At a Crossroads:  American Policy and the Middle East
By Mary E. Morris

California State University at San Bernardino
January 22, 2004

It has become a cliché to say that the Middle East is at a crossroads.  At this time, however, both the Middle East and the United States as well are at a crossroads, a result of America's extraordinary intervention in the region since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Since that time, the United States has invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq, declared official support for an independent and viable Palestinian state, repudiated, at least in principle, U.S. support for authoritarian regimes while professing support for the development of democratic processes, and implemented a policy of preemptive war.  In fact, the U. S. is more entangled in affairs of the Middle East today than at any time in history.  Nation-building has become the primary concern of an administration that initially viewed that activity as a squandering of U.S. military resources. [1]

For the United States, both opportunities and challenges exist in post-Saddam Iraq and in the Middle East as a whole, but the process of working through challenges to opportunities will be far more complex than expected.  Iraq remains deeply unsettled almost a year after its military conquest and occupation, as the January 18 Baghdad suicide bombing reminds us.  Additionally, conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is escalating again, with continued suicide bombings and increased land appropriation, the latter  primarily as a consequence of the ongoing construction of the Israeli security fence/wall.  Islamic terrorists continue strikes, in Iraq, in Pakistan, and elsewhere, while Al Qaeda is reportedly making a comeback, with new recruits and new bases of operation.

Overall, ensuring a secure political, economic and social environment is proving to be tougher than anticipated by the Bush Administration, which continues to struggle with the slow pace of reconstruction and the provision of basic services, primarily in the central portion of Iraq.   The risk of conflict among religious and ethnic groups remains, while resistance to the Administration's current plan for handing over Iraq to Iraqis continues.  Throughout Iraq and the Middle East, there is hostility and resentment against American occupation.  Indeed, the U. S. seems to have maneuvered itself into a position in Iraq where there is no good solution, where it can neither go nor stay without damage to its core objectives for Iraq and for the region. 

After a dazzling military victory, it now appears that the U.S. government was almost completely unprepared to cope with the reality of post-Saddam Iraq.  Part of the problem was the lack of human intelligence sources - Humint - inside Iraq, to truly determine the level of resistance that might be encountered.  But the slow and clumsy attempts at reconstruction after the war also seem indicative of an uncharacteristic lack of planning - or a refusal, perhaps, to plan for any other than the best outcome - anathema to strategic planners who are trained to plan for the worst case, not the best one. Where were those planners, and why were they not consulted?

The ineptitude of the occupation, accompanied by an apparent lack of concern over the looting that took place in its early days, has led to resentment of the U.S. presence, and suspicions of America's intentions in a country familiar with colonialism.  Additionally, foreign support for the U. S. effort has been limited, due to both the unpopularity of  war and to America's apparent lack of interest in gathering international support for anything but doing the clean-up and paying the bills. 

But economic and political reforms need to begin immediately to avert increased chaos, continuing divisiveness, and growing anti-Americanism.  The cycle of dysfunction needs to be broken.  Continuing disorder threatens future attempts to establish a base for a stable political system, not to mention business and investment.  Iraq is a country used to repression, but also used to absolute stability; the disorder that has characterized the last year is inexplicable to many Iraqis. 

In addition, the legitimacy of the interim government that is being pushed by the U.S. is questionable - many Iraqi opposition members who are American favorites have been outside Iraq for years and have no local ties.

In the South, Shi'ite leaders have asserted control over increasing numbers of institutions.  Immediately following the war, they provided crucial services that Americans could not, like trash collection and water distribution. 

Problems from the pre-war period also have to be dealt with, including the matter of Iraq's external debt (estimated at from $40 billion to $200 billion), incurred during the Iran-Iraq war and including reparations dating back to the invasion of Kuwait.  The debt problems must be resolved through procedures such as rescheduling or outright forgiveness.  (Some recent progress has been made on this front by former Secretary of State James Baker, who has won concessions from France and Qatar.)  In addition, decisions must be made about who will control the oil: Iraq under the Provisional Government or the United States, as caretaker.  International trusteeship is another possibility, until new Iraqi government can handle the responsibility.  In the meantime, pumps and pipelines need renovating and production capacity needs boosting.   

At the same time that the United States is working out its problems in Iraq, management of the Israeli-Palestinian problem has become more critical than ever.  This is not the most important problem the region faces-population control, uncontrolled urbanization, un- and underemployment and repressive regimes which offer no outlet for legitimate political opposition are far more significant in both the short and the long-term.  But the long-running conflict between Arabs and Israelis is the most visible problem, the prism through which Americans view the Middle East and through which Arabs (and Israelis) see America.  It is the litmus test the region uses to measure American commitment to the region and its ability to treat all parties fairly. Perceptions of U.S. willingness to stay the course are wrapped up in solving this problem.

In a recent New York Times column Tom Friedman calls present U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict "insane." [2]  He characterizes Palestinians as gripped by "collective madness" and Israelis with "a leadership adrift," resulting in an "utterly self-destructive vicious cycle that threatens Israel's long-term viability, poisons America's image in the Middle East, undermines any hope for a Palestinian state, and weakens pro-American Arab moderates.. ..Yet the Bush team, backed up by certain conservative Jewish and Christian activist groups, believes that the correct policy is to do nothing." 

It's instructive to look at the plight of the Palestinians since the beginning of the Oslo process in 1994.  According to Sara Roy, one of the best chroniclers of Palestinian social and economic issues, since Oslo:

• 70,000 acres of Palestinian land have been appropriated
• The Israeli settler population has doubled to approximately 220,000 in 150 settlements in West Bank and 16 in Gaza
• 4,000 Palestinian homes have been destroyed
• 14,000 homes have been damaged
• 10,000 people in Gaza are homeless
• The West Bank and Gaza have been divided into non-contiguous cantons with over 500 military checkpoints
• Palestine's physical resources have been destroyed, including "homes, business, public and private buildings, workshops, factories, vehicles, roads, sidewalks, schools, clinics, agricultural land, crops, water supply networks, waste disposal and sanitation systems, electricity networks, transformers and street lighting, and telecommunications equipment" [3]
• Movement of people and economy is severely restricted, leading to widespread unemployment and poverty.

There are no excuses for suicide bombings.  Nonetheless, Palestinian rage did not emerge in a vacuum, nor has Arab anger at U. S. policies suddenly emerged for no reason.  With all of the condemnation of Palestinian attacks-in this and in previous U. S. administrations-no one in a high position of influence appears to have asked "why?"  Yet Israeli actions, compounded by U.S. inaction, have provided fodder for radical political and religious groups. 

Mr. Friedman is right.  The "road map" proposed by the Bush administration seeks only to end conflict, not occupation, and even this appears to have been abandoned in recent months.  For the U.S. to continue to do nothing is a recipe for even further disaster in the Middle East.

We have already profoundly changed the future of the region by our invasion of Iraq.  As an occupying power, we bear both legal and moral responsibility for a country we have made completely dependent on us.  We must also keep promises made across the board, and that includes helping to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

A recent trip to Jordan provided opportunities to talk to many people - from past and present ministers of government to religious leaders, from media representatives to university professors.  There was both sincere welcome and serious criticism of U.S. Middle East policy.  One of the most significant requests was that the U.S. listen to the voices of the region, instead of performing analysis on the basis of either hearsay from limited sources or on the basis of what the U.S. would like to see rather than what actually exists.

Many Arabs, who have studied and worked in the United States, say they are both puzzled and angry at current U.S. actions - in Iraq, but particularly with regard to the Palestinians.  Ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is seen as key - little will be done in other areas until this is solved.  The big question in the region is: does the United States understand the long-term consequences of its current policies?  No one understands why the U.S. took on the fight against Iraq alone, why it chose to go without international backing, why reconstruction planning was done so poorly, and why the United States continues to ignore the slow but steady disintegration of the Palestinian people.  Israelis and Palestinians must make the peace; but the United States must exercise its influence and  make it imperative that they sit down and do so. 

In general, American policies have generated wide-spread distrust throughout the Middle East.  Our rejection, or ignoring, of regional voices - including, significantly, the peace process suggested last year by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - makes us appear arrogant.  Our seeming lack of understanding of consequences makes us appear both uncaring and myopic.  Our refusal to work with others, as in Iraq, makes us appear greedy.  Our unconditional support of Israel makes us seem insensitive to the suffering of a people who have been dispossessed and continuously insulted for over fifty years.  And our focus on Israel, Iraq, and the protection of the Gulf oil fields-each treated as a separate problem rather than a piece of the whole - has enabled the region to continue avoiding the real major problems it faces: water and food security, ineffective and corrupt governments, lack of civil societies, human rights abuses, un- and under-employment, housing, education, sanitation, rising populations and shrinking resources.

Taken together, these unsolved problems present opportunities for terrorism's recruiters, for there is a pervasive belief (rooted in a great deal of reality) in the region that people cannot affect their own lives and futures.  Groups like Al Qaeda prey on discontent and despair, and give such people a sense of empowerment, as well as a stake in a powerful movement.  Religion becomes a shield and a tool to achieve power.

Most people in the Middle East have a love-hate relationship with the U.S.  Many know the United States well, through visits, through educational experiences, through relatives or even just through TV.  Most are aware of American culture and cultural icons - for good or ill.  Most truly like Americans - but they also truly dislike U.S. policies.  Many people believe that the U.S. does not listen to or respect regional views, nor does it necessarily take into consideration regional interests.  Some people fear that the United States has lost its way.

In general, American policy toward the Middle East consistently ignores the subtle internal realities of the region.  Our current policies toward and public opinion about Saudi Arabia in particular provides evidence of this.  There is continued emphasis on the Saudi nationality of 15 out of 19 of the terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 events, with an implication that all Saudis are therefore terrorists, supported by their government. 

There has also been extensive linking in U. S. minds between Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi Islam and the radical blend of Islamism, paranoia, power hunger and hatred that filled the terrorists.  Many Americans fail to differentiate between terrorists and ordinary, everyday Saudis; in truth, there is little differentiation between Saudis and other Arabs, either.  While we have no trouble understanding differences among European countries, we tend to see all of the Middle East as a sea of Arabs, indistinguishable and interchangeable.

Anti-Saudi sentiment in the U.S. has fueled anti-U.S. sentiment in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East in general, all this despite the fact that Saudi Arabia  has been one of the U.S.'s staunchest allies and oldest friends in the Middle East - an association that goes back to the May 1933 agreement with the Standard Oil Company of California.  Saudi Arabia became a strategic ally of the United States during World War II, and provided close military cooperation with the United States during the Cold War.  Since that time, the Kingdom has provided basing rights even when the policy was unpopular with many Saudis and, indeed, other Arab countries.  It provided additional oil to the United States when that was needed, as in the days immediately following September 11.  Not insignificantly, it has invested billions of dollars in the U.S. economy and is the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East.   It is not all about oil - it is about shared interests and shared values as well.

At the present time, however, public opinion in Saudi Arabia is more anti-American than at any time in recent history.  According to a July Zogby International poll, 94 percent of Saudis held unfavorable impressions of U. S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 81 percent opposed U.S. policy in Iraq.  Most important, 70 percent had an unfavorable opinion, not just of American policy, but of the American people.

What can the U.S. do to counter anti-Americanism-not just in Saudi Arabia or the Middle East, but around the globe? 

• The U.S. must not only be against terrorism, but for something beneficial to the region, such as developing institutions of civil society and assisting businesses in entering international markets.
• Regional moderates, reformers and scholars should be encouraged; one example: encourage greater recognition of two recent studies, the Arab Development Reports, that have been compiled by respected Arab scholars and that are landmark analyses of the region's problems.  These studies have received little notice in the United States.
• Develop more realistic goals and encourage open discussion on them, both in the region and in the United States.
• Keep Israelis and Palestinians on track - whether that be the "road map" or some other process - and do it with a sense of fairness to both sides.
• Encourage the rebuilding of Arab societies based on respect for human rights and freedoms.

Most important, we need to listen to the voices from the Middle East that are telling us that we are in deep trouble if we continue on the present path.  We are indeed at a crossroads in the Middle East, and we need to think very carefully about consequences before choosing our next steps. 

Notes:

[1]  See Augustus Richard Norton, "Making War, Making Peace: The Middle East Entangles America," in Current History, January 2004, p. 3 ff, for a more complete discussion.

[2]  Tom Friedman, "War of Ideas, Part 4," New York Times, January 18, 2004.

[3]  Sara Roy, "The Palestinian State: Division and Despair," Current History, January 2004, pp. 31

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mary E. Morris is a private consultant on the Middle East to private industry, individuals, and government entities.  Ms. Morris was previously the Associate Director of the Greater Middle East Studies Center at RAND in Santa Monica, as well as a senior researcher and Associate Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program in RAND's Arroyo Center, which performs research for the U.S. Army.  She has been an instructor in international conflict resolution at California State University, Dominguez Hills. For the past two decades, Morris has worked on a number of projects related to events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, ranging from military and political analyses to development of political gaming techniques for resolving crisis situations to enhancing regional potential for cooperation on environmental issues.  She has been a featured speaker at numerous meetings and conferences, and has coordinated several conferences on the Middle East, including a workshop on Palestinian refugees at the Jewish-Arab Center at Haifa University, Israel, for RAND. Ms. Morris is the author of reports, monographs, and journal articles on the Middle East, including: Issues of Engagement and the Course of Future U.S.-Saudi Relations Post-September 11, Saudi Studies Center, 2002;  "Regional Economic Cooperation in the Middle East: Prospects and Problems," in Smoothing the Path To Peace: The Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Triangle, Conference Proceedings, University of Haifa (1998); Water and Security in the Middle East, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, United Arab Emirates (May 1998);  "What Do Women Want? Gender and Politics in the Middle East," in Middle East Policy (September 1997);  "Water and Conflict in the Middle East: Threats and Opportunities," in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Spring 1997; Where Environmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet: Green Conflict in Asia and the Middle East (RAND, 1995), The Persistence of External Interest in the Middle East (RAND, 1994), and  "Poisoned Wells: The Politics of Water in the Middle East," in Middle East Insight (1993).  Ms. Morris received both B.A. and M.A. degrees in History at Mount St. Mary's College in Los Angeles.  She is a member of the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Studies Association, and the Association for Middle East Women's Studies, and is a charter member of the California Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and the Advisory Council for the Von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies at UCLA.  She is a Board member of the International Studies Academy at Manual Arts High School.