| Editor's
Note:
Also see Dr. Cordesman's updated "If We
Fight Iraq: Iraq's Military Forces and Weapons of
Mass Destruction." Click
Here to open the PDF file.
A Coalition of the Unwilling: Arms Control as
an Extension of War by Other Means
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies
January 25, 2003
The UNMOVIC/IAEA reports due in the next few
days, and the President's State of the Union
Address, are combining with the steady grow of
international opposition to war with Iraq to create
major challenges to US policy. The end result is a
crisis that affects far more than the timing of a
potential war with Iraq. It is a broad crisis in
American foreign and defense policy that may
resonate for years.
Creating a Coalition of the Unwilling
There have been long-standing US problems in
dealing with proliferation and the containment of
Iraq. The Clinton Administration postured and
blustered, but made little effort to really explain
or justify its policy, or refute the constant stream
of Iraqi claims that the US was responsible for the
hardships of UN sanctions. The Bush Administration
has relied on a largely exhortative and "inside
the beltway" diplomacy to justify its action,
has been weak and incoherent in dealing with the
Second Intifada, has faltered in the diplomatic side
of the war on terrorism, and has largely alienated
the arms control community in dealing with
proliferation while failing to make its case for a
more proactive and security-oriented approach to
dealing with the problem.
The end result threatens to become a
"coalition of the unwilling:" An unpopular
war that the US can force on the international
community and its regional allies, but that only the
leaders of Kuwait and Britain now seem to really
support.
Part of the reason we have such a coalition of
the unwilling is that we have made only a poor and
faltering case for our actions. The US and Britain
have issued two good white papers on Iraq's
proliferation, and a summary
comparison is attached. These two white papers
came very late in the game, however, and they are
complex and difficult even for experts to parse out
in terms of rhetoric versus facts. They also remain
largely unread and misunderstood because the US has
failed to follow them up with details, to refer back
to them in depth, and to support them with follow-up
background briefings and explanations. There has
been no serious information campaign. There have
been moralistic exhortations by senior officials,
given largely in terms of American domestic politic
rhetoric.
The end result is US government speaks largely in
terms of shallow and parochial sound bites, slogans,
and press briefings. It fails to dialog in depth, it
does not support its case on a day-by-day basis,
refuting charges as they come. It offers war without
defining its goals for Iraq in depth, refuting
conspiracy theories and charges of neoimperialism,
and without providing enough detail on its plans to
show the world Iraq will be far better off in the
peace to follow any war. It talks in terms of regime
change that imply a threat to every other existing
regime in the region without explaining for a moment
that it is ready for the real-world challenges of
national building, and years of effort in Iraq. It
cedes much of the floor by default to
neoconservative extremists who alienate, rather than
convince.
This diplomatic failure - which is a fundamental
failure in information warfare -- interacts with the
increasingly negative image of the US caused by
other major factors. First, the image in the Arab
and Islamic world that the US is the captive of
Israel in the case of the Second Intifada, is not
serious about the peace process, and is responsible
for Palestinian suffering. The fact this image of
the Bush Administration is not fair or balanced is
irrelevant. It now permeates the entire Middle East,
most of Europe, and much of the rest of the world.
Public opinion polls in the Arab world and Gulf show
it is the one key foreign policy issue people care
about and that some 70-80% of Arabs polled express
anger at the US over the issue.
The second problem is the combination of the
impression of American "unilateralism"
that the Bush has created in much of the world, and
the broad anti-Arab and anti-Islamic rhetoric in
much of the American media since "9/11."
In fairness to the Bush Administration, the
President and most senior US officials have fought
to avoid the impression of a clash of civilization.
The American press, however, has fought to provoke
one, with a strange coalition of liberal politicians
and neoconservatives competing to see who can become
the most negative instant expert on Islam and the
Arab world.
The Joys of International Irresponsibility
If the US is as fault, however, so are those who
criticize it. Germany is clearly acting out of
parochial domestic politics that are far less
responsible than their counterpart in the US. France
has long opposed for opposition's sake, and combines
this in the case of Iraq with an interest in debt
repayment and oil deals. Russia and China have their
own parochial interests. Far too many nations are
acting more out of a freedom from responsibility for
their own actions than any clear picture of how to
deal with the problem or any concern for the very
real risks involved.
Part of the reason for this "coalition of
the unwilling" is that the US is now virtually
the only power outside the Gulf taking any serious
responsibility for its security, and the only
Western power dealing seriously with the risk of
proliferation and terrorism. The US is certainly
making mistakes, but its normal allies are not
taking responsibility. They are placing vague hope
in the UN, disarmament, and the international system
to deal with very real threats.
Some Bush Administration officials have
occasionally made the case that US should make
constantly and in depth, and the fact is that those
who oppose war with Iraq have done little to refuter
it. Paul Wolfowitz's January 22nd speech to the
Council on Foreign Relations articulates the
following and very real set of problems:
| As terrible as the
attacks of September 11th were, however,
we now know that the terrorists are
plotting still more and greater
catastrophes. We know they are seeking
more terrible weapons-chemical,
biological, and even nuclear weapons. In
the hands of terrorists, what we often
call weapons of mass destruction would
more accurately be called weapons of mass
terror. The threat posed by the connection
between terrorist networks and states that
possess these weapons of mass terror
presents us with the danger of a
catastrophe that could be orders of
magnitude worse than September 11th.
Iraq's weapons of mass terror and the
terror networks to which the Iraqi regime
are linked are not two separate themes -
not two separate threats. They are part of
the same threat. Disarming Iraq and the
War on Terror are not merely related.
Disarming Iraq of its chemical and
biological weapons and dismantling its
nuclear weapons program is a crucial part
of winning the War on Terror. Iraq has had
12 years now to disarm, as it agreed to do
at the conclusion of the Gulf War. But, so
far, it has treated disarmament like a
game of hide and seek-or, as Secretary of
State Powell has termed it,
"rope-a-dope in the desert."
But this is not a game.
It is deadly serious. We are dealing with
a threat to the security of our nation and
the world. At the same time, however,
President Bush understands fully the risks
and dangers of war and the President wants
to do everything humanly possible to
eliminate this threat by peaceful means.
That is why the President called for the
U.N. Security Council to pass what became
Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations and, in so doing, to eliminate
the danger that Iraq's weapons of mass
terror could fall into the hands of
terrorists. In making that proposal,
President Bush understood perfectly well
that compliance with that resolution would
require a massive change of attitude and
actions on the part of the Iraqi regime.
But history proves that such a change is
possible.
U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein one
last chance to choose a path of
cooperative disarmament, one that he was
obliged to take and agreed to take 12
years ago. We were under no illusions that
the Baghdad regime had undergone the
fundamental change of heart that
underpinned the successes I just
mentioned. Nevertheless, there is still
the hope -- if Saddam is faced with a
serious enough threat that he would
otherwise be disarmed forcibly and removed
from power -- there is still the hope that
he might decide to adopt a fundamentally
different course. But time is running out.
The United States
entered this process hopeful that it could
eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's
weapons of mass terror without having to
resort to force. And we've put more than
just our hopes into this process. Last
fall, the Security Council requested
member states to give, quote, "full
support," unquote, to U.N.
inspectors.
The United States
answered that call and President Bush
directed departments and agencies to
provide, I quote, "material,
operational, personnel, and intelligence
support," unquote, for U.N.
inspections under Resolution 1441. Such
assistance includes a comprehensive
package of intelligence support, including
names of individuals whom we believe it
would be productive to interview and
information about sites suspected to be
associated with proscribed material or
activities. We have provided our analysis
of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological
and missile programs, and we have
suggested an inspection strategy and
tactics. We have provided
counterintelligence support to improve the
inspectors' ability to thwart Iraqi
attempts to penetrate their organizations.
The United States has
also made available a wide array of
technology to support the inspectors'
efforts, including aerial surveillance
support in the form of U-2 and Predator
aircraft. So far, Iraq is blocking U-2
flights requested by the U.N., in direct
violation of Resolution 1441, which states
that inspectors shall have free and
unrestricted use of manned and unmanned
reconnaissance vehicles.
Let's consider for a
moment what inspectors can do and what
they can't. As the case of South Africa
and the other success stories demonstrate,
inspection teams can do a great deal to
verify the dismantling of a program if
they are working with a cooperative
government that wants to prove to the
world it has disarmed. It is not the job
of inspectors to disarm Iraq; it is Iraq's
job to disarm itself. What inspectors can
do is confirm that a country has willingly
disarmed and provided verifiable evidence
that it has done so. If a government is
unwilling to disarm itself, it is
unreasonable to expect the inspectors to
do it for them. They cannot be charged
with a "search and destroy"
mission to uncover so-called smoking guns,
especially not if the host government is
intent on hiding them and impeding the
inspectors' every move. Inspectors cannot
verify the destruction of weapons
materials if there are no credible records
of their disposition.
Think about it for a
moment. When an auditor discovers
discrepancies in the books, it is not the
auditor's obligation to prove where the
embezzler has stashed his money. It is up
to the person or institution being audited
to explain the discrepancy. It is quite
unreasonable to expect a few hundred
inspectors to search every potential
hiding place in a country the size of
France, even if nothing were being moved.
And, of course, there is every reason to
believe that things are being moved
constantly and hidden. The whole purpose,
if you think about it, for Iraq
constructing mobile units to produce
biological weapons could only have been to
be able to hide them. We know about that
capability from defectors and other
sources, but unless Iraq comes clean about
what it has, we cannot expect the
inspectors to find them.
Nor is it the
inspectors' role to find Saddam's hidden
weapons when he lies about them and
conceals them. That would make them not
inspectors, but detectives, charged with
going through that vast country, climbing
through tunnels and searching private
homes. Sending a few hundred inspectors to
search an area the size of the state of
California would be to send them on a
fool's errand or to play a game. And let
me repeat: this is not a game.
David Kay, a former
chief UNSCOM inspector, has said that
confirming a country's voluntary
disarmament is a job that should not take
months or years. With cooperation, it
would be relatively simple because the
real indicators of disarmament are readily
apparent. They start with the willingness
of the regime to be disarmed, the
commitments communicated by its leaders,
the disclosure of the full scope of work
on weapons of mass destruction, and
verifiable records of dismantling and
destruction.
Unfortunately, though
not surprisingly, we have seen none of
these indications of willing disarmament
from Iraq.
So let's discuss what
disarmament does not look like. Despite
our skepticism about the intentions of the
Baghdad regime, we entered the disarmament
process in good faith. Iraq has done
anything but that.
Instead of a high-level
commitment to disarmament, Iraq has a
high-level commitment to concealing its
weapons of mass terror. Instead of
charging national institutions with the
responsibility to dismantle programs, key
Iraqi organizations operate a concealment
effort that targets inspectors and thwarts
their efforts. Instead of the full
cooperation and transparency that is
evident in each of those disarmament
success stories, Iraq has started the
process by openly defying the requirement
of Resolution 1441, and I quote, "to
provide a currently accurate, full and
complete" declaration of all of its
programs.
Indeed, with its
December 7th declaration, Iraq resumed a
familiar process of deception. Secretary
Powell has called that 12,200-page
document a catalogue of recycled
information and brazen omissions that the
secretary said, "totally fails to
meet the resolution's requirements. Most
brazenly of all" -- I'm still quoting
Powell -- "the Iraqi declaration
denies the existence of any prohibited
weapons programs at all," unquote.
Among those omissions are large quantities
of anthrax and other deadly biological
agents and nuclear-related items that the
U.N. Special Commission concluded Iraq had
not accounted for. There are also gaps in
accounting for such deadly items as 1.5
tons of the nerve gas VX, 550
mustard-filled artillery shells, and 400
biological weapons-capable aerial bombs
that the U.N. Special Commission concluded
in 1999 -- and this is the U.N.'s
conclusion -- Iraq had failed to account
for.
There is no mention of
Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from
abroad. Iraq fails to explain why it's
producing missile fuel that seems designed
for ballistic missiles it claims it does
not have. There is no information on 13
recent Iraqi missile tests cited by Dr.
Blix that exceeded the 150-kilometer
limit. There is no explanation of the
connection between Iraq's extensive
unmanned aerial vehicle program and
chemical or biological agent dispersal.
There is no information about Iraq's
mobile biological-weapons production
facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq
has not accounted for some two tons of
anthrax growth media.
When U.N. inspectors
left Iraq in 1998, they concluded, and I
quote: "The history of the Special
Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued
by coordinated efforts to thwart full
discovery of Iraq's programs,"
unquote. What we know today from the
testimony of Iraqis with first-hand
knowledge, from U.N. inspectors and from a
variety of other sources, about Iraq's
current efforts to deceive inspectors
suggests that Iraq is fully engaged today
in the same old practices of concealment
and deception. Iraq seems to be employing
virtually all of the old techniques that
it used to frustrate U.N. inspections in
the past.
At the heart of those
techniques, of course, is hiding things,
and moving them if they're found. In the
past, Iraq made determined efforts to hide
its prohibited weapons and to move them if
inspectors were about to find them. In
1991, in one of the first, and only,
instances where the inspectors found
prohibited equipment, they came upon some
massive calutrons, devices used for
enriching uranium, at an Iraqi military
base. Even at that early stage, Iraq had
begun to make provisions to move its
illegal weapons in case inspectors
stumbled across them. As the inspectors
appeared at the front gate, the Iraqis
moved the calutrons out the back of the
base on large tank transporters.
Today, those practices
continue, except that over the last 12
years, Iraqi preparations for concealing
their illegal programs have become more
extensive and sophisticated. Iraq's
national policy is not to disarm but
rather to hide its weapons of mass terror.
That effort, significantly -- the effort
of concealment -- is led by none other
than Saddam's own son, Qusay, who uses a
Special Security Organization under his
control for that purpose. Other security
organizations contribute to these
"anti-inspection" activities,
including the National Monitoring
Directorate, whose ostensible purpose is
to facilitate inspections. Instead, it
provides tip-offs of sites that are about
to be inspected and uses
"minders" to intimidate
witnesses. Iraqi security organizations
and a number of government agencies
provide thousands of personnel to hide
documents and materials from inspectors,
to sanitize inspection sites and to
monitor the inspectors' activities.
Indeed, the "anti-inspectors"
vastly outnumber the couple of hundred of
U.N. personnel on the ground in Iraq.
Already, we have
multiple reports and other evidence of
intensified efforts to hide documents in
places where they are unlikely to be
found, such as private homes of low-level
officials and universities. We have
reports and other evidence of prohibited
material and documents being relocated to
agricultural areas and private homes or
hidden beneath mosques and hospitals.
Furthermore, according to these reports,
the material is moved constantly, making
it difficult to trace or find without
absolutely fresh intelligence. It is a
shell game played on a grand scale with
deadly serious weapons.
Those efforts at
concealment are assisted by active
surveillance and penetration of the
inspectors. In the past, Iraq
systematically used its intelligence
capabilities to support efforts to conceal
its illegal activities. Former inspector
David Kay recalled that in 1991, the
inspectors came across a document warning
the chief security official of the
facility they were about to inspect, that
David Kay would lead the U.N. team. That
warning had been issued less than 48 hours
after the decision had been made for Kay
to lead the team, and at that time, fewer
than 10 people within the inspection
organization were supposed to know the
operational plan.
In the 1990s, there were
reports that Iraqi intelligence recruited
U.N. inspectors as informants. And it was
known that Iraqi scientists were fearful
about the confidentiality of their
interviews. Recent reports that Iraq
continues these kinds of efforts are a
clear sign that it is not yet serious
about disarmament.
Today, we also
anticipate that Iraq is likely to target
U.N. computer systems through cyber
intrusions to steal inspections, methods,
criteria, and findings. And we know that
Iraq has the capability to do that.
According to Khidhir Hamza, a former
senior official in the Iraqi nuclear
program, Iraq's Babylon Software Company
was set up to develop cyber warfare
capabilities on behalf of the Iraqi
Intelligence Service in the early 1990s.
Some people assigned to Babylon were
segregated into a highly compartmented
unit and tasked with breaking into foreign
computers to download sensitive data. Some
of the programmers reported that they had
accumulated sufficient expertise to break
into moderately protected computer
systems, such as those that the inspectors
depend upon.
Further technique is
intimidation and coercion, both of the
inspectors and of the people they're
inspecting. In the past, Iraq did not
hesitate to use pressure tactics to obtain
information about the inspectors.
Sometimes the pressure was quite crude.
During the UNSCOM period, one inspector
was reportedly filmed in a compromising
situation and blackmailed.
Sometimes the pressure
was more subtle. Richard Spertzel, a
former inspector in the biological warfare
unit, recalled the case of an Iraqi
official who coyly asked a member of
Spertzel's team, "Just how far is it
from Salt Lake City to Minnesota?"
Since this woman had just moved from Salt
Lake City to Minneapolis a few days prior
to her arrival in Iraq, you can imagine
that she was unnerved by the comment.
More recently Iraq has
again begun referring to the inspectors as
spies, clearly hoping to make them
uncomfortable at best and afraid at worst,
and to intimidate Iraqis from interacting
with them.
For Iraqis, there is
nothing subtle about the intimidation. As
President Bush stated so correctly, and as
numerous reports by Human Rights Watch and
other organizations confirm, "The
dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin,
using murder as a tool of terror and
control, within his own cabinet, within
his own army, and even within his own
family."
Today we know from
multiple sources that Saddam has ordered
that any scientist who cooperates during
interviews will be killed, as well as
their families. Furthermore, we know that
scientists are being tutored on what to
say to the U.N. inspectors and that Iraqi
intelligence officers are posing as
scientists to be interviewed by the
inspectors.
And finally, of course,
there's obstruction, and obstruction
concealed by lying. In the past, U.N.
inspectors faced many instances of delay,
with excuses that ranged from, "We
can't find the keys," to "You
can't come in here because only women are
allowed." When all else fails, lying
becomes a standard technique.
Richard Butler, the
former head of the U.N. Special
Commission, reported, and I quote,
"Iraqi leaders had no difficulty
sitting across from me and spontaneously
changing a reported fact or figure."
For example, he said, six previously
reported warheads could suddenly become
15, or vice versa, with no explanation or
apology about a previous lie. Butler
reports that actions taken to obstruct
inspectors were often explained away with
excuses that were as credible as "the
dog ate my homework." One example
that Butler quotes, literally: "A
wandering psychopath cut some wires to the
chemical plant monitoring camera. It seems
he hadn't received the medicine he needed
because of the U.N. sanctions."
(Laughter.) And here's another: "The
wicked girlfriend of one of our workers
tore up the documents in anger."
During the UNSCOM
period, Richard Spertzel on one occasion
confronted Dr. Rihab Taha, still a
principal and sinister figure in Iraq's
biological weapons program. He said to
her, and I quote, "Dr. Taha, you know
that we know that you're lying, so why are
you doing it?" Dr. Taha drew herself
up and replied, "Dr. Spertzel, it is
not a lie when you are ordered to
lie." Lying was more than a
technique. It was, and it remains, a
policy.
Today, Iraqi obstruction
continues on large issues as well as small
ones. Authorities that Resolution 1441
confers unconditionally on the inspectors
are constantly subject to conditions by
the Baghdad regime. For example, the
resolution requires that the U.N.
inspectors shall have, quote, "free
and unrestricted use and landing of fixed-
and rotary-winged aircraft, including
manned and unmanned reconnaissance
vehicles," unquote. But Iraq has
objected to U-2 flights and shoots at our
Predators. Even more serious, Iraq has yet
to make a single one of its scientists or
technical experts available to be
interviewed in confidential circumstances
free of intimidation as required by the
U.N. resolution.
Long ago Iraq became
accustomed to the fact that even when
caught, the consequences could be
negligible. And hence a new game entered
the lexicon: cheat and retreat. This
happened on issue after issue. For
example, as Butler reports -- I'm quoting
again -- "Initially Iraq had denied
ever having manufactured, let alone
deployed, VX. But this was not true."
Confronted with evidence of VX in soil
samples, the Iraqis then admitted they had
manufactured, but claimed a quantity of no
more than 200 liters. Subsequent probing
showed they'd made far more. So Iraq's
initial complete lie had been replaced by
a false statement about the quantity. Iraq
then reached for a third lie: they'd never
weaponized VX. This, it turned out, was
yet a third falsehood.
The same pattern was
repeated with Iraq's nuclear and
biological weapons. Baghdad revised its
nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times
within 14 months of the initial submission
in April 1991. During the UNSCOM period,
Iraq submitted six different biological
warfare declarations, each one of which
the U.N. inspectors rejected. Following
the defection of Saddam's son-in-law,
Husayn Kamil, Iraq dramatically disclosed
more than half a million pages of
biological weapons-related documents. But,
in fact, sparse relevant information was
buried within a massive volume of
extraneous data, all of which was intended
to create the appearance of candor and to
overwhelm the U.N. inspectors' analytical
resources.
A process that begins
with a massive lie and proceeds with
concealment, penetration, intimidation and
obstruction cannot be a process of
cooperative disarmament. The purpose of
Resolution 1441, I repeat, was not to play
a deadly game of hide-and-seek or
cheat-and-retreat for another 12 years.
The purpose was to achieve a clear
resolution of the threat posed by Iraq's
weapons of mass terror.
If Iraq were to choose
to comply with the requirement to
dismantle its weapons of mass terror, we
would know it. We would know it from their
full and complete declaration of
everything that we know that they have, as
well as by revelations of programs that
our intelligence has probably not yet
discovered. Recall that after the Gulf
War, we were stunned by the magnitude of
Iraq's nuclear program, despite all of our
intelligence efforts and those of our
allies, including Israel, and even though
Iraq had been subject to IAEA inspections
for many years.
We would know it if we
saw an attitude on the part of the Iraqi
government that encouraged people to
cooperate with inspectors, rather than
intimidated them into silence and lies. We
would know it when inspectors were able to
go about their work without being spied on
or penetrated. And we would know it most
of all when Iraqi scientists and others
familiar with the program were clearly
speaking freely.
But in the absence of
full cooperation, particularly in the
absence of full disclosure of what Iraq
has actually done, we cannot expect that
the U.N. inspectors have the capacity to
disarm an uncooperative Iraq, even with
the full support of American intelligence
and the intelligence of other nations.
American intelligence
capabilities are extraordinary, but they
are far from the omniscient, all-seeing
eye depicted in some Hollywood movies. For
a great body of what we need to know, we
are dependent on traditional methods of
intelligence -- that is to say, human
beings, who either deliberately or
inadvertently are communicating to us.
It was only after Saddam
Hussein's son-in-law, Husayn Kamil,
defected in 1995 that U.N. inspectors were
led to a large cache of documents, on a
chicken farm, that contained important
revelations about Iraq's biological
weapons. In contemplating the magnitude of
the task of finding such hidden sites, one
might ask: How many farms are there in
Iraq? How many structures are there in
which important documents could be stored?
How many garages in that big country are
large enough to hold the tractor-trailers
that make up an Iraqi mobile biological
weapons factory?
And we need to be
worried. Even when inspectors were in Iraq
before, the Baghdad regime was building
and retaining weapons of mass terror. It
would be folly to think that those efforts
stopped when the inspectors left.
Consider that in 1997,
U.N. inspectors found Iraq had produced
and weaponized at least 10 liters of ricin.
In concentrated form, that quantity of
ricin is enough to kill more than 1
million people.
Baghdad declared to the
U.N. inspectors that it had over 19,000
liters of botulinum toxin, enough to kill
tens of millions; and 8,500 liters of
anthrax, with the potential to kill
hundreds of millions. And consider that
the U.N. inspectors believe that much
larger quantities of biological agents
remained undeclared. Indeed, the
inspectors think that Iraq has
manufactured two to four times the amount
of biological agents it has admitted to
and has failed to explain the whereabouts
of more than two metric tons of raw
material for the growth of biological
agents. Despite 11 years of inspections
and sanctions, containment and military
response, Baghdad retains chemical and
biological weapons and is producing more.
And Saddam's nuclear scientists are still
hard at work.
As the President put it,
and I quote, "The history, the logic
and the facts lead to one conclusion:
Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and
gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is
to hope against the evidence. To assume
the regime's good faith is to bet the
lives of millions and the peace of the
world in a reckless gamble. And this is a
risk we must not take."
So, we come back to the
imperative: Baghdad must disarm,
peacefully if at all possible, but by
force if necessary. The decision on
whether Iraq's weapons of mass terror will
be dismantled voluntarily or whether it
will have to be done by force is not up to
us, it is not up to the inspectors, it is
not up to the United Nations. The decision
rests entirely with Saddam Hussein. So
far, he has not made the fundamental
decision to disarm, and unless he does,
the threat posed by his weapons programs
will remain with us, and, indeed, it will
grow.
Yes, there are real
dangers in confronting a tyrant who has
and uses weapons of mass terror and has
links to terrorists. But those dangers
will only grow. They are far greater now
than they would have been five or 10 years
ago, and they will be much greater still
five or 10 years from now. President Bush
has brought the world to an extraordinary
consensus and focus on this problem; it is
time to see it resolved, voluntarily or by
force, but resolved one way or another.
And time is running out.
On a happier note, if
one thinks about it, once freed from
Saddam's tyranny, it is reasonable to
expect that Iraq's educated, industrious
population of more than 20 million could
build a modern society that would be a
source of prosperity, not insecurity, for
its neighbors.
Barham Salih, a very
brave and distinguished Iraqi Kurdish
leader, spoke recently of the dream of the
Iraqi people, and I quote. He said,
"In my office in Suleymaniyah, I meet
almost every day some traveler who has
come from Baghdad or other parts of Iraq.
Without exception, they tell me of the
continuing suffering inflicted by the
Iraqi regime, of the fearful hope secretly
nurtured by so many enslaved Iraqis for a
free life, for a country where they can
think without fear and speak without
retribution."
We may someday look back
on this moment in history as the time when
the West defined itself for the 21st
Century, not in terms of geography or race
or religion or culture or language, but in
terms of values, the values of freedom and
democracy.
For people who cherish
freedom and seek peace, these are indeed
difficult times. But such times can deepen
our understanding of the truth. And this
truth we know: the single greatest threat
to peace and freedom in our time is
terrorism. So this truth we must also
affirm: the truth does not belong to
tyrants and terrorists. The truth belongs
to those who dream the oldest and noblest
dream of all -- the dream of peace and
freedom.
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Arms Control as an Extension of War By Other
Means
It now seems almost certain, that neither the
IAEA or UNMOVIC report will find sufficient
"smoking guns" to justify a US-British
attack on Iraq in the eyes of those who now oppose
or question the need and justification for such an
attack. It seems likely that Iraq has chosen
concealment over ongoing activity at levels high
enough to be visible, and over creating near-term
warfighting capabilities.
This makes good strategic sense from Iraq's
viewpoint. It can fight a continuing war using arms
control. Its own propaganda is often awkward and
unconvincing, but Iraq has the advantage in terms of
Arab and European opinion and the Bush
Administration's clumsy efforts are making Iraq the
political victor in the battles for world opinion in
the UN. Most of Iraq's Gulf War inventory, and many
of its production facilities, are obsolete and far
better suited to a theater-wide war with Iran than a
modern, more focused strategic effort that
concentrates on small numbers of highly lethal
biological weapons, indigenous missile and cruise
missile production, and covert delivery means.
Carrying out small, clandestine, and
well-distributed research and development efforts in
small cells, no one of which is a "smoking
gun" makes good sense. So does preserving
intellectual capital in terms of human resources and
leaving records and data in the hands of private
individuals. Using oil for food to create a wide
network of dual-use civilian facilities that can be
rapidly converted to produce biological weapons,
variants on VX, or fourth generation chemical
weapons allows Iraq to solve the production problem.
So does concentrating on nuclear weapons development
and centrifuge technical without creating large,
visible and potentially failed or obsolescent
enrichment facilities.
If Iraq does want to preserve a last-ditch
warfighting capability, it makes good sense to use
the technique it pioneered during the Gulf War. If
it is limited to 12-25 Scud assemblies and a handful
of operational system, it may make the most sense
never to use them. If it does, it makes sense to
create a small cadre of ultraloyalist forces in Iraq
intelligence and to conceal such weapons in so
broadly scattered a form than no one discovery would
be decisive, but a rapidly assembled launch on
warning or surprise force could be used. If Saddam
wants some form of martyrdom or "historical
last gesture" attack, it makes much more sense
to use a total concealable form of attack like
smallpox or covert use of dry, storable micropowders
like Anthrax.
If Iraq wants to use chemical and biological
weapons in tactical situations, it made sense to
hide them in new covert facilities in urban areas
early in 2002 - if not years earlier - or in area
out in the open desert. It is important to note that
Iraq is far more familiar with the use of chemical
weapons in urban and area warfare than we are, and
that its experience showed in Halabjah that such
weapons were anything but decisive it blocking an
Iranian advance, and in Faw that massive amounts
were needed to disrupt a largely static Iranian
dug-in infantry force. As a result, Iraq may abandon
the use of tactical weapons, keep only small amounts
for "decisive" urban engagements, or
simply leave them in place and try to rely on
popular urban warfare.
Under all of those conditions, it is unlikely
that UNMOVIC will ever get mass of evidence it needs
to force an unwilling Arab world and Europe to
accept the need for war. Unlike UNSCOM, the IAEA had
already abandoned the inspection effort by 1998
because it could not find new evidence and had
shifted to the monitoring role, stating it could
neither confirm that Iraq had abandoned the search
for nuclear weapons or continued it. Iraq has a very
good chance of riding out any arms control focused
effort to disarm it, and of reemerging as the
"victor of the Gulf War" and champion of
Islam, the Palestinians, and Arab world in the eyes
of many in the region. It is more likely to win the
war of arms control than loose it.
Short of a major intelligence breakthrough -
which is possible but unlikely - the most the US and
Britain can now do is to make the case that Iraq has
been in material breech since 1998, that it has
failed to comply with those terms of UNSCR 1441 that
require it to answer all past UNSCOM and IAEA
questions about its programs, and seek to convince
as many as possible without getting any kind of
favorable response from the UN or most nations.
The US and British problem will also be greatly
complicated by the fact that if we do have sensitive
data, even finding one "smoking gun" may
not be enough to persuade the world, while it may
allow Iraq to rapidly alter its pattern of deception
and concealment, or -at a minimum - relocate weapons
and equipment in ways we cannot target. The issue is
not simply one of losing intelligence sources or
means, it is one of seriously compromising our
warfighting capability, increasing the risk such
weapons will be used, and ending up with the
international community still unwilling to support
US and British action.
This may well confront the US with having to go
to war with a coalition of the unwilling, and in a
climate of extreme international tension. It could
potentially knock Turkey out of our list of allies,
limit Saudi cooperation even more, threaten the
Blair government, and present real problems for our
other allies in the Gulf. If so, we will fight in a
firestorm of international media and political
criticism, every civilian casualty and bit of
collateral damage will be even more explosive in
political terms, and the broader backlash in the
Arab world, Europe, and Asia will be a growing
problem for every day of the fighting. If we do not
go to war, however, the US will be perceived in most
of the Middle East as having decisively lost the war
it never fought. Proliferation, terrorism, and the
Second Intifada will be even more serious problems,
and our ability to count on regional basing and
support will be increasingly uncertain.
If there is any answer to this dilemma, it lies
in having a peace that so convincingly aids Iraq
build a nation that serves the interests of the
Iraqi people, that we will be foreign the war and
the coalition of the unwilling. This, however, means
winning a peace that will be expensive and take
years, and that winning the war will be yet another
Gulf War defeat if we do not accept this fact and
succeed. Unfortunately, we as yet have no clear
picture that the Bush Administration is any better
prepared for nation building and winning a peace
than it was in dealing with the Second Intifada and
Afghanistan. We have a few sound bites and slogans
from senior officials but no real depth. There is
intensive quiet planning in State, the intelligence
community, and other government agencies, but no
clear Presidential articulation of our goals and
means. So far, it is as clumsy and inarticulate in
providing a convincing picture of how it will win a
peace as it has been in showing why it should fight
a war.
ABOUT DR.
ANTHONY CORDESMAN
Dr. Anthony
Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy
at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and
is Co-Director of the
Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military
analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at
Georgetown. He directs the
assessment of global military balance, strategic
energy developments, and
CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He
is the author of books
on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well
as the Arab-Israeli
military balance and the peace process, a six-volume
net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military
developments in Iran and Iraq. He
analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans,
counter-proliferation issues, arms
transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and
energy issues.
Dr. Cordesman
served as a national security analyst for ABC News
for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert
Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National Security to Senator John
McCain and a Wilson
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at
the Smithsonian. He has
served in senior positions in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, and
the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting
as the Civilian Assistant
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of
Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and
Analysis in the Department
of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the
Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman
has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a
member of
the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the
NATO International Staff,
working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served
in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has
been an advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has
traveled extensively in
the Gulf and North Africa.
PREVIOUS
GULFWIRE APPEARANCES
"The
West and the Arab World: Partnership or a 'Clash of
Civilizations?'"
"Strategy
in the Middle East: The Gap Between Strategic Theory
and
Operational Reality"
"A Firsthand Look at Saudi Arabia Since
9-11"
"Iraq: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and Its Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
"If
We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional Military
Balance"
"Escalating
to Nowhere: The Israeli and Palestinian Strategic
Failures"
"Reforging
the U.S. and Saudi Strategic Partnership"
BOOKS BY DR. CORDESMAN
"Iraq's
Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net
Assessment"
"Iraq
and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and
Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
"Iraq:
Sanctions and Beyond," (CSIS Middle East
Dynamic Net Assessment)
"Saudi
Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom," (CSIS
Middle East Dynamic Net
Assessment)
"Terrorism,
Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Defending
the U.S. Homeland"
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