Introduction
Press
summaries and reports can be highly misleading.
The following text contains the verbatim
transcripts of what Hans Blix, Colin Powell, and
Jack Straw said about the Iraqi declaration as
well as the text of a US State Department White
Paper on the declaration. Please note that for the
full context of these statements, you should refer
to the comparative analysis of the CIA and British
intelligence reports on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction contained in the Iraq section of the
CSIS web site at www.csis.org.
The
highlighting of key passages in italics is my own.
It should be noted that section three of Hans
Blix's briefing, and some sections of Secretary
Powell's briefing and the State Department white
paper, have been reordered by type of weapon of
mass destruction. However, no change has been made
in the content.
Tony Cordesman
CONTENTS
Notes
for briefing the Security Council regarding
inspections in Iraq and a preliminary assessment
of Iraq's declaration under paragraph 3 of
resolution 14411 (2002)
Hans Blix,
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC
19 December 2002
First
part: situation report on inspection effort
Before I take up the major subject of my briefing;
which relates to the Declaration submitted by Iraq
under operative paragraph 3 of resolution
1441(2002), I should like, with your permission,
to report briefly on where the UNMOVIC inspection
effort stands today, 41 days after the adoption of
the resolution on 8 November.
As you will recall, inspections resumed on 27
November.
- Since then
the number of UNMOVIC IC inspectors in Baghdad
has increased from 11 to over 90. In addition
there are some 55 support staff.
- Since the
adoption of the resolution on 8 November, we
have signed over 145 employment contracts,
most of them for staff in Baghdad but some to
strengthen our capacity here in New York.
- During the
autumn, we have signed contracts for equipment
and services amounting to some 32.3 million
dollars, assuming that the services run for a
year. Out of this, the largest part of 22.3
million will be for air operations.
- Since the
adoption of the resolution, we have initiated
an air shuttle between Larnaca in Cyprus and
Baghdad, with a field office in Larnaca and
service facilities at Saddam International
Airport in Baghdad.
- We have
recently deployed one helicopter to Baghdad
and are expecting 7 more before the end of the
year. All will be stationed at the Rasheed
airbase, where the Iraqi authorities provide
service facilities.
- We have
put the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Centre (BOMVIC)
into operation and the Iraqi authorities are
cooperating with us in the establishment of a
field office in Mosul.
The build-up
could hardly have been faster. We have benefited
from the extensive preparations which we made for
deployment during the past years, the training of
potential inspectors, the early identification of
potential suppliers and the identification of
sites to be inspected at the initial phase. We
have also benefited from the excellent cooperation
and assistance extended to us by many divisions of
the UN Secretariat in New York and by the UN
organizations in Baghdad, Cyprus and Brindisi.
Here, in New York, we have been given more office
space necessary for our functioning but difficult
to obtain in the crowded buildings of the UN. For
Baghdad, we plan to expand the premises as soon as
possible. The Iraqi cooperation has been very
helpful for our logistical and infrastructure
build-up.
Second
part: results so far of the inspection effort
Let me next
report on some of our activities and experiences
from the past three weeks:
- We have
inspected 44 sites declared by Iraq or
inspected by UNSCOM or the IAEA in the past,
among them 3 in the Mosul area and 8
newly-declared locations.
- We have
inspected some sites, which were previously
indicated by Iraq as sensitive or
presidential. They were now inspected in the
same manner as other sites.
- Access
to sites has been prompt and assistance on the
sites expeditious. It seems probable that a
general instruction has been issued not in any
way to delay or impede inspection of the kind
of sites we have gone to so far. This is
welcome and it is to be hoped that such an
instruction will extend to all sites we may
wish to inspect in the future, regardless of
location, character and timing.
- With
respect to the results of our inspections, I
should note that several sites, which have
been the subject of public discussion, have
been inspected and questions as to their use
may have been answered.
- We have
identified the location of some artillery
shells and containers with mustard gas. They
were placed under UNSCOM supervision in 1998.
They will now be sampled, and eventually
destroyed.
- Criticism
has been voiced by the Iraqi side regarding
some inspections:
- The
inspection of a presidential site took place
without problems - after a minor delay in
access. However, it was subsequently stated
from the Iraqi side that the inspection was
unjustified and that the inspectors could not
have looked for weapons of mass destruction,
as they did not wear protective gear. Clearly,
we do not need to justify any of our
selections of sites and one does not need
protective gear to look for documents or
computer files.
- Some sites
were inspected last Friday-the Muslim day of
rest. In one of them, the Iraqi staff were
absent and a number of doors inside locked,
with no keys available. The Iraqi side offered
to break the doors open while videotaping the
event. However, they agreed with a suggestion
that the doors in question could be sealed
overnight and the offices inspected the next
morning. Clearly, we have the right to
undertake inspections at any time, night or
day, whether on weekdays or religious
holidays. We intend to exercise this right-not
to harass-but to demonstrate that just as
there are no sanctuaries in space there are no
sanctuaries in time.
Let the
report, lastly, two formal requests that we have
directed to Iraq in conformity with the
resolutions of the Security Council.
Under
subparagraph 4 of paragraph 7 of resolution 1441
(2002), UNMOVIC has asked Iraq to provide the
names of all personnel currently or formerly
associated with some aspect of Iraq's programme of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles. During my talks in Baghdad last month, I
indicated that this request would be made and in
the Declaration just submitted we find that, in
several chapters, the Iraqi side has refrained
from submitting names explicitly on the ground
that they expected the request to come.
We have asked that the names be submitted to us
before the end of the year and suggested that Iraq
may proceed in pyramid fashion, starting from the
leadership in programmes, going down to
management, scientists, engineers and technicians
but excluding the basic layer of workers.
The list of names may have several uses. It could,
for instance, be of use to learn where those who
earlier worked on the biological weapons programme,
are now. Some persons on the list could be called
for interviews. We certainly consider interviews
in Iraq a potentially important source of
information as it has been in the past.
Taking persons to be interviewed and family
members out of Iraq is authorized under paragraph
5 of resolution 1441 (2002) and is an option.
Although Iraq would be obliged to cooperate, the
practical arrangements would have to be carefully
examined. Clearly, we could not take anybody out
of Iraq without his or her consent.
The second
formal request concerns legislation implementing
Security Council resolutions. I have reminded the
Iraqi side several times in the past year that it
should be easy for it to enact such legislation,
notably laws prohibiting legal and physical
persons to engage in any way in the development,
production or storing of weapons of mass
destruction or missiles of proscribed range. Model
legislation was, in fact; transmitted to Iraq by
UNSCOM and the IAEA long ago.
Third
part: a preliminary assessment of Iraq's
declaration of 7 December
I shall now turn to discuss those parts of Iraq's
Declaration of 7 December, which concerts
biological and chemical weapons and long-range
missiles. I hope that my comments may he of some
assistance especially to those Members of the
Council who have only had the working version one
day arid who are about to begin their analytical
work.
Although
UNMOVIC has had access to this text a whole week
before the working version was made available, our
analysts have been fully occupied preparing the
working version and my comments must necessarily
be, provisional. I trust there will be a
further occasion for discussion, when all have had
more time for study and analysis.
The first
point to be made is that Iraq continues to state
in the Declaration, as it has consistently done
before its submission, that there were no weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq, when inspectors left
at the end of 1998 and that none have been
designed, procured, produced or stored in the
period since then.
While
individual governments have stated that they have
convincing evidence to the contrary, UNMOVIC at
this point is neither in a position to confirm
Iraq's statements, nor in possession of evidence
to disprove it.
The purpose
of the Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq
to declare all WMD programmes and creating an
extensive and intensive inspection system is to
attain, through peaceful means, confidence that
Iraq is rid of or ridding itself of all such
programmes and proscribed items-verified
disarmament.
A
declaration cannot, if it stands alone, create
confidence. The listing of sites or of persons,
the reporting of production, importation,
destruction and consumption figures and the
opening of doors, giving access to inspections, is
not enough to create confidence that no weapons
programmes and proscribed items remain. The
statements need to be supported by documentation
or other evidence. Only so do they become
verifiable.
During the
period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations
called, full, final and complete. Regrettably,
much in these declarations proved inaccurate or
incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by
evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise
that proscribed programmes car items have been
eliminated.
Such was the
situation at the end of 1998, when inspectors left
Iraq. The many question marks are documented in a
report to the Council early in 1999 (S/1999/94)
and in the so-called Amorim Report (S/1999/356).
To these question marks, nearly four years without
any inspection activity have been added.
In resolution
1441 (2002), Iraq was given an opportunity to
provide a fresh declaration and to make it
verifiable to the inspecting authorities by
submitting supporting evidence. It remains to
analyse in detail how much is clarified by the new
declaration and supporting material. When we have
performed a more thorough analysis, we may ask
Iraq for supplementary information and
clarifications.
Overall
Impression
The overall
impression is that not much new significant
information has been provided in the part of
Iraq's Declaration, which relates to proscribed
weapons programmes, nor has much new supporting
documentation or other evidence been submitted.
New material has, on the other hand, been provided
concerning non-weapons related activities during
the period from the end of 1995 to the present
time.
Missiles
and Delivery Systems
In the
missile area, there is a good deal of information
regarding Iraq's activities in the past few years.
As declared by Iraq, these are permitted
activities which will be monitored by UNMOVIC to
ensure that they comply with the relevant Council
resolutions. A series of new projects have been
declared that are at various stages of
development. They include a design for a new
liquid oxygen/ethanol propellant engine and
replacement of guidance systems for several
surface-to-air missiles. These projects will need
to be investigated and evaluated by UNMOVIC.
In the missile area, Iraq has declared the
development of a missile known as the Al Samoud,
which uses components from an imported
surface-to-air missile. A variant of the Al Samoud,
with a larger diameter (760 mm) than the standard
version (500 mm) has been declared. Because of the
potential of such a missile, UNSCOM had informed
Iraq that such a development should not proceed
until technical discussions had resolved the
question of capability. In the latest update of
the semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has
declared that in 13 flight tests of the Al Samoud
the missile has exceeded the permitted range. The
greatest range achieved was 183 kilometres.
The use of components from the imported
surface-to-air missile, which I have just
mentioned, was also the subject of the letters of
March 1994 and November 1997 in which the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM stated that the
activity was not permitted. Iraq disputed the
UNSCOM view that the activity was in violation of
its obligations. From its current Declaration, it
appears that Iraq has, in fact, proceeded with the
conversion in recent years. The whole issue will
now need to be considered.
Chemical Weapons
Although it
must be noted that much of what Iraq has provided
in the weapons part of its Declaration is not new,
there are some sections of new material. In the
chemical weapons field, Iraq has further explained
its account of the material balance of precursors
for chemical warfare agents. Although it does not
resolve outstanding issues on this subject, it may
help to achieve a better understanding of the fate
of the precursors.
While I am on
the subject of new information, I would like to
mention a document recently provided by Iraq. This
is the so-called Air Force document, which was
once in the hands of an UNSCOM inspector and which
relates to the consumption of chemical munitions
in the Iraq/Iran War. Potentially, it could assist
in resolving some questions relating to the
material balance of chemical weapons. We are now
closely examining this document to establish the
scope of the information and to evaluate it in the
light of information in our archives. It is too
early to say whether it will support the
information in Iraq's Declaration.
In the
civilian chemical area, Iraq has declared that it
has repaired and installed equipment that had
previously been destroyed under UNSCOM
supervision, under Council resolution 687 (1991).
The equipment is now at a civilian chemical plant
and used for the production of chlorine and other
chemicals. An UNMOVIC team has recently inspected
both the plant and the equipment. Consideration
will now need to be given to the fate of this
equipment, as well as other equipment, which was
presumed destroyed.
Biological
Weapons
It would
appear that the part that covers biological
weapons is essentially a reorganized version of a
previous declaration provided by Iraq to UNSCOM in
September 1997. In the chemical weapons area, the
basis of the current Declaration is a declaration
submitted by Iraq in 1996 with subsequent updates
and explanations. In the missile field, the
Declaration fellows the same format, and seems to
have largely the same content as Iraq's 1996
missile declaration and updates.
I now turn to
some inconsistencies and issues that will need
clarification. In the biological area, Iraq
previously provided, in its submission to the
Amorim panel in February 1999, a table concerning
the additional import of bacterial growth media.
Growth media was used by Iraq in the production of
anthrax and other biological warfare agents. This
table has been omitted from the current
Declaration and the reasons for the omission need
to be explained.
Nuclear
Weapons
Iraq has also
provided information on a short-range rocket that
is manufactured using 81 mm aluminium tubes.
Although this is not a new disclosure, the
information may be relevant to well-publicized
reports concerning the importation of aluminium
tubes. At this stage, UNMOVIC has drawn no
conclusions concerning the tubes; and further
investigation of this will be conducted.
New
Information and Inconsistencies, Particularly in
Chemical and Biological Weapons
I have
covered new information in Iraq's Declaration,
some inconsistencies and issues that need to be
considered or clarified through investigation or
technical discussions.
As there is
little new substantive information in the weapons
part of Iraq's Declaration, or new supporting
documentation, the issues that were identified as
unanswered in the Amorim report (S/1999/356) and
in UNSCOM's report S/1999/94 remain unresolved. In
most cases, the issues are outstanding not because
there is information that contradicts Iraq's
account, but simply because there is a lack of
supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in
the form of documentation, testimony by
individuals who took part, or physical evidence,
for example, destroyed warheads, is required to
give confidence that Iraq's Declaration is indeed
accurate, full and complete.
The issues
that have previously been identified include the
unilateral destruction of indigenously produced
"training" missile engines, the
accounting for 50 conventional warheads declared
to be unilaterally destroyed but not recovered,
550 mustard gas shells declared lost after the
Gulf War, declarations concerning the production
and weaponization of the nerve agent VX, the
declared unilateral destruction of biological
warfare agents and Iraq's declaration concerning
the material balance of bacterial growth media.
While in most
cases issues are outstanding because there is a
lack of supporting evidence, in a few cases, there
is information in our possession that would appear
to contradict Iraq's account. At this point, I
will only mention that there are indications
suggesting that Iraq's account of its production
and unilateral destruction of anthrax during the
period between 1988 and 1991, may not be accurate.
On this matter, we shall certainly ask Iraq to
provide explanations and further evidence.
Fourth
part: Outlook
What role
will the inspection system play if Iraq fails to
provide evidence supporting its statements that
there remain no weapons of mass destruction and
that nothing was produced or developed or stored
during the period from the end of 1998 until now?
Inspections
of sites have, as one important objective, the
verification of industrial, military, research and
other current activities with a view to assuring
that no proscribed programmes or activities are
regenerated at any site in Iraq. This side of the
inspection system can be characterized as a form
of containment. Through the other side of the
system of reinforced monitoring, there is a
continuation of investigations to complete the
requirement of disarmament as laid down in
resolution 687 (1991) and many subsequent
resolutions.
The sites
to be inspected in the future are not only those
which have been declared by Iraq or inspected in
the past, but also any new sites which may become
known through procurement information, interviews,
defectors, open sources, intelligence or overhead
imagery. New techniques and increasing resources
are available for this effort.
The use of
multiple teams-in all disciplines-operating in
parallel all over Iraq has been the basis for
planning our inspections. To decrease the
possibility of prediction, no systematic patterns
are being followed. Advanced technology will play
its role once procurement is finalized. Not only
monitoring equipment, such as cameras and sensors,
will be used but also surveillance over-flights
from various platforms, including fixed-wing
aircraft, drones and helicopters.
Inspection
activities at sites seek to establish the
operational objectives of sites. They comprise
searches for proscribed material and equipment, as
well as documents and computers. Sampling may also
provide important information related to any
undeclared activities at sites. Arrangements are
in place for the procurement of chemical and
biological analytical facilities to be installed
at our Baghdad Centre. None of these tools and
inspection activities will guarantee that all
possibly concealed items and activities will be
found, but based on the extensive authority given
in resolution 1441 (2002) and backed by a united
Security Council, they will make any attempted
concealment more difficult.
19
December 2002
Powell Says Iraq Remains "In Material
Breach" Of U.N. Obligations
(Outlines four-step approach to dealing with Iraq
in press conference)
Iraq "remains
in material breach of its obligations"
required in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1441, which calls for Iraq "to
disarm of its weapons of mass destruction and to
disclose all of its nuclear, chemical, biological
and missile programs," said Secretary of
State Collin Powell at a December 19 press
conference.
Powell told
reporters that according to U.N. inspectors'
findings, Iraq has failed to provide new
information in the 12,200-page declaration
document submitted to the Security Council on
December 7th.
Powell said that while thousands of the document's
pages are a resubmission of incomplete material
that Iraq gave the U.N. in previous years, other
sections include copies of passages from reports
written by the United Nations and the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Powell said the Iraqi declaration is silent on its
anthrax stockpile; supplies of botulinum toxin (a
biological agent) from which mustard gas, sarin
gas and VX nerve gas can be produced; and the
procurement and use of high-strength aluminum
tubes that can be used in a nuclear weapons
program. The declaration does not address
questions that U.N. inspectors had in 1998 before
they left Iraq, he said.
Powell presented a four-step approach to deal
with Iraq in the coming weeks: audit and examine
the Iraqi declaration "to understand the full
extent of Iraq's failure to meet its disclosure
obligations;" conduct interviews with
scientists and other witnesses outside of Iraq by
U.N. inspectors; intensify U.N. inspectors'
efforts inside Iraq, with the full support and
assistance of the U.N. Security Council; and
consult with the Security Council and U.S. allies
on how to compel Iraq to comply with the terms of
the resolution.
Powell said that although there is no calendar
deadline by which Iraq has to show compliance,
"there is a practical limit to how much
longer you can just go down the road of
noncooperation and how much time the inspectors
can be given to do their work. ... This situation
cannot continue."
Asked if the United States will seek another
resolution from the Security Council authorizing
military action, Powell reiterated President
Bush's interest in the peaceful disarmament of
Iraq. However if this is not possible, said
Powell, "it will be done by force."
"We are doing everything we can to avoid war.
The President has made that clear. But if war
comes, the only thing I would say about the nature
of that conflict is that it will done in a way
that would minimize the loss of life, and it would
be done to be accomplished is as swift a manner as
possible, and for the purpose of getting rid of
weapons of mass destruction and liberating the
Iraqi people," said Powell.
According to
Powell, "Resolution 1441 was the latest in a
long string of Security Council resolutions since
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Previous resolutions,
which included requirements to disarm and to end
the cruel repression of the Iraqi people, have all
been defied or ignored by Iraq."
Following
is the text of Secretary of State Colin Powell's
December 19 Press Conference on Iraq:
(2:30 p.m. EST)
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. On November 8th, the United Nations
Security Council responded to the challenge issued
by President Bush in his 12 September speech to
the United Nations General Assembly. On that day,
the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution
1441, requiring Iraq to disarm itself of its
weapons of mass destruction and to disclose all of
its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile
programs.
Resolution
1441 was the latest in a long string of Security
Council resolutions since Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. Previous resolutions, which included
requirements to disarm and to end the cruel
repression of the Iraqi people, have all been
defied or ignored by Iraq.
Resolution
1441 recognized that Iraq "has been and
remains in material breach of its
obligations," but gave the Iraqi regime,
again, a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations.
Iraq's answer
came on December 7th in a 12,200-page document
submitted to the Security Council.
Resolution
1441 required Iraq to submit a declaration on all
its mass weapons program of destruction, a
declaration that was "currently accurate,
full and complete," in the words of the
resolution.
The
inspectors told the Security Council this morning
that the declaration fails to answer many open
questions. They said that in some cases they even
have information that directly contradicts Iraq's
account.
Our
experts have also examined the Iraqi document. The
declaration's title echoes the language of
Resolution 1441. It is called, "Currently
Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration." But
our experts have found it to be anything but
currently accurate, full or complete. The Iraqi
declaration may use the language of Resolution
1441, but it totally fails to meet the
resolution's requirements.
The
inspectors said that Iraq has failed to provide
new information. We agree. Indeed, thousands of
the document's pages are merely a resubmission of
material it gave the United Nations years ago,
material that the UN has already determined was
incomplete.
Other
sections of the Iraqi declaration consists of long
passages copied from reports written by the United
Nations and the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The only changes the Iraqi regime made
were to remove references critical to its own
conduct. The declaration totally fails to address
what we had learned about Iraq's prohibited
weapons programs before the inspectors were
effectively forced out in 1998.
And let me
just touch on a few examples, and we'll be giving
out a fact sheet later with additional examples.
Biological
Weapons
- Before the
inspectors were forced to leave Iraq, they
concluded that Iraq could have produced 26,000
liters of anthrax. That is three times the
amount Iraq had declared. Yet, the Iraqi
declaration is silent on this stockpile,
which, alone, would be enough to kill several
million people.
- The regime
also admitted that it had manufactured 19,180
liters of a biological agent called botulinum
toxin. UN inspectors later determined that the
Iraqis could have produced 38,360 additional
liters. However, once again, the Iraqi
declaration is silent on these missing
supplies.
- Nor does
the declaration address questions that have
arisen since the inspectors left in 1998. For
example, we know that in the late 1990s, Iraq
built mobile biological weapons production
units. Yet, the declaration tries to waive
this away, mentioning only mobile
refrigeration vehicles and food-testing
laboratories.
Chemical
Weapons
- The Iraqi
declaration also says nothing about the
uncounted, unaccounted precursors from which
Iraq could have produced up to 500 tons of
mustard gas, sarin gas and VX nerve gas.
Nuclear
Weapons
- We also
know that Iraq has tried to obtain
high-strength aluminum tubes which can be used
to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear
weapons program. The Iraqi regime is required
by Resolution 1441 to report those attempts.
Iraq, however, has failed to provide adequate
information about the procurement and use of
these tubes.
Most
brazenly of all, the Iraqi declaration denies the
existence of any prohibited weapons programs at
all. The United States, the United Nations and the
world waited for this declaration from Iraq. But
Iraq's response is a catalogue of recycled
information and flagrant omissions. It should be
obvious that the pattern of systematic holes and
gaps in Iraq's declaration is not the result of
accidents or editing oversights or technical
mistakes. These are material omissions that, in
our view, constitute another material breach.
We are
disappointed, but we are not deceived. This
declaration is consistent with the Iraqi regime's
past practices. We have seen this game again and
again-an attempt to sow confusion and buy time,
hoping the world will lose interest. This time,
the game is not working. This time, the
international community is concentrating its
attention and increasing its resolve as the true
nature of the Iraqi regime is revealed again.
On the
basis of this declaration, on the basis of the
evidence before us, our path for the coming weeks
is clear.
- First,
we must continue to audit and examine the
Iraqi declaration to understand the full
extent of Iraq's failure to meet its
disclosure obligations.
- Second,
the inspections should give high priority to
conducting interviews with scientists and
other witnesses outside of Iraq, where they
can speak freely. Under the terms of
Resolution 1441, Iraq is obligated-it is their
obligation-to make such witnesses available to
the inspectors.
- Third,
the inspectors should intensify their efforts
inside Iraq. The United States, and I hope
other Council members, will provide the
inspectors with every possible assistance, all
the support they need to succeed in their
crucial mission. Given the gravity of the
situation, we look forward to frequent reports
from Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei.
- Finally,
we will continue to consult with our friends,
with our allies, and with all members of the
Security Council on how to compel compliance
by Iraq with the will of the international
community.
But let there
be no misunderstanding. As Ambassador John
Negroponte said earlier today, Saddam Hussein
has so far responded to this final opportunity
with a new lie. The burden remains on Iraq. Not on
the United Nations. Not on the United States. The
burden remains on Iraq to cooperate fully and for
Iraq to prove to the international community
whether it does or does not have weapons of mass
destruction. We are convinced they do until they
prove to us otherwise.
Resolution
1441 calls for serious consequences for Iraq if it
does not comply with the terms of the resolution.
Iraq's noncompliance and defiance of the
international community has brought it closer to
the day when it will have to face these
consequences. The world is still waiting for Iraq
to comply with its obligations. The world will not
wait forever. Security Council Resolution 1441
will be carried out in full. Iraq can no longer be
allowed to threaten its people and its region with
weapons of mass destruction. It is still up to
Iraq to determine how its disarmament will happen.
Unfortunately, this declaration fails totally
to move us in the direction of a peaceful
solution.
And now I'd
be prepared to take some questions.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary.
SECRETARY
POWELL: Yes.
QUESTION: I'm
a little confused because this was to have been
Iraq's last chance and you've just laid out four
additional things, including interviewing
scientists, and you're still saying that Iraq has
the opportunity to so-and-so and so-and-so. I
don't know if you're saying an airtight case
hasn't been made or somehow you have some slim
hope it can be turned around by Iraq.
SECRETARY
POWELL: It remains to be seen. The resolution was
its last chance and there were obligations for
Iraq in that resolution: one, to accept the
resolution; two, to provide a declaration. We have
begun our analysis of that declaration and we find
so far that it has failed to do what it was
supposed to do.
But we will
continue to work with UNMOVIC and IAEA and we'll
consult with other members of the Council to see
what conclusions the Council members arrive at,
and to see whether or not more evidence can be
brought forward to make the case to the Council
that Iraq has totally missed its opportunity.
But so
far, with respect to complying with the conditions
and the terms of 1441, Iraq is well on its way to
losing this last chance.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, you've used the expression
"material breach." Can you tell us why
you've chosen to use this? And how would you
answer those who have been saying this morning
that by using this without taking action you are,
in fact, devaluing the expression?
SECRETARY
POWELL: "Material breach." I think,
perhaps, too much has been made of the term.
Material breach is a term that comes from the law
that says a party to a commitment has failed in
meeting the terms of that commitment. Iraq has
done that repeatedly in the past. That's why 1441
begins with that statement of past material breach
on many occasions by Iraq, still in material
breach, and this is a new material breach.
I don't
think we are devaluing the term. I think we are
using the term to make it clear to the world that,
once again, we have a breach on the part of Iraq
with respect to its obligations and therefore the
spots have not changed.
Now, I'll let
the other members of the Council make their own
judgment as to whether they wish to characterize
it as such right now. The important point, I
think, is that from what we heard from Dr. Blix
and Dr. El Baradei this morning, and what I heard
from other members of the Council who have spoken,
is that there is no question that Iraq continues
its pattern of noncooperation, its pattern of
deception, its pattern of dissembling, its pattern
of lying. And if that is going to be the way they
continue through the weeks ahead, then we're not
going to find a peaceful solution to this problem.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, is there a deadline by which Iraq has
to show this compliance, and will the United
States return to the Security Council and seek
another resolution authorizing military action
toward the end of next month if Iraq does not
comply?
SECRETARY
POWELL: There is no calendar deadline, but
obviously there is a practical limit to how much
longer you can just go down the road of
noncooperation and how much time the
inspectors can be given to do their work.
In the weeks
ahead, we expect both the IAEA and UNMOVIC to give
regular reports as they get deeper into their
inspection work, and as they analyze the
declaration further. There are still long sections
of the annexes that came with the declaration that
have to be carefully examined. So I would not put
a timeline on it, but obviously it is not
indefinite. This situation cannot continue.
A body of
evidence is slowly building since the passage of
Resolution 1441, and that body of evidence shows
that Iraq is still not cooperating. It is Iraq's
obligation to cooperate and they are the ones who
are supposed to be coming forward under this
resolution to demonstrate to the international
community what they have done in the past, what
they might still be holding, and to come clean.
And what we have seen in this declaration is they
still have not made a decision to come clean. And
the inspectors will not be able to do their work
until Iraq demonstrates that they are cooperating
and they are coming clean and bringing forward the
information. And until that happens, we should be
very skeptical, and I'm afraid we should be very
discouraged, with respect to the prospects of
finding a peaceful solution.
Terri.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, when is the US planning to share its
intelligence with the inspectors, if at all? I
think we were told they were waiting until after
the initial assessment. Is now the right time to
do that?
SECRETARY
POWELL: We have, of course, been sharing our
evaluation of the declaration with the inspection
teams of both IAEA and UNMOVIC with respect to
providing them additional forms of support that
would make the inspection effort perhaps more
targeted and effective. We are prepared to start
doing that and we'll be in contact with them.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, as you know, the Vice President, in
particular, has been very skeptical about
inspections. So far, the inspectors have not
turned up anything. Are you not concerned that if
another month elapses and the inspectors are not
able to find any of these weapons that you say are
hidden, that that's going to undermine your case
to the world that there is, in fact, violations?
SECRETARY
POWELL: We have all been skeptical of inspections
because we are basically distrustful of Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi regime, and for good reason,
and so, the President took the case to the
international community.
The
declaration, I think, is further evidence of
Iraq's unwillingness to comply with the
requirements of the international community. And
I don't want to prejudge what the inspectors might
or might not find and it is not clear, exactly,
what they have found or not found yet. They are
getting up to speed. The number of inspectors has
increased. Bits and pieces of information will
come together. I hope that when members of the
Council provide more support to the inspectors, it
may make their work even that much more effective.
But I wouldn't prejudge. The President has said
repeatedly, he is interested in the disarmament of
Iraq peacefully, if possible, but if that is not
possible, it will be done by force.
QUESTION:
Thank you. Mr. Secretary, if the US goes to war
with Iraq, what kind of war would it be? Will it
be swift, or will it be bloody? How will it differ
from Desert Storm?
SECRETARY
POWELL: We are doing everything we can to avoid
war. The President has made that clear. But if war
comes, the only thing I would say about the nature
of that conflict is that it will done in a way
that would minimize the loss of life, and it would
be done to be accomplished is as swift a manner as
possible, and for the purpose of getting rid of
weapons of mass destruction and liberating the
Iraqi people. But I wouldn't go any further right
now.
Way in the
back, please.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, are you satisfied with the Turkish
cooperation on this Iraq subject?
SECRETARY
POWELL: We have been in very close touch with the
Turkish Government at all levels, and the new
Turkish Government as well, and we are satisfied
with the level of dialogue. And in the days ahead,
now that some political issues are behind us with
respect to EU accession, I think the new Turkish
Government will be able to focus more on
consultation with us with respect to Turkish
actions and Turkish interests in what we are
doing.
QUESTION: The
Iraqi declaration helped to clarifications or more
additions, would the United States be ready and
willing to accept more qualifications of what they
already said? Would you take into consideration
that they said, "Oh, yes, we forgot this year
what we actually have done with this"? Will
that be possible to prevent a war?
SECRETARY
POWELL: Let's see what happens in the days ahead.
I can't hypothesize on that because I have little
confidence that the Iraqis will do anything but
try to-see, we answered your question here, but
we're not answering all these other questions that
perhaps you haven't even asked us yet.
The
resolution was clear: currently accurate, full and
complete. It means the burden is on them to come
forward and say, "You know we've been doing
this. You know we've done it in the past. We have
now changed, turned over a new leaf, and we're
giving you all the information you need to see
that we are giving this up, or anything we still
are doing we will not do and we are demonstrating
to you where this is so it can be destroyed, and
we are in compliance."
But that
has not been the attitude of the Iraqi Government
for the past 12 years, it is not the attitude of
the Iraqi Government today, and the world should
view this with great skepticism, keep the pressure
on, make sure Iraq knows that it will be disarmed
one way or the other, and hope that the Iraqi
people and Iraqi leaders, besides Saddam Hussein,
realize that they are going to disarm one way or
the other.
Charlie.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, you are also facing another crisis in
Venezuela. Can you bring us up to date on where
that crisis stands? Are things getting better,
getting worse, as supply of food and fuel is
shortened?
SECRETARY
POWELL: We are very concerned and we are following
the situation in Venezuela very closely. We are
concerned about the continuation of the strikes
and the demonstrations in the streets that create
the possibility of violence and deep political
unrest and social unrest. We also are worried
about the fact that the oil sector is slowly
shutting down, with economic consequences for all
Venezuelans, but as well as others outside of
Venezuela.
We are in
close touch with the Secretary General of the OAS,
who is in the lead for the community of American
nations on this subject. We have presented some
ideas to the Secretary General for his
consideration. I had a conversation last week with
the Foreign Minister of Venezuela to see if we
could play a helpful role.
There have
been some efforts in the last day or two to put
forward ideas from both sides that might be a
basis of discussion. I can't say that much
progress has been made on that. Both sides have
been acting in a rather intransigent way. But we
are watching it closely and working closely with
the OAS and we are also in touch with others who
are interested, such as the Carter Center.
Last one. Betsy, you got it.
QUESTION: Mr.
Secretary, Mr. Blix said today that he had asked
for lists of Iraqi scientists who had worked on
these programs. He said that there were no efforts
yet to try and work on modalities for access to
these people. Are you going to push them harder
to-I mean, getting access, after all, is what
you're after.
SECRETARY
POWELL: We are working on modalities now and we
are putting in place, working with Dr. Blix and
Dr. El Baradei, putting in place means by which
one could accomplish this interview task. It has
some complex aspects to it.
And there
will be names that will be made available. And let
us remember this. Under the resolution, when those
names are presented to the Iraqi Government, they
are required to provide these individuals for
interview, and for interview in a safe place, and
for their families to be in a safe place where
they will not be in danger of losing their lives
for telling the truth.
And so we are
hard at work on all of these modalities. Thank
you.
State
Department Cites Gaps in Iraq Weapons Declaration
(Fact sheet calls missing information
"material omissions") (610): 19 December
2002
Illustrative
Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration
to the United Nations Security Council
Ballistic Missiles
- Iraq has
disclosed manufacturing new energetic fuels
suited only to a class of missile to which it
does not admit.
- Iraq
claims that flight-testing of a larger
diameter missile falls within the 150km limit.
This claim is not credible.
- Why is the
Iraqi regime manufacturing fuels for missiles
it says it does not have?
Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Programs
- Iraq
denies any connection between UAV programs and
chemical or biological agent dispersal. Yet,
Iraq admitted in 1995 that a MIG-21
remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was to
carry a biological weapon spray system.
- Iraq
already knows how to put these biological
agents into bombs and how to disperse
biological agent using aircraft or unmanned
aerial vehicles.
- Why do
they deny what they have already admitted? Why
has the Iraqi regime acquired the range and
auto-flight capabilities to spray biological
weapons?
VX
- In 1999,
UN Special Commission and international
experts concluded that Iraq needed to provide
additional, credible information about VX
production.
- The
declaration provides no information to address
these concerns.
- What is
the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not
providing this information?
Chemical
and Biological Weapons Munitions
- In January
1999, the UN Special Commission reported that
Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that
550 mustard gas-filled artillery shells and
400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs had
been lost or destroyed.
- The Iraqi
regime has never adequately accounted for
hundreds, possibly thousands, of tons of
chemical precursors.
- Again,
what is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not
providing this information?
Empty
Chemical Munitions
- There is
no adequate accounting for nearly 30,000 empty
munitions that could be filled with chemical
agents.
- Where are
these munitions?
Anthrax
and Other Undeclared Biological Agents
- The UN
Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not
verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg
of growth media.
This is
enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax
- 3 times
the amount Iraq declared; 1200 liters of
botulinum toxin; and, 5500 liters of
clostridium perfrigens
- 16 times
the amount Iraq declared.
Why does the
Iraqi declaration ignore these dangerous agents in
its tally?
Mobile
Biological Weapon Agent Facilities
- The Iraqi
declaration provides no information about its
mobile biological weapon agent facilities.
Instead it insists that these are
"refrigeration vehicles and food testing
laboratories."
- What is
the Iraqi regime trying to hide about their
mobile biological weapon facilities?
Nuclear
Weapons
- The
Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium
from Niger.
- Why is the
Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?
Summary
None of these
holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration are mere
accidents, editing oversights or technical
mistakes: they are material omissions.
JACK
STRAW'S STATEMENT ON IRAQ AFTER WEAPONS
INSPECTORS' REPORT (19/12/02)
The Foreign
Secretary said:
'The
reports from the inspectors, Dr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei,
to the Security Council this afternoon show
clearly that Iraq has failed to meet the
obligations imposed on it by Security Council
Resolution 1441, which requires them to make a
full and complete disclosure of their weapons of
mass destruction, the material to put those
weapons of mass destruction together. And, as Dr.
Blix has said, this means that we cannot have
confidence - I would add to put it very mildly -
that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction as it
has claimed. This now means that Iraq faces even
greater responsibilities to comply fully with the
inspectors and co-operate fully with the United
Nations if military action is to be avoided. This
disclosure does not of itself trigger military
action under Operational Paragraph Four, but it is
a very serious failure to comply, and a clear
warning has to go out to Iraq that they now have
to co-operate fully with the United Nations and
its inspectors as is required of them by
international law.'
'IRAQ'S
WEAPONS DECLARATION' (19/12/02)
QUESTION:
Can you give us the grounds upon which we might
justify going to war given that lying alone by
Saddam is not enough?
JACK STRAW:
Well the grounds for declaring that there's been a
material breach are very clearly set out in the
resolution which we and the Americans put together
which was agreed by the Security Council on 8
November. And that requires that if there is to be
what's called a further material breach there has
to be full statement or omissions in the
declarations and failure by Iraq at any time to
comply with and cooperate fully in the
implementation of this resolution.
QUESTION:
And that hasn't happened.
JACK STRAW:
Not so far and let me make this clear: what
we've got today is a further step in a very calm
and deliberate process to try by every means
possible to get Iraq to comply with its
international law obligations peacefully and
therefore and thereby to resolve this crisis in a
peaceful manner.
Nobody
wants war. We do not want war, the United States I
am certain does not want war. But the paradox
we've always been faced with here is this: that it
is only by linking our very active diplomacy with
a credible and increasing threat of force that
there is any serious chance of ensuring the
peaceful disarmament of Saddam Hussein's weapons
of mass destruction.
QUESTION:
You said in the House yesterday if Saddam persists
in this obvious falsehood, that's to say not
having given a full declaration in that document,
it will become clear that he has rejected the
pathway to peace laid down in resolution fourteen
forty one. Geoff Hoon says something quite
different from that doesn't he?
JACK STRAW:
Not that I recall. I think Geoff has said exactly
the same thing. I mean sometimes we use slightly
different languages which just proves that we're
different individuals.
QUESTION:
But what he says is that there must not only be an
obvious falsehood, there must be deliberate
obstruction by Iraq. Now is that the case? Because
if so it doesn't seem to fit with what you said
yesterday?
JACK STRAW:
No, the two are entirely consistent. The one thing
that Geoff and I are absolutely accurate reporters
on is what is contained in the resolution which
after all we and the United States put ourselves
together.
And we were
clear when we described what was a further
material breach which could be described as a
trigger for military action that you had to have
two limbs to this. One was a failure to disclose,
another was failure in other ways by Iraq to
cooperate. What I've been talking about, and the
Prime Minister was yesterday, was the fact that on
the fact of it on a preliminary assessment of the
declaration made by Iraq it looks as though they
have not put in the complete full and accurate
disclosure that they're required to.
And let
me say how it's possible to arrive at this, even
at this preliminary stage. Your listeners will
recall that at the end of 1998 the previous
inspectors called UNSCOM had to leave Iraq because
they found the conditions in which they were
trying to do the inspections impossible. UNSCOM
made a final report to the United Nations Security
Council in February of 1999 and in that final
report they said that three thousand tonnes of
precursor chemicals, three hundred and sixty
tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents including
one and a half tonnes of very dangerous VX nerve
agent, more than thirty thousand special munitions
for delivery of chemical and biological agents and
large quantities of growth media acquired for the
use of production of biological weapons, including
three times the amount of anthrax that Iraq had
previously declared, that all those were
unaccounted for.
Since then
we've been saying to the Iraqis that UNSCOM knew
that this was here. You haven't accounted for it.
You have to account for it. It's a base line for
these inspections. So that's one of the measures
by which it's possible to determine whether there
has been this full, accurate and complete
disclosure.
QUESTION:
Right, but just to be quite clear about that, they
would have to come back, that is already a breach
of sorts, right? That quite clearly if that
material is not declared in the statement then
that is what you describe as a falsehood. But my
question is this, does there not then have to be
in addition to that Hans Blix and his team saying
and we have been obstructed and if he does not
come back and say and we have been instructed,
then there would not be war?
JACK STRAW:
This is part of a continuing process. And it's
quite interesting I thought in the rather
breathless report from Andrew Gilligan that he's
describing a cool, calm and diplomatic process and
at the same time expressing some regret that
British troops were not about to go to war
tomorrow. That's true. And the United Nations
Security Council resolution lays down a very
clear, calm procedure which will lead up to a full
discussion in Security Council on 27 January when
Dr Blix and his colleague from the Atomic Energy
Inspectors, Dr ElBaradei, will have to make a full
first report on their activities of inspection.
Now what I
suspect will happen at this afternoon's meeting of
the Security Council is that the Security Council
will receive a report from Dr Blix and Dr
ElBaradei. It's highly probable I mean, I'm
anticipating this, that the inspectors will say as
we're saying because it's pretty obvious look
there are big gaps in this disclosure. Then there
will be requirements by the Security Council or by
the inspectors who've got the power themselves to
say to the Iraqis you've now got to cooperate in a
way you've not been cooperating in the past. We
don't just mean cooperating to allow the, the
weapons inspectors vehicles through. We mean
cooperating to tell us, the international
community, where the stuff is.
QUESTION:
And, if they come back at the end of that process
and say look we haven't been obstructed, then
there is no question at all of war and that
process may take quite a long time, may it not?
JACK STRAW:
It's always been a process that may take a long
time. The operational paragraph four which I've
read out is very clear about what constitutes what
constitutes a further material breach. Now you're
also asking me who makes the final decision about
that, and it's not a matter for the inspectors and
never has been.
The
initial consideration will be a matter for the
Security Council, that's also clearly laid out in
the resolution. And we've been through this
before. What we would hope very much is that if
there was the clearest evidence of a further
material breach the Security Council would accept
its responsibilities and then say that the will of
the international community had to be enforced by
all necessary means, which means military action.
If that was blocked and I know we've been round
the houses on this, then we obviously have to
reserve the right for what we call the Kosovo
option, but our absolute clear preference is that
if in that sad eventuality we believe that
military action is the only way of enforcing the
international order then that should be done by a
second Security Council resolution.
QUESTION:
Right, but you see the worry that a lot of people
have is that you are asking the inspectors to
prove something that perhaps they simply can not
prove. In other words you are giving them an
option which is bound to lead to war.
JACK STRAW:
I understand that and I fully understand people's
anxieties about this and people ought to be
anxious about war. I'm anxious about the prospect
of military action, so's the Prime Minister, so
are the leaders of the American administration
because innocent people get killed in war and you
should only take military action as a last resort.
So I fully
understand people's anxieties given all the
reports that have been written about this, that
people may think the US and the United Kingdom
about to take five steps ahead of themselves and
then go to war. Well it isn't the case, and if for
example the US had been determined to go quotes
unilateral it would have done so, but it decided
to go down the UN route.
We've got an
excellent Security Council resolution backed
fifteen zero by the international community. What
we're now seeing is this resolution being
processed. Now I'd just like to deal with your
last point. Are we giving the inspectors a quotes
impossible task? No we're not. The reason the
inspectors are in Iraq and they're not in anywhere
else is because we know for absolute certain that
Iraq has had weapons of mass destruction and the
ability to put them together and we know from
their previous record that they've lied about
this. So the inspectors have got a difficult task,
but not an impossible one.
ABOUT DR.
ANTHONY CORDESMAN
Dr. Anthony
Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in
Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and
is Co-Director of the
Center's Middle East Program. He is also a
military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at
Georgetown. He directs the
assessment of global military balance, strategic
energy developments, and
CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East.
He is the author of books
on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as
well as the Arab-Israeli
military balance and the peace process, a
six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military
developments in Iran and Iraq. He
analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans,
counter-proliferation issues, arms
transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and
energy issues.
Dr. Cordesman
served as a national security analyst for ABC News
for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation
Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National Security to Senator
John McCain and a Wilson
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
at the Smithsonian. He has
served in senior positions in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, and
the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting
as the Civilian Assistant
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of
Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and
Analysis in the Department
of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as
the Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman
has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was
a member of
the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the
NATO International Staff,
working on Middle Eastern security issues. He
served in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has
been an advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and
has traveled extensively in
the Gulf and North Africa.
PREVIOUS
GULFWIRE APPEARANCES
"Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism,
and Terrorism"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_12_01.htm
"The West and the Arab World: Partnership or
a 'Clash of Civilizations?'"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_11_12.htm
"Strategy in the Middle East: The Gap Between
Strategic Theory and
Operational Reality"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_10_22.htm
"A Firsthand Look at Saudi Arabia Since
9-11"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_10_10.htm
"Iraq: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_07_12.htm
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and Its Weapons of
Mass Destruction"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_06_02.htm
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional
Military Balance"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_06_01.htm
"Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli and
Palestinian Strategic Failures"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_04_08.htm
"Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Strategic
Partnership"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_01_28.htm
BOOKS BY DR.
CORDESMAN
"Iraq's Military Capabilities in 2002: A
Dynamic Net Assessment"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0892064161/arabialink
"Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional
Threats and Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275965287/arabialink
"Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond," (CSIS
Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332362/arabialink
"Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert
Kingdom," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net
Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332427/arabialink
"Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Defending
the U.S. Homeland"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275974278/arabialink
|
