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Developments
in Iraq at the End of 2003: Adapting U.S. Policy
to Stay the Course
By Anthony H.
Cordesman
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Developments
in Iraq at the End of 2003: Adapting US Policy to Stay the
Course
By
Anthony H. Cordesman
One
of the key issues shaping U.S. policy in Iraq is what really
defines an acceptable exit. In one sense, the United States
cannot lose in Iraq. Whatever happens over the coming months,
it will achieve several critical prewar goals:
- Saddam
Hussein will be gone, and with him a regime that could
make Iraq into a successful aggressor and major regional
military threat in a region with more than 60% of the
world's proven oil reserves.
- Iraq
will not be a major threat in terms of proliferation for
at least a decade.
- Iraq
will not be serious conventional military threat for
roughly the same time period.
- Iraq
will not be able to play a major military role in any
future Arab-Israeli conflict or in using military force to
destabilize any Arab-Israeli peace process.
What
is also clear, however, is that there is no prospect that Iraq
will emerge as an example of democracy and capitalism that
will transform the region, as an example of U.S. capability to
largely bypass the international community in nation building,
or even as a definitive example of U.S. military capability,
since U.S. problems in asymmetric warfare have already largely
offset the image of invincibility the United States created in
defeating Saddam's
conventional
forces.
At this point in time, the real issue is what the United
States can achieve between the end of 2003 and some point no
later than the end of 2005, when it will have largely or
totally exhausted its ability to directly influence events in
Iraq.
The
Post-Exit Iraq is What Counts
The
prognosis is mixed at best. The United States may be able to
start a great deal in the time it has remaining in Iraq, but
there is little it will be able to finish or even be sure it
can build up enough momentum so that Iraqis will execute U.S.
plans in the future. As a result, it is necessary to consider
what now seems likely to happen after that exit occurs before
one even considers the events leading up to a U.S. exit.
A
Limited Political Beginning at Best
It
now seems almost certain that the United States will have to
leave long before Iraqis can develop a lasting constitution
and basis for a rule of law based on a new criminal code and
the ability to enforce it. Whatever Iraqi government emerges
before the United States leaves, is almost certain to be
inherently unstable. It will not have solved the religious
sectarian and ethnic tensions in Iraq --which are growing as
the conflicts and power struggles between Sunni and Shiite
become more serious. Iraq's population
is Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turkmen, Assyrian, or other
5%. It is 97% Muslim (Shi'a 60-65%, Sunni 32-37%), Christian
or other (3%).
Stable political parties will not have emerged. Leaders will
be inexperienced and largely untested, particularly in
reaching effective compromises and dealing with a post-aid
economy. Whatever resolution is reached in the near term
regarding the role of Islam in Iraq's government
will at best be unstable. There are no rules to history, but
few nations with anything like the problems Iraq now faces
have experience less than a decade of political instability,
and many have gone through strongman phases and coups.
Moreover, it seems very unlikely that current Iraqi leaders,
who lack strong followings and personal charisma, will survive
U.S. departure.
Limited
Economic Reform and Development
It
seems equally likely that the U.S. aid program will have
helped Iraq deal with its short term crises, but that the
United States will never be able to develop and began to
implement any comprehensive plan to convert Iraq into a modern
free market economy, modernize Iraq's industries
and agricultural sector, or shape the future of Iraq's
petroleum
development and industry.
The fact that the United States has not yet been able to issue
key prime contracts for much of its aid effort, has no clear
technical basis for modernizing Iraq's oil
fields, and now seems likely to have to give up efforts to
privatize Iraq's state
industries and switch from national food rationing to a
market-driven agricultural sector, indicate that the United
States may well leave an Iraq unready to manage its economy
and attract foreign investment on competitive terms.
It is unclear how much Secretary Baker will be able to
accomplish in terms of debt and reparations relief for a total
ranging from $100 to $300 billion. Moreover, the Bush
Administration may have created an aid funding and management
nightmare by trying to go from zero to $18.7 billion in a
single year, but promising not to seek additional funds in
FY2005.
This is not an optimistic picture for the near and mid-term,
and it will interact with Iraq's political
problems. To put it in perspective, the U.S. government
estimates that Iraq earned only $12.3 billion in oil export
revenues in 2002, with exports more than twice those it will
have in 2003, and oil revenues accounted for 95% of all
exports. Its GDP in 2002 was $15.6 billion in purchasing power
parity terms. This is around one-third of Iraq's GDP in 1989
(after eight wars of the Iran-Iraq War). And Iraq's
population is now
some 40% higher with current unemployment levels of 50-60%.
An
Insecure Regional Environment
The
most likely post-exit case will also be one in which Iraq does
not have a secure regional environment. The U.S. efforts to
create meaningful Iraqi military forces have been faltering at
best, and seem to have been quietly scaled back after more
than a third of the men in the first battalion left. Iraq may
be able to cobble tighter some kind of force out of the
remnants of its army and air force equipment, but it will be a
token force at most and it will have no navy. Whatever the
United States may want, it also seems increasingly unlikely
that any Iraqi government that achieves full sovereignty will
want, or be able to maintain, a significant U.S. or coalition
presence once it has full control. The United States and
Britain are already seen as occupiers by most of the Iraq
people.
Turkey cannot and will not ignore the threat posed by its own
Kurds and the role Iraqi Kurds will play in the future. Syria
has its own interests as an Arab and Ba'ath power; it may be
relatively covert but it will not be passive. Even if Iran
wants to stand aside, it will be drawn into any Shiite versus
Sunni tensions, as the Sunni Arab states will be drawn in on
the other side. Jordan will have to live with the backlash of
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the lack of future subsidies,
and Saudi Arabia will face problems with smuggling and drugs.
(The numbers of Iraqis now
trying to enter Saudi Arabia for such purposes is about 10-20
times the number of Arabs trying to infiltrate across the
Saudi border into Iraq.)
One minor irony: Iraq is almost certain to reemerge as
anti-Israel at the political level. Post Saddam media have
been at least as hostile to Israel as Saddam era media, an d
Iraq will have to reassert its Arab and Islamic identity. The
results will be less threatening to Israel in terms of cash
flow and Iraqi military capability, but Iraq also will be free
of sanctions and more capable of cooperation with other
states.
An
Exit with Iraqi Hope and U.S. Honor?
The
United States and its allies cannot afford to try to stay in
Iraq much beyond 2005 -- if they can stay that long. They also
cannot hope to bind the future. Even if a transfer of
sovereignty appears to be conditional, with some arrangements
for a continuing U.S. and British presence, it will quickly
prove untenable unless the Iraqi people and Iraqi elites
fundamentally reverse their present hostility to any form of
continuing U.S. and British occupation. The United
States truly does face what senior U.S. commanders in CJTF-7
call descending consent. Every day that passes sees a slight
decline in Iraqi tolerance for a U.S. or British military
presence.
Unfortunately, the only thing likely to reverse this trend is
a new worst case. This would be a case where Shiites (and
Kurds?) feel so threatened by the Sunni former regime
loyalists that they call upon the coalition to stay until it
finishes the job. It is unclear that the Shiites will ever
seek such a U.S. presence even if the Sunni former regime
loyalists continue to strike in Shiite areas, but such a case
is at least possible. Unfortunately, the end result would be a
low intensity war where the United States was seen in both
Iraq and the region as fighting a largely religious sectarian
war in favor of the Shiites, a future the United States has
every reason to avoid.
Given these realities, the most the United States can hope for
is to leave Iraq having created conditions that given Iraq
real hope if new leaders emerge, if
they can work together and work towards the national interest,
and if the Iraqi people are willing to follow.
The minimum that the United States and its allies should
strive for is to create conditions where they gave Iraq these
opportunities, and it is clear that the resulting failure is
Iraq's and not that of the United States and its coalition
allies.
A
Strategy for Defining Failure as Victory
Ironically,
the failure of the Governing Council and of the effort to
create a new constitution on the schedule originally set by
the United States, and the present race to sovereignty may be
the best way to accomplish this. Iraqis are now forced to cope
with the same impossible, accelerated schedule for a transfer
to sovereignty that they want from the United States and the
Coalition:
- By
March 15, 2004: Elect a constitutional convention.
- By
June 30, 2004: Select a transitional national assembly by
local caucus or election, which assumes full powers to
govern on this date.
- By
December 31, 2005: Ratify the constitution and elect a new
Iraqi government; transfer sovereignty back to Iraq on or
about this day.
While
it is increasingly questionable that the United States can
wait as long as December 31, 2005, to transfer sovereignty,
this schedule still means some form of elections -- uncertain
as they may be -- will create new leaders well before the
United States leaves Iraq. It also explains why the CPA and
United States are already abandoning over-ambitious goals in
terms of nation building and beginning to realize that the
Iraqiization of governance, security, and economic/aid
planning must be as rapid as possible.
Granted, the end result will be an inefficient mess. (A
description that could be applied with equal justification to
the most recent session of the U.S. Congress.) It will,
however, be a transition to an Iraqi inefficient
mess, and the longer this can be done while U.S. forces are
actively dealing with the former regime loyalists, the better.
Here, it is important to note that the United States cannot
win a military victory that will create an Iraq that will
approach the ideal post sovereignty state that either
Americans or Iraqis would like. The creation of such a state
will take years beyond such a victory and either be done by
the Iraqis or not at all. The United States may,
however, be able to create the kind of victory that will
defeat enough of the former regime loyalists so that it is
clear to the Sunnis that they must work with the Shiites and
Kurds, and that no combination of the leading tribes and
extended families that dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein has
any hope of regaining their past power.
The
Security Issue
The
United States may have pursed the wrong strategy in dealing
with the new Iraqi Army to achieve this end, although it seems
likely that it was right in largely writing off the old Iraqi
Army immediately after the war. There simply was too little
worth preserving to justify the effort. The United States
seems to have been right, however, in seeking to create the
kind of Iraqi security forces that can both help the United
States deal with the current threat and offer some hope for
security once the United States leaves.
In any case, the practical problem for the future is that the
United States may have the time to create security forces that
can deal with the insurgent threat on its own, but almost
certainly does not have the time to create the heavier Iraqi
forces that Iraq will need once sovereignty is transferred.
The goal, as with all other aspects of the pre-transfer
effort, must be to accomplish the art of the possible within
the next 12 to 24 months, and lay the groundwork for future
cooperation if the new Iraqi government chooses to pursue it.
The United States already seems on track in the security
effort. The Washington Post has reported that there are
some 60,000 Iraqi police, 48,000 security guards, 12,200
border and customs officers, and 8,500 in the Iraqi civil
defense corps, which may come to include at least one 800 man
force of the militias now controlled by Iraqi leaders and
ethnic groups.
Work by Mark Stone of ABC provides somewhat different figures.
He indicates that the Border Police, Custom & Immigration
Service total around 10,000, Border Police: 5000, Border
enforcement officials (immigration etc.): 3000, and Support
staff: 2000. The Facilities Protection Service has some
65,000 men (The various ministries hire FPS people to guard
installations and facilities that come under their respective
jurisdiction.)
The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has 13,000 serving and
2,000 in training. The ICDC has been formed to work in
conjunction with coalition forces, serve as a liaison between
the coalition and the local communities, and provide human
intelligence. It is recruited from local communities, trained
and then sent back to that community to work with the
coalition.
According to Stone, the CPA total manning goals for the fall
of 2004 are 75,000 police, 7,000 Border Guards (already over
the required level), 50,000 Facilities Protection Service
(already over the required level), and 40,000 Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps.
The problem is not the police and security services, but
rather that the new Iraqi Army has only one active battalion
(the 1st), and some 300 of its 700 men have refused to serve.
Some 800 men are in training for the 2nd battalion, and
another 800-1000 have signed up and are scheduled to be in
training in January. These forces, however, will add up to
little more than a light infantry regiment/brigade if they
fully complete training without further resignations.
The United States has talked about increasing the Army to
35,000 men by the fall of 2004, but has never announced any
clear plans for doing so, or for creating the mix of land,
air, and naval forces Iraq must have to replace the forces it
lost in the recent fighting. At the present schedule, Iraq
will not have begun to create a meaningful self-defense
capability by the time the United States must transfer
sovereignty, and nations like Iran, Syria, and Turkey have
massive conventional forces.
The United States cannot accomplish this by pursuing its
current approach, which does much to reinforce the image of
the United States as both an occupying power and one with
lasting ambitions for a military presence in Iraq -- a
presence that many Iraqis already find unacceptable. The
United States needs to create Iraqi forces that can both
defend Iraq and act as a symbol of true Iraqi sovereignty
before it departs. The United States instead needs to find a
compromise between rebuilding elements of the old army and air
force and creating the kind of ideal armed forces it is not
seeking to build from the ground up. It must now seek to
create armed forces that Iraqis want and will support, whose
development Iraqis largely plan and manage, and whose manpower
clearly cuts across religious sectarian lines.
In practice, this means taking the effort out of the control
of the CPA and putting it under Iraqi civil and military
command, with the US and others in an advisory role. The
United States simply cannot afford to allow the good to be the
enemy of the mediocre, or have illusions about an extended
span of control that it will not possess.
At the same time, the United States does need to lay the
groundwork for a longer-term strategy. It needs to leave a
legacy where a new Iraqi government will see a clear incentive
to use the United States and United Kingdom as military
advisors, and where the prospect of major ongoing military
assistance will act as an incentive for Iraqi unity and
continued pluralism and respect for human rights. Rather than
try to force a continued coalition presence on the new Iraqi
government, the United States should create the kind of aid
package that Iraqis will clearly see as in their own interest,
and which can act as a broad stabilizing influence at both the
military and political level.
The
Aid Process
At
least through the end of 2004, and possibly 2005, the aid
process must seen primarily as a short term effort designed to
support Iraqi political consensus building and win popular
support, and not as some master plan for restructuring Iraq.
It may be possible to help key Iraqi ministers develop longer
term plans, but the United States cannot hope to succeed in
imposing its own ideas or in using aid in the long term. Sheer
volume of resources and waste has always been a major U.S.
weapon in war and it must be one in nation building as well.
The primary goal through the transfer of sovereignty must be
to use aid to change Iraqi perceptions of the value of
cooperation, win hearts and minds, ensure that as much money
as possible goes to Iraqis, and ensure that aid is distributed
in ways that minimize ethnic and religious sectarian tensions.
This again, however, does not preclude the kind of
longer-term, post transfer of sovereignty -- aid offers that
will act as an incentive for ongoing economic reform, as well
as an incentive for Iraqi unity and continued pluralism and
respect for human rights. Like military assistance, economic
aid should become conditional on both the Iraqi development of
sound programs for development and reform, and on a reasonable
degree of Iraqi political stability and progress. This does
mean an aid program will be necessary long after FY2004, but
such a program should be much easier to internationalize as
Iraq acquires sovereignty, and the idea of a massive quick
fix, limited to FY2004, is a promise the Bush Administration
should never have made and the Congress should never have
accepted.
The
Political Process
The
United States must decouple itself as much as possible from
trying to pick Iraq's new
leaders and trying to micromanage the form of government that
Iraqis choose. It should put the Iraqis in charge as much as
possible, and focus on trying to shape a political process the
ensures that whatever government is created (a) protects basic
human rights, (b) does as much as possible to minimize the
depth and importance of religious sectarian and ethnic splits,
and (c) sees major post transfer of sovereignty incentives for
maintaining some form of democratic pluralism and avoiding
internal conflict.
The end result is unlikely to be pretty. It will probably be
at least as fractious and chaotic as the United States was
under the articles of confederation and during the early years
of its political system. The United States needs to recognize,
however, that Iraq has the right to make its own mistakes, and
that it has a truly different culture.
The
Cost of Staying the Course
What
the United States and its allies cannot afford to do is to cut
and run. It seems almost certain that no amount of U.S.
effort between the end of 2003 and the transfer of sovereignty
can now compensate for the Bush Administration's
failures to
prepare for effective security, conflict termination, and
nation building. (If such missions could have been
accomplished even with suitable preparation.) This does not
mean, however, that the United States can ignore the
devastating decline in its strategic position if it is seen to
make anything less than a strong, good faith effort, and to
respond to events in Iraq as effectively as possible. At a
minimum, the Iraqis must be seen as having failed to use the
opportunity. In practice, the United States must do everything
possible to given them a serious opportunity to shape their
own destiny.
The
Cost in Terms of aid and Casualties
The
bill, however, will be a high one. In dollar terms, military
operations at likely to cost at least $4-5 billion a month at
least through the end of 2004. The aid bill already is high.
The United States has appropriated a total of $21.6 billion
through the end of 2004, with $18.7 billion in 2004 alone.
Other countries have pledged some $13 to $19 billion. This is
a total of roughly $84 billion for the United States alone in
2004, and no estimates exist for 2005 and beyond.
The fact is, however, that much of the current U.S. aid
program makes little real sense. The idea is to use major one
shot contracts to accomplish far more than its practical at
far too high a short term cost, when the Iraqi people need
confidence, economic security, and recovery during a period of
political change and turmoil. Aid should be political now and
buy support for a transition to sovereignty on the best terms
possible. It then should be conditional, not on Iraq adopting
U.S. plans and economic ideology, but rather on the Iraqis
coming up with practical plans of their own and Iraqi
political stability. This will be cheaper than some $20
billion a year, but it may well mean another $20 billion over
FY2005-FY2007, and an ongoing U.S. effort to internationalize
the aid process and obtain full debt and reparations
forgiveness.
The worst bill, however, will be the "butcher's
bill" of fighting a prolonged low intensity conflict. The
United States suffered a total of 3,173 casualties between
March 19 and December 27, 2003: 325 killed in action, 145
non-hostile killed, 2,333 wounded in action, and 370
non-hostile wounded. The United States ended the fighting
against Saddam's
regime
with a total of 665 casualties: 115 killed in action, and 550
wounded in action. The Iraqi resistance was comparatively slow
to organize and gather momentum, and the United States
suffered 639 casualties in the four months followed the end of
the war on May 1st. It lost 95 killed in action, and 570
wounded in action during May through the end of August. This
total rose to 1,354 casualties between September 1 and
December 27: 145 killed in action, and 1,209 wounded in
action. The number killed in action in counterinsurgency
phase was 210, nearly twice the 115 battlefield fatalities
during major combat operations. The number wounded in action
in counterinsurgency operations, 1,783, was more than three
times the 550 wounded in action during major combat
operations.
A total of 88 allied forces have been killed and 100 were
wounded from March 19 to December 27, and some 150 UN,
international aid personnel, and foreign contractors have been
killed. The vast majority have been casualties from in
counterinsurgency operations. Estimates of the number of
Iraqis killed from March 19 to December 27 go as high as 7,950
to 9,800. The insurgents have increasingly targeted Iraqis
supporting the coalition and Iraqi nation building efforts,
and at least several hundred Iraqis have died as a result of
former regime loyalist and insurgent attacks.
A few experts feel that the United States can reduce the
impact of attacks to minimal levels by the spring of 2004.
They feel that U.S. intelligence is making major improvements,
and that the insurgents are led by former regime loyalists
from the upper and middle ranks of five extended families from
a few villages near Tikrit, and centered around Auja (Saddam's
birthplace), Dawr, and Abu Ajeel. If these networks can be
destroyed, they feel the resistance may largely collapse.
Most experts, however, are far less optimistic. They feel the
direction of the insurgent effort is far more diffuse, and
that dismantling the structure most loyal to Saddam will
simply lead other insurgents to act who are Ba'ath loyalists,
Arab and Iraqi nationalists, Islamic extremists, Sunnis who
fear a Shiite takeover, and foreign volunteers.
It seems likely that the United States and its allies will
continue to take similar levels of casualties long in to 2004
and may well continue taking casualties until the day they
depart Iraq. No one can do more than make the roughest guesses
about the future, but 2004 may well cost another 360 U.S. dead
and 2,640 wounded. The costs to its allies are likely to be
proportionate, and the costs to Iraqis will probably be much
higher -- reaching several thousand more Iraqi civilians,
officials and security forces. It also seems likely that the
insurgents will seek to steadily broaden the scope of the war
beyond the so-called Sunni triangle (The area including Bayji,
Tikrit, Balad, Baqubah, Baghdad, Fallujah and Ramadi). So far,
U.S. casualties reflect the fact that the insurgency has been
largely contained to part of Iraq:
|
Region
|
Coalition
Forces
|
US
and Allied Killed by Location (May 1-December 27,
2003)
|
| North |
101st
Airborne |
41
US: 2 in Tall Afar, 4 in Kirkuk, and 35 in Mosul.
(Note that Mosul and Kirkuk are mixed Sunni and
Kurdish areas and Tall Afar is largely Sunni) |
| Northeast |
4th
Infantry Division |
3
US : 1 in Jalawia and 2 in Sadiyah (Largely Sunni) |
| Sunni
Triangle |
4th
Infantry Division |
87
US: 1 in Bayji, 14 in Tikrit, 1 Dawr, 10 in Samarra,
11 in Balad, 14 in Baqubah, 25 in Fallujah, 9 in
Ramadi, 1 in Hamariyah, and 1 in Khaldiya. |
| Greater
Baghdad |
1st
Armored Division |
65
US and 10 allied: 58 US and 3 allied in Baghdad
proper, 2 US in Taji, 7 allied in Mahmudiya, 2
US in Iskandariya, and 3 US in Hazah. (Most attacks
took place in Sunni and mixed neighborhoods.) |
| West |
82nd
Airborne |
5
US: 3 in Husaybah near Syrian border, 1 in Haitha on
road from Baghdad to Syria, and 1 in Asad. (Largely
Sunni areas) |
| Center-South |
Multi-National
Division |
9
US and 6 allied: 5 US and 6 allied in Karbala, 1 US in
Hilla, 1 US in Najaf, and 2 US in Diwaniya. (Largely
Shiite areas) |
| South |
British
Division |
33
Allied: 5 in Basra, 6 in Majar al Kahir, 17 in Nasiyah,
and 5 in unreported location. |
The
Domestic Political Challenge
The
United States will have to go through an election year, having
to retrench on a commitment not to seek more aid funds in
FY2005 and facing a constant stream of casualties. It will
almost certainly do so having failed to find enough weapons of
mass destruction to justify the prewar assessments of the
threat, and discovering by the day that the reality of Iraqi
nation building will fall far short of the goals of those
neoconservatives (and some liberals) who saw the fall of
Saddam Hussein as a transformational
event
for the entire Middle East.
No matter how well coalition and Iraq security forces do in
fighting the insurgents, there are certain to be some terrible
moments. U.S. political sensitivities are well known to both
former regime loyalists and Islamic extremist terrorists. So
are the dates for key primaries, Congressional hearings, and
speeches. The example of Israel is also one that needs careful
consideration. Attackers do not need to maintain a constant
level of attacks; they only need to hit hard at critical
points in time and the political sensitivity of the target
will always be as important as the casualties produced. Only
sheer luck can prevent at least one incident on the scale of Blackhawk
Down
or
the Marine Crops Barracks.
An election year is a poor time to call for bipartisan
restraint, and it is already clear that little may be shown.
At the same time, both parties need to understand that the
more the United States appears to be divided, or vulnerable to
pressures for early withdrawal, the more both today's
insurgents and new insurgents will be inspired to go on
attacking and seek to drive the United States and coalition
out of Iraq.
Similarly, there will almost certainly be brutally critical
post mortems on what the Bush Administration did wrong in
underestimating the challenges involved in Iraq, and in
failing to prepare for conflict termination, security, and
nation building. However, if this leads to the kind of
politics that paralyze practical action, end in demands to
meet impossible goals, or imply the United States will cease
to aid Iraq, however, the end result will almost certainly be
to persuade Iraqis that there is no future in supporting any
aspect of U.S. plans or to trigger civil war before or after
the transfer of sovereignty.
There are real world limits on what the United States can do
to stay the course that could become all too apparent during
the course of 2004. The United States will have to accept the
strategic cost of leaving Iraq if loses the support or
tolerance of the Iraqi people as a whole at any time before
the end of 2005, or if it should lose the tolerance of the Shiite
majority. The United States cannot force unity and peace on
Iraq in the face of massive resistance or de facto civil war.
Nothing could be more futile than an effort to save a nation
from its own citizens.
Under every other circumstance, however, the United States
must continue to pay the political, aid, and butchers bill
necessary to demonstrate the depth of the U.S. commitment and
transfer sovereignty to Iraq under conditions that offer real
hope for the future. The Congress and rival Presidential
candidates must understand this. Staying the course will not
be pretty at any point in the foreseeable future, but any U.S.
withdrawal without having done everything possible, or for
domestic political reasons, will be an open demonstration of
American vulnerability and weakness that will be as difficult
to overcome as Vietnam, and the resulting impact on the Middle
East is almost certain to be future conflicts and crises that
could otherwise be avoided.
Dr.
Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke
Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies and is Co-Director
of the Center's Middle East Program. He is
also a military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at
Georgetown. He directs the assessment of
global military balance, strategic energy
developments, and CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment
of the Middle East. He is the author of books
on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war
as well as the Arab-Israeli military balance
and the peace process, a six-volume net
assessment of the Gulf, transnational threats,
and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He
analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans,
counter-proliferation issues, arms transfers,
Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy
issues.
Dr. Cordesman
served as a national security analyst for ABC
News for the 1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia,
Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He
was the Assistant for National Security to
Senator John McCain and a Wilson Fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the
Smithsonian. He has served in senior positions
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy,
and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency. His posts include acting as the
Civilian Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming,
and Analysis in the Department of Energy,
Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the
Secretary of Defense's representative on the
Middle East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman
has also served in numerous overseas posts. He
was a member of the U.S. Delegation to NATO
and a Director on the NATO International
Staff, working on Middle Eastern security
issues. He served in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon,
Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been
an advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S.
Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively
in the Gulf and North Africa.
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