Union (EU) and where the EU puts pressure on the Arab League. Stop talking about region-wide democracy and liberty before there are responsible political parties and the other reforms necessary to make democracy work. Focus on a country-by-country approach to reform that considers human rights, economic welfare and demographic issues to be at least as important as elections. Stress cooperation in "evolution," not random efforts at "revolution."

• Prepare for the fact that nation building may still fail, and position the United States to use the threat of withdrawal as leverage.  Make it clear that the United States can and will leave Iraq if the Iraqis do not reach agreement on an effective interim solution and if they do not proceed with reasonable unity to implement the UN plans.

The U.S. position should be that the United States is ready to help an Iraq that will help itself and that it supports a true transfer of sovereignty. It should make it clear to Iraq and the world, however, that the United States has a clear exit strategy. It has no interest in bases or control over Iraqi oil. It has no reason to stay if Iraq become unstable, devolves into civil war or ends up under a strong man. The United States can live with a weak or unstable Iraq, and Iraq still will have to export oil at market prices and will still be far less of a threat than Saddam’s Iraq.