November 18, 2003

Author's Note:

The accompanying report in PDF Format both describes the situation in Iraq and makes specific recommendations about how the United States should deal with the issues involved. It is both the result of my recent trip to Iraq and the Gulf, and of years of dealing with the country and the region.

I am reluctant to try to summarize this report in a short executive summary. Iraqi is an extremely complex mix of problems in military operations, aid, political nation building and information warfare. Some of the key points, however, include the following recommendations:

Military Actions

Grand strategy is the key to victory, and victory or defeat is tied as much to politics as to warfighting. This means the Bush Administration faces some hard choices. It seems very unlikely that the current level of fighting will be over before February at the earliest, and may well continue until June or longer. Some casualties and major incidents seem likely to occur through the November 2004 election and may well go on as long as the US is in Iraq.

Any effort to “spin” these unpleasant realities out of existence is going to broaden the credibility problem the Administration has developed by underplaying the risks before, during, and immediately after the war. The sooner the Administration prepares the American people and its allies for a long period of low intensity conflict and continuing casualties, the better.

Moreover, while it may not affect defeat or victory in Iraq, the United States must consider better ways to ensure the proper rotation of U.S. military personnel, and more acceptable duty cycles for regular and reserve personnel. U.S. military forces are scarcely broken, but no one can visit Iraq without become aware that they are damaged and reenlistments are going to drop sharply unless the men and women in uniform can be assured that there is a near term answer to creating limited tours of duty in combat areas and providing a career cycle that gives personnel time for their families and ordinary lives. The United States needs larger or different forces to do this and it at most has 1-2 years to begin rushing through the necessary changes.

In the interim, one solution may be to offer a clear pay incentive to those who face extended tours in hardship areas, similar to combat pay plus better insurance and other incentives like tax relief. A strong incentive program for long tours for critical combat, intelligence, and other specialties may be vital to avoiding a key problem as in Vietnam: The constant departure of critical personnel at the time they have become most valuable to both the military and civil-military efforts.

Efficiency of the CPA and U.S. Political Efforts in Nation Building

The United States and CPA should strongly consider:

• A major review of the quality of the administrative effort by CPA.

• The impact on basic human relations of the way CPA Baghdad deals with the U.S. military, its own field staff, and Iraqis.

• Reinforcing CPA field efforts and reducing staffs in Baghdad.

• Creating aid evaluation cells, with suitable field staff, similar to those developed by Task Force Ironhorse, to better focus, monitor, and evaluate both the effectiveness of aid programs and how Iraqis actually perceive them in the field.

• Getting out of the central palace complex in Baghdad to reduce CPA’s profile, interference in the daily life of Iraqis, and indirect association with the former regime; and collocating with CJTF-7. This would also be a way of dispersing more personnel to the field.

• Ending short rotations in the CPA, and selecting personnel on the basis of a willingness to take on “year-long plus” to ensure continuity, development of proper expertise, and better relations with Iraqis. One way of accomplishing this would be strong pay and other incentives for long tours and major bonuses to stay the course. This could include the same kind of early retirement benefits offered to some intelligence officers in hardship posts.

At the same time, the major interagency coordination problems between State and Defense, and striking ineffectiveness of the National Security Council in forcing effective interagency coordination, remain a major problem. Four years into office, the Bush national security team is not a team, and there are far too many reports of ideological efforts to shape the nation building effort and personnel deployed to Iraq. Both the CPA and troops in the field now suffer from the past results of these failures. They should have been decisively and finally corrected long ago.

Finally, what is now happening in Iraq must be clearly understood to be a warning of things to come. Just as the U.S. military must restructure away from a focus on defeating conventional forces and technical intelligence to a matching focus on low intensity combat and HUMINT, and see the civil-military and security missions as having the same priority as the combat mission, the civil side of the U.S. government must understand that it must prepare for armed nation building in the future.

State and other civil agencies need to be prepared for political and aid activity in a low intensity combat environment and for the fact the UN, most international agencies, and most NGOs will not operate effectively or at all as long as low intensity combat presents a threat. There must be a clear plan for future “Phase Four” operations on an interagency basis and to recruit USAID and other personnel who know they may have to operate in such environments and have the equipment, training, and pay/career incentives to do so.

The current force transformation strategy of the Department of Defense is fatally flawed and inadequate in several critical respects. It does not make adequate military preparation for low intensity combat and provide for adequate HUMINT resources, and it only provides for winning half the war: Winning the combat but not the peace. The Department of Defense does, however, at least have a strategy. The civil side of the government does not.

Jointness must be an interagency effort and the current exclusive focus on military jointness fails to meet our defense and foreign policy needs. At present, the NSC, State Department, and other civil departments – including some elements of the civilian intelligence agencies – may often have some excellent people in the field but their Washington headquarters approach to asymmetric warfare and the need for armed nation building is all talk and no walk.

Transition from the Governing Council to a Constitutional Convention and Election

The United States should take the following measures:

• Either announce early elections that can create an elected body to replace the Governing Council and take on the role of a provisional government, or most of this role – provided that Iraqis can agree on mechanisms that will allow this without triggering major new confessional and intra-Shiite tensions.

• Announce a projected schedule for local elections of delegates to constitutional conventions and push forward with or without the support of the Governing Council.

• Use the constitutional convention not only to create a constitution but also to provide a public and transparent drafting process so the  Iraqi and Arab media can see the actions of the officials involved, be sure the process is legitimate, and judge what new new political leaders should emerge.

• Make it clear to the members of the Governing Council that the United States has absolutely no future obligation to any members or self-appointed leaders who remain part of the problem rather than becoming part of the solution.

• Plan for less than perfect elections to both the constitutional convention and the creation of a national government. Avoid the trap of trying to meet idealized “international standards.”

• Reinforce these national efforts with local and provincial elections and by giving successful ministers and lower levels officials the same or a higher public profile in Iraq than the members of the Governing Council. Do the same with successful jurists, tribal councils, and human rights activists.

• Make all these efforts a key focus of the information campaign, and ensure that peaceful dissent from U.S. views is given equal time, including the views of Shi’ite and Sunni religious figures and Sunnis who may have ties to the former regime.

• Communicate a clear plan for projected phase out of the US/British occupation to the Iraqi people in terms of clear milestones with strong incentives to the Iraqis to meet them to speed the US and allied withdrawal. Seek a full transfer of sovereignty and full withdrawal by end 2004 and no later than mid-2005 --  barring the reality of risk of civil war.

The Level of Confessional and Ethnic Conflict and/or Cooperation

• The United States and its other allies in the coalition should make it clear to the Iraqis that its efforts are to create a republic that protects all Iraqis and shares power rather than shifts it. It should announce options for such a republic and not wait on the constitutional convention. The United States should not try to impose such solutions. It should propose and endorse them.

• The coalition should make it clear to all Iraqis that its aid efforts already provide a fair share for each region, and for Kurd, Sunni, Shi’ites, and others. It should not talk about aid in confessional or ethnic terms, but funding and progress should be described in enough regional detail, and in regular media and meetings, to show the Iraqis that all will benefit.

• The coalition should reinforce the current efforts to create local and provincial governments, and engagement programs, that show Iraqis that they will control their own destiny at the local and regional level, and not be subject to the domination of a central government under any group. Strengthening local and regional government while building central government is a key check and balance.

• The creation of a strong legal system and protection of human rights also provides protection of the Sunnis, Kurds, and other minorities. There is far too much talk about democracy in the narrow sense of elections, and far too little talk about the role of the separation of power and rule of law. This reflects a critical problem in the Administration’s entire approach to “democracy” in the Middle East. It is largely advocating undefined slogans, not practical and balanced specifics. In Iraq, and elsewhere, the end result is often seen as showing contempt for Arab societies, or as a prelude to new US efforts at regime change.

• The coalition should consider creating a long-term international aid, debt relief, and reparations program clearly tied to a post-sovereignty Iraqi government that fairly distributes power and wealth. The Coalition will lose any power to compel, but not the power to create incentives.

The Quality and Impact of the U.S. and International Aid Effort

There are, however, several additional recommendations that would help in dealing with the uncertainties in the aid program:

• Do not assume anyone can make Iraq a model of free enterprise in less than 5-10 years. Do not operate on theory. Evaluate every program in terms of its practical impact in terms of immediate and near term Iraqi perceptions and as a seed that may or may not succeed once the Iraqis have sovereignty.

• Break programs into smaller, and easier to plan and manage, components. Reduce reliance on U.S. primes as soon as possible. Change U.S. contracting procedures to sharply reduce paperwork, time, and the incentive to go to large contracts simply to bureaucratize the aid process efficiently.

• Bring in as many people with actual area expertise as possible, and “internationalize” as much of the effort in terms of non-U.S. expertise as soon as possible.  Integrate Iraqis fully into the planning, project selection, and contract award process. Shift from U.S. to Iraqi contracting and project standards as soon as possible.

• Open up every aspect of the aid effort to Iraqis with full, near real time transparency, and create Iraqi teams to publicly evaluate contract performance.

• Publicly "crucify" the first major U.S. contractor foolish enough to non-perform as an international example to the others.

• Understand that oil revenues are the key to power in Iraq and the success of the future Iraqi government. U.S. success stand or falls on the quality and export revenues of the Iraqi petroleum industry and on Iraqi confidence that all decisions on the future of the industry will be made by Iraqis, and the United States and Britain will not seek to gain any financial advantages.  Do not securitize modernization and renovation. If done at all, this should come after the transfer of sovereignty and purely by Iraqis.

• Allow for the fact no one can really survey the needs and costs of the petroleum sector at this point, predict the impact of sabotage and combat conditions. or predict near term revenues. Be adaptive, be prepared for things to go wrong, and do not count on near term oil reserves.

• Do make it clear that the United States will seek to create an Iraqi constitution that ensures revenues will be shared with some equity.

• Look beyond the aid often to Iraq’s overall financial position. Do not forget the whole aid issue will be moot if Iraq is left with a Weimar Republic-like heritage of debt and reparations payments. This is a burden of over $100 billion. A push for international forgiveness is almost certainly far more important than trying to find more small aid donors.

The Information Battle for Hearts and Minds

The most reliable polls taken to date – run with the support of the Independent Republican Institute -- indicate that a narrow majority of Iraqis still supports or tolerates the coalition, although two-thirds feel occupied rather than liberated. The poll also showed, however, that number of Iraqis who feel coalition forces are liberators or peacekeepers declined from 47.2% when they first arrive to 19% in October, and 46% felt less safe than a month earlier versus 23% that felt more safe.  Only 3% felt the coalition patrols were the best guarantee of safety, although only 9.8% strongly opposed the coalition presence. These polls precede the sharp intensification of the fighting that has followed, the problems in moving forward in creating a constitution, and the uncertainties created over the future role of the Governing Council and elections.

An independent panel of area – not media – experts – with full language skills in Arabic is needed to work with the CPA and CJTF-7 to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. message and what needs to be done to improve it. Honest use of public opinion polls is needed; not propaganda like manipulation of efforts like the Zogby poll. The issue is not American popular music, it is trust in nation building, the security efforts, and the honesty and diversity of the information the United States provides.

Transition to Iraqi Rule and the Effectiveness of the Iraqi Regime that Follows

Transition to Iraqi Rule and the Effectiveness of the Iraqi Regime that Follows

A U.S. strategy for a "post-sovereignty" Iraq should take the following form:

• A clear commitment to major and long-term aid in grant form if Iraq maintains a democratic form of government and protects human rights, and moves forward towards economic reform. The United States cannot hope to succeed in influencing a post-sovereignty by a cut and run approach to aid simply because this saves money in the short run. The United States, Iraq, and the region will pay far more for such a policy in the long run.

• The United States should offer Iraq security guarantees and military assistance, but U.S. combat forces should quickly leave. Independence should be full independence, barring a major internal military problem or outside threat. This means accepting risk. However, the United States can never win Iraqi or regional trust if it tries to stay, in military terms, one day longer than the Iraqis truly demand.

• The United States should accept the fact that the post-sovereignty Iraq will sometimes be hostile to the United States (and Israel), rather than grateful. These are realities that are likely to emerge with true independence. This should not, by itself, be a reason to halt aid or every effort to gain international support for Iraq in areas like aid, trade policy, debt foreignness, and reparations forgiveness. The United States, of all countries, should know that young regimes are not always easy to live with.

• Iraq cannot be separated from the other issues that divide the United States and the West from Iraq and the rest of the Arab world. Friendship and trust will be dependent on the belief the United States is fully committed to an ongoing peace effort at the highest levels. It will be dependent on the belief the United States seeks partnership in the war on terrorism and does not demonize Arabs or Islam. It will be dependent on proving the U.S. search for “democracy” means supporting well-planned reforms on a nation-by-nation basis, and showing the United States will help the peoples and leaders of each nation find their own best path to reform on a evolutionary terms and not make "democracy” a tool for U.S. efforts at regime change and serving U.S. regional ambitions.

• The United States should seek a well-defined Arab, UN, and international role in Iraq once the United States transfers sovereignty, and do everything it can to encourage the development of UN and NGO activities the moment sufficient security is available. There is no practical option for transferring power to the UN and international community. There are many options for expanding their role in transferring power to the Iraqis.

Sovereignty and freedom are not catchphrases; they must be real and the United States must be prepared to live with the consequences. There is as much reason for optimism as pessimism, however, and the consequences may well be good ones.

Click here for the full report in PDF format.

Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He directs the assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments, and CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of books on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli military balance and the peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues. Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for ABC News for the 1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's representative on the Middle East Working Group. Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff, working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively in the Gulf and North Africa.