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Four Wars and
Counting: Rethinking the Strategic Meaning of the Iraq War
By Anthony H.
Cordesman
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Author's Note:
The
accompanying
report in PDF Format suggests
that the United States needs to rethink its approach to the Iraq War
as one part of a series of enduring conflicts in the Middle East that
are coupled to major strategic risks in Korea and the Taiwan Straits.
Four Wars and Counting: Rethinking
the Strategic Meaning of the Iraq War
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Almost
without sensing it, America has drifted into involvement in four
separate and simultaneous conflicts. The most obvious war is Iraq.
Former regime loyalists and violent Islamic extremists are fighting a
low intensity conflict. American and other coalition soldiers die
there every day, a U.S.-led occupation force governs it, and it has
the highest media and political profile. No matter how this conflict
develops, there is little prospect of a stable Iraq over the next 5-10
years, or that Iraq will serve as an example that will transform the
Middle East.
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"Nation
building is having its own crisis in Afghanistan, but at less
cost and no longer under high profile American
direction."
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In
the process, the second conflict - Afghanistan - has become the
"not quite forgotten" war. Americans and America's
allies die there too, but not as regularly. Nation building is having
its own crisis in Afghanistan, but at less cost and no longer under
high profile American direction. "Victory," however, has
proved as relative as in Iraq. The Taliban has mutated and is fighting
again, Al Qaeda has lost many of its leaders but has mutated and
relocated some of its operations in Pakistan, the internal tensions in
Afghanistan threaten to make its central government the government of
"Kabulstan," and the spillover of Islamic extremism into
Central and South Asia continues.
The
third war, the broader global "war on terrorism," continues,
but in an increasingly confused form. The Bush Administration has
sometimes sought to make Iraq its focus, knowing that Americans (and
presumably the world) will react better to the "war after the
war" in Iraq if it is blamed on terrorism and Al Qaeda, than
perceived as a product of the Bush Administration's failure to prepare
for conflict termination and nation building.
Top
officials like President Bush and Vice President Cheney still talk in
these terms although the U.S. military in Iraq talks about a threat
that is "95% former regime loyalists," and Secretary
Rumsfeld has made it clear that Saddam's regime prepared to fight the
conflict we now face before the U.S. invasion began. This, however, is
only part of the problem. Rather than making war on specific terrorist
movements hostile to the United States and its allies, many in the
U.S. Congress and media have used rhetoric that has made the
"war" seem like a war on Islam and the Arab world. Others
continue to try to make Saudi Arabia its focus in spite of the fact
that the Saudis are fighting their own battle against Al Qaeda.
| The
war on terrorism involves hostile Islamic extremist
movements and cells all over the world, and its focus is
global and not simply Iraq or Saudi Arabia. It is a war
being fought primarily within Islamic states between secular
leaders and religious extremists - Shi'ite, Salafi, Sufi,
and neo-Wahhabi. However, it is a "clash within a
civilization" that continues to spill over into other
regions and which often uses the United States as a proxy
target for local regimes. |
Others
continue to try to make Saudi Arabia its focus in spite of
the fact that the Saudis are fighting their own battle
against Al Qaeda.
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The
war on terrorism involves hostile Islamic extremist movements and
cells all over the world, and its focus is global and not simply Iraq
or Saudi Arabia. It is a war being fought primarily within Islamic
states between secular leaders and religious extremists - Shi'ite,
Salafi, Sufi, and neo-Wahhabi. However, it is a "clash
within a civilization" that continues to spill over into other
regions and which often uses the United States as a proxy target for
local regimes.
| The
fourth war does not involve direct American use of troops,
but rather the Arab and Islamic perception that the United
States is a cobelligerent with Israel. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves the United States
strategically in almost as much depth as if it were a
belligerent. The United States is Israel's ally, and its
main source of aid and military equipment. It is seen
throughout most of the Arab and Islamic world as partially
responsible for Israel's actions. A struggle that the
United States and Israel perceive as a struggle against
terrorism and extremism is perceived by Arabs and Iran as a
struggle against Palestinians using the only means they have
to struggle for liberation and independence, and far too
often, Arab media are anything but objective. Worse, the
U.S. "occupation" in Iraq is increasingly seen in
the Arab world as the mirror image of the Israeli occupation
in Gaza and the West Bank. There is a flood of conspiracy
theories charging that the United States is copying Israeli
tactics or that its actions in Iraq are somehow dictated by
Israel. |
..the
U.S. "occupation"
in Iraq is increasingly
seen in the Arab world
as the mirror image of
the Israeli occupation
in Gaza and the
West Bank..
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Other
potential struggles are waiting in the wings, although it is far from
clear that war will actually occur. These flashpoints include Iran and
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, North Korea's efforts to
proliferate and constant stream of threats, and the much lower level
of tension across the Taiwan Straits. At a less intense level, the
United States is also involved in Colombia in a war on drugs that
inevitably means involvement in Colombia's civil war and faces an
uncertain situation.
| Media
coverage of these wars should see them as interconnected, and
as part of an enduring struggle, not in terms of a short term
conflict in Iraq. It should understand that the forces at work
will take at least half a decade to work out in Iraq, even if
the United States should defeat the present former regime
loyalist and Islamic extremist threat. It should also
understand that the strains on U.S. military forces will
continue, and cannot be met with anything approaching the high
technology emphasis of the "revolution" in military
affairs. |
"It
[the media] should understand that the forces at work
will take at least half a decade to work out in Iraq..."
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This
report highlights the issues involved, as well as serious problems in
the U.S. strategy and organization for modern war. It outlines both
the key policy issues that must be dealt with and the new strategic
options that must be investigated.
Click
here for the full report in PDF format.
Dr.
Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in
Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East
Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown.
He directs the assessment of global military balance,
strategic energy developments, and CSIS' Dynamic Net
Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of
books on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as
well as the Arab-Israeli military balance and the
peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments
in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S. strategy and force
plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms transfers,
Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues.
Dr. Cordesman served
as a national security analyst for ABC News for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert
Fox, and Kosovo. He was the Assistant for National
Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson Fellow at
the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the
Smithsonian. He has served in senior positions in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of
State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency. His posts include
acting as the Civilian Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and
Analysis in the Department of Energy, Director of
Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman has also
served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of
the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO
International Staff, working on Middle Eastern
security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon,
Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an
advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in
Europe, and has traveled extensively in the Gulf and
North Africa.
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