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IRAQ'S
WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
by Anthony H. Cordesman
No one can read Saddam
Hussein's mind or be sure of
Iraqi tactics and strategy. If
war does come, however, Iraq
does have options in spite of
the military advantages of the
US and Britain. These options
almost certainly cannot save
Saddam, but Iraq will probably
use a mix of the following
tactics and strategies.
The Battle of Baghdad
The battle of Baghdad will be
the key element of Iraqi tactics
and strategy. It is clear that
Iraq already has a two-layer
defense of the greater Baghdad
area and probably a defense in
depth consisting of a much wider
ring of forces that will retreat
inwards towards Baghdad -- if
they can.
The regular army will
probably be used to try to hold
positions in the outermost ring
-- taking casualties with the
force least likely to remain
loyal. It will be supported by
popular forces in some areas
that are expendable.
The Republican Guards will
probably try to hold key strong
points and lines of
communication in the broad area
from Ar Ramadi, Bayji, north of
Kut, and north of Karbala. In
some areas, bridges and viaducts
will be blown, there will be
oil-filled trenches, use of
earthen barriers and a mix of
short and long-range
surface-to-air missiles and AA
guns to deal with US assault
helicopters as well as the fixed
wing air threat.
Work by Colonel John Olsen, a
Norwegian Air Force analyst,
indicates that, the defense of
the northern approaches through
Bayji may be a line near
Saddam’s palace in the Jabal
Makhul Mountains just north of
the city, and the oil refineries
that surround it.
A defense of the Western
approaches could begin at
Fallujah, but is more likely to
begin at Ar Ramadi. This is an
area with a key palace complex
and which potentially could try
to hold the area between the
main lakes west of Baghdad. It
would also defend the key air
bases around Fallujah.
Unless Turkey does allow the
US to base the 4th Infantry
Division in time to support a
major line of attack from the
north, the main line of US and
British armored advance will
come from the south and
southwest, and the Southern
Corps of the Republican Guard
will probably either fall back
from defensive strong points in
cities and towns the area of
Hilla-Suweira-Kut or have the
regular army forces move to
these lines and then use the
Republican Guards either as a
reserve or to defend positions
further to the rear where they
have a higher probability of
retreating intact into the
outskirts of Baghdad.
There will be a natural
winnowing out process during
such a defense. Only the loyal
regular forces and Republican
Guards will actively retreat in
the face of US air power and
attacks. Contrary to some
reports, Iraqi forces have also
been given some freedom of
action operate independently if
communications and central
command breakdown. There also
are four independent regional
commands, plus new options for
command by governate, city, and
town if Baghdad can’t exercise
detailed control.
The last major defensive
positions are being placed
around Baghdad, although they
may include Tikrit. Tikrit is
the center of Saddam's tribe and
broader tribal support. A
defensive “ring” reaching
out to Tikrit would have to go
too far to be cohesive, however,
and Tikrit is not a good place
to try to defend in depth. It is
more a place for martyrdom than
for last ditch survival.
Much will depend on how
realistic Iraq is about US and
British ability to bypass any
broad defensive line, and the
Iraqi need to provide dispersed
defense in depth, rather than
hold a perimeter defense. Iraq
will be easiest to defeat if it
tries to hold Baghdad with a
broad circle. The US can use
helicopter mobile forces, armor,
and air strikes to crush key
points in such defenses and it
can move more rapidly than the
Iraqis.
Iraq may, however, use a
different approach. It may man
the forward parts of the inner
defenses of Baghdad with a mix
of its popular army and regular
army – stiffened by the
Republican Guards, and Special
Republican Guards units to delay
US and British forces at the
edge of the city. At the same
time, it would keep its core of
Republican Guards, maneuver
units, and urban warfare units
sheltered in the city and then
use them to defense against the
key lines of US and British
advance once these lines of
attack are clearly defined.
Opinions differ as to how the
defense will take place once US
and British forces are inside
the city,. There is a massive
Presidential Palace complex in
the center and a similar al-Radwaniyah
complex in the western suburbs.
These are both defended by the
Special Republican Guard
battalions and the rest of the
security organizations. Some
analysts believe these will be
to last key defensive areas.
However, there are many other
small compounds and headquarters
inside the city -- some 50 to
70. Defending the most
predictable areas, which are all
in large, open compounds with no
cultural or historical
significance, and that can be
hit by artillery and from the
air, may not be the best
approach. If Saddam chooses to
retreat into more densely
populated areas, he will make it
much harder for the US to use
armor, air, and helicopter
mobility, and he can make much
more use of the forces like the
Popular Army and the young thugs
in Saddam's Fedayeen.
It will be very difficult for
Iraq to take advantage of urban
warfare, like fighting
house-to-house battles, if it
remains in the large open
compounds where most Iraqi
security forces and facilities
are located in peacetime.
Many sources report that the
Special Republican Guard,
Saddam's Fedayeen, and security
forces like the SSO and Amn al-Khass
are training heavily for urban
warfare. The Republican Guard
has some training in urban
fighting, but it is limited and
often more misleading than
helpful, since it is based on
experience drawn from dealing
with Kurdish and Shi'ite
resistance, the battles in the
Iran-Iraq War, and the Second
Intifada. The Iraqis will know
the ground, but be poorly
trained to deal with the speed
of reaction and technology of US
forces.
Military Loyalty
The Republican Guards and
security forces may well remain
loyal until the last, although
some localized defections or
surrenders seem almost
inevitable. Their loyalty may
still be a major issue, however,
particularly if Popular Army
forces collapse and run, or if
the US and Britain can cut off
key loyalist units in compounds,
isolate them, and go for the
core of Saddam's regime.
Popular Forces, Defenders,
and Stiffeners
Iraq claims to have up to one
million armed personnel in its
popular forces and it has at
least 12,000 and 25,000 core
loyalists in the intelligence
branches, security services,
Baath Party, government, and
Special Republican Guards. Many
have little future if the regime
falls and various cultural and
tribal reasons to be loyalty.
While the combat value of many
is very limited, they may be
able to disperse into the
Popular Forces and other
mobilized units and act as
"commissars" who
enforce loyalty.
This may explain why some
sources report that the Popular
Army and Saddam's Fedayeen are
being stiffened by men from
these forces and that some plan
to operate in civilian dress to
ensure the loyalty of such units
or carry out attacks where the
US and Britain cannot tell
military from civilian.
Dispersal, Deception, and
Decoys
Iraq lacks high-tech
solutions to coping with the US
and British mix of command and
control assets, intelligence and
sensor systems, speed of
maneuver, and precision strike
capability. It does, however,
have low-tech countermeasures --
many that worked for Serbia in
the Kosovo fighting. Dispersal
and the equivalent of a shell
game in which key Iraqi forces
constantly move from one area to
another is the key. The US and
Britain will find it hardest to
hit what is well dispersed and
concealed or what is moving.
Decoys can include buildings.
They can be false or interim
communications and command
centers that appear to be the
dispersed site. They can be
spoofing by appearing to
over-rely on a concentrated
peacetime facility.
Dispersal Means More than
Baghdad
Iraq will concentrate key
forces around the defense of the
greater Baghdad, Tikrit, Ar
Ramadi areas. It may well
abandon the defense of the
southern and western desert
areas, and shift main force
units away from Mosul and Kirkuk.
Saddam has nothing to gain,
however, from making life easy
for us, and making us fighting
at least some kind of battles
for major cities, bases, and
roads forces us to disperse
assets and takes time.
Saddam also has far more
forces than he has loyalists and
killing them off in forward
battles is not a loss. He also
cannot use all of his
intelligence and security forces
cadres, which can be used to put
up at least a minimal popular or
area defense in areas like
Basra, etc. It may not be major
urban warfare, but even if we
have to bypass a good road
junction or city, it is still
useful. If he can lock the US
and Britain into any serious
fighting outside his main power
centers, this will be a major
tactical victory.
Population Centers,
Sensitive Sites, and Human
Shields
Iraq can try to counter the
US and British advantage in
conventional forces by
colocating or dispersing his
forces and equipment into
densely populated areas, placing
equipment in shrines and
museums, and deliberately
covering military activity with
civilians.
Stay Behind Spotters and
Attackers
Iraq will lack air cover,
have little reconnaissance, and
generally lack the technology to
provide intelligence. It even
generally lacks modern artillery
radars and fire control systems.
A man with a cell phone,
however, can provide extensive
intelligence coverage in the
areas the US and British occupy,
and covert or terrorist
operations can be extremely
disruptive and require the US
and Britain to devote far more
men to securing reader areas
than we want. Infiltrating into
Kuwait should also be easier for
forward deployed agents once the
waves of US troops are moving
forward and refugees complicate
the problem.
Air Strikes and Helicopter
Use
Saddam can use his fixed wing
air power and helicopters in
desperate one-way strike
missions, for symbolism in
showing his will to defend, or
to try to complicate and disrupt
US and British air operations.
The result will be massive Iraqi
losses, but it will have some
military effect. Assad did
something similar in 1982, even
at the cost of similar losses.
Air Defense Dispersal and
Deception
Iraq is constantly moving its
ground-based air defenses,
dispersing them, and practicing
jamming tactics and pop-on radar
tactics. These are unlikely to
be effective, but it would be
surprising if Iraq did not
surprise us with some new force
locations, tactics, and
technology. There also is little
incentive to concentrate such
forces. Overlapping coverage
from different weapons and
sensors, and defense in depth is
the key to success.
Tactical Use of Chemical
and Biological Weapons
Iraq could use any chemical
and biological weapons it still
possesses at any point during
the war. It faces a "use or
lose" situation if its does
not fire any forward-dispersed
artillery rockets and rounds,
and any bombs or Scuds dispersed
into areas where the US is
advancing. US rear areas in
Kuwait will be most vulnerable
while some US and British forces
are still concentrated or
static, and allied armor will be
most vulnerable while it is
still concentrated in the area
around Basra, or during times it
pauses near Iraqi forces
(unlikely).
Iraq can try to enhance the
perimeter defense of any town or
city by using chemical and
biological weapons, and it might
risk considerable damage to
civilians -- particularly if
they are Shi'ite. Saddam will
have little to use in political
or propaganda terms, and little
real risk of US escalation.
The Arab world probably does
not care about any lies in this
area, or use if it is directed
against US and British forces.
The only history Saddam cares
about will be written by Arabs
and Islamists, the US cannot
afford to strike massively at
Iraq cities or population
centers, and outlying Iraqi
forces and military facilities
will already have been lost.
Sabotage and Terrorism
If Iraq is to use sabotage and
terrorism it probably already
has the teams and materials in
place, knowing they have to be
almost perfectly covert or any
exposure would be a cause for
war. The most logical targets
are ones Arab peoples might
support: These include US, UK,
Israel, and Kuwait. Any sabotage
or covert attack on US and
allied forces in an Arab state
would meet this test, however,
such rules, including ports,
airports, rear areas, supply,
etc.
Another type of target would
be the desalination plants and
power plants on the Gulf coast.
Damaging these would not produce
mass casualties but could affect
whole populations and industrial
areas. Iraq also has an option
other than covert or proxy
attacks. A mass release of crude
from its oil terminals in the
Gulf might create a massive
spill that would move towards
such facilities.
Sabotage and Terrorism
Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction
There is no way to know if
Saddam would see a successful
terrorist attack with WMD as
possibly halting a war or as a
desperate last attack to show we
was not defeated. Such tactics
are already possible and the
timing and political rationale
is a matter of guesswork.
Attack Israel
From Saddam Hussein's
viewpoint, he may have little to
lose by attacking Israel as long
as he does not provoke a nuclear
response. He will lose virtually
all of his military assets in
any case. If his missiles are
intercepted by the Arrow or
Patriot ballistic missile
defenses, he has shown the Arab
world he is not afraid. If
Israel rides out the attack, it
is a kind of victory. If Israel
attacks population centers or
the Iraqi economy, it is a
propaganda and historical
victory, and complicates US and
British operations.
Conventional Oil
Interruptions
It is not clear that Iraq has
any meaningful conventional
missile or air capability to
attack the oil fields or major
export and downstream facilities
in the Gulf. Most are too large
and redundant for simple covert
raids. It is possible that
systematic "inside
job" acts of sabotage might
affect one or two facilities,
but it is very unclear that Iraq
has such a capability or outside
support.
Burning Iraq's
Oilfields/Destroying Key
Facilities
There are convincing reports
that Saddam has prepared
explosives for the destruction
of some of Iraqis oil wells and
key facilities. There may be
little the US/UK can do if Iraq
has already preset explosives at
its oil wells and/or key
facilities. Iraq can create
fires and smoke by setting
charges at the wellhead and it
can force major redrilling by
setting the charges deep inside
wells. It could achieve at least
some prolonged damage by
deliberate water flooding and
more by injecting salt water in
the south. US, British, and
Australian Special Forces cannot
move faster than an Iraqi can
flip a switch.
The question will be will the
Iraqis do it, and why? The one
military argument for burning
oil wells is that the oil smoke
would paralyze or limit US
operations. It wouldn't. We do
not rely on lasers anymore, and
oil smoke does not affect
weapons with GPS. US combat
aircraft and attack helicopters
can simply fly around such
smoke, or launch GPS weapons in
support of ground forces, and
most fires would be in the wrong
area with little tactical
impact. Iraq might do more to
inhibit its own operations and
anger its own population than
hurt the US. The "act of
martyrdom" rationale is
harder to deal with. It is
unclear that Saddam really wants
to go into martyrdom having
destroyed his country, but he
may well see such an act as
poisoning any US/UK victory and
an act of "historical"
defiance.
Floods and the Dams
Iraq is filled with dams and
waterways. The government can
easily widen many water barriers
and create a limited flood plain
in many areas in the south.
There are also four to five dams
where blowing the dam might
produce a major increase in the
flood plain around Baghdad, and
significant flooding in the
south. This is a tactic,
however, that needs to be kept
in perspective. It really isn't
clear that even the most
destructive blowing of key dams
could have more than a temporary
affect on combat operations. The
US and UK could maneuver around
most such barriers by going west
through the desert. In many
cases, any flooding would impair
Iraqi land movement more than
US/UK movement, particularly
because the US and UK will have
major helicopter and air assets
and Iraq will have virtually
none.
Once again, such actions
might reflect an "act of
martyrdom" rationale or
some twisted effort to punish
the Shi'ite for disloyalty or an
uprising. It is again unclear
that Saddam really wants to go
into martyrdom having destroyed
his country, but he may well see
such an act as poisoning any
US/UK victory and an act of
"historical" defiance.
ABOUT DR. ANTHONY
CORDESMAN
Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds
the Arleigh Burke Chair in
Strategy at the Center for
Strategic and International
Studies and is Co-Director of
the Center's Middle East
Program. He is also a military
analyst for ABC and a Professor
of National Security Studies at
Georgetown. He directs the
assessment of global military
balance, strategic energy
developments, and CSIS' Dynamic
Net Assessment of the Middle
East. He is the author of books
on the military lessons of the
Iran-Iraq war as well as the
Arab-Israeli military balance
and the peace process, a
six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and
military developments in Iran
and Iraq. He analyzes U.S.
strategy and force plans,
counter-proliferation issues,
arms transfers, Middle Eastern
security, economic, and energy
issues.
Dr. Cordesman served as a
national security analyst for
ABC News for the 1990-91 Gulf
War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation
Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National
Security to Senator John McCain
and a Wilson Fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for
Scholars at the Smithsonian. He
has served in senior positions
in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Department of
State, the Department of Energy,
and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His
posts include acting as the
Civilian Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Director
of Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy,
Programming, and Analysis in the
Department of Energy, Director
of Project ISMILAID, and as the
Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle
East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman has also served
in numerous overseas posts. He
was a member of the U.S.
Delegation to NATO and a
Director on the NATO
International Staff, working on
Middle Eastern security issues.
He served in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and
West Germany. He has been an
advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S.
Forces in Europe, and has
traveled extensively in the Gulf
and North Africa.
MORE IN GULFWIRE FROM DR.
CORDESMAN
[To access these reports
and other GulfWire on-line
archive materials visit: http://www.arabialink.com/ArchiveInfo
for details.]
REFORMING THE MIDDLE EAST:
PRESIDENT BUSH'S NEO-CON LOGIC
VERSUS REGIONAL REALITY -
GulfWire Perspectives - February
27, 2003
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2003/GWP_2003_02_27.htm
IRAQ SECURITY ROUNDTABLE AT
CSFS: A DISCUSSION WITH DR.
ANTHONY CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - January 28, 2003 http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2003/GWP_2003_01_28.htm
A COALITION OF THE UNWILLING:
ARMS CONTROL AS AN EXTENSION OF
WAR BY OTHER MEANS BY ANTHONY H.
CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - January 25, 2003
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2003/GWP_2003_01_25.htm
IS IRAQ IN MATERIAL BREACH?
WHAT HANS BLIX, COLIN POWELL,
AND JACK STRAW ACTUALLY SAID BY
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - December 20, 2002
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_12_20.htm
SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSITION,
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN --
GulfWire Perspectives - December
1, 2002 http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_12_01.htm
PLANNING FOR A SELF-INFLICTED
WOUND: U.S. POLICY TO RESHAPE A
POST-SADDAM IRAQ BY ANTHONY H.
CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - November 24, 2002
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_11_24.htm
THE WEST AND THE ARAB WORLD
PARTNERSHIP OR A "CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS? BY ANTHONY H.
CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - November 12, 2002
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_11_12.htm
STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGIC THEORY
AND OPERATIONAL REALITY BY DR.
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - October 22, 2002
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_10_22.htm
A FIRSTHAND LOOK AT SAUDI
ARABIA SINCE 9-11 GULFWIRE'S
INTERVIEW WITH DR. ANTHONY
CORDESMAN IN SAUDI ARABIA --
GulfWire Perspectives - October
10, 2002 http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_10_10.htm
IRAQ: A DYNAMIC NET
ASSESSMENT BY DR. ANTHONY
CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - July 12, 2002
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_07_12.htm
IF WE FIGHT IRAQ: IRAQ AND
ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN --
GulfWire Perspectives - June 2,
2002 http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_06_02.htm
IF WE FIGHT IRAQ: IRAQ AND
THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY
BALANCE BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
-- GulfWire Perspectives - June
1, 2002 http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_06_01.htm
ESCALATING TO NOWHERE: THE
ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN
STRATEGIC FAILURE BY ANTHONY H.
CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - April 8, 2002
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_04_08.htm
REFORGING THE U.S. AND SAUDI
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BY DR.
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN -- GulfWire
Perspectives - January 28, 2002 http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWPersp/GWP2002/GWP_2002_01_28.htm
BOOKS BY DR. CORDESMAN
"Iraq and the War of
Sanctions: Conventional Threats
and Weapons of Mass
Destruction" http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275965287/arabialink
"Iraq: Sanctions and
Beyond," (CSIS Middle East
Dynamic Net Assessment) http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332362/arabialink
"Saudi Arabia: Guarding
the Desert Kingdom," (CSIS
Middle East Dynamic Net
Assessment) http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332427/arabialink
"Terrorism, Asymmetric
Warfare, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Defending the U.S.
Homeland" http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275974278/arabialink
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