|
INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION
COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT
PERSPECTIVES
JUNE 24, 2002
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH'S
PEACE INITIATIVE
===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================
PASSING BRAVE: CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH’S
PEACE INITIATIVE
by
John Duke Anthony
With the world still awaiting word from
President Bush on what he will say
next in support of Israeli-Palestinian peace, public commentary continues
apace on Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdallah’s March 28 peace proposal for
solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. GulfWire is pleased to offer herein a
perspective on the topic by GW publisher, Dr. John Duke Anthony. Dr.
Anthony focuses on the Crown Prince’s initiative in light of its treatment
and assessment to date by many Americans, Arabs, and Israelis, including,
among the latter, the Israeli leadership.
Depending on the degree of familiarity that
analysts and critics have with
the subject, and, also, on what they know about modern Saudi Arabian
history, much of the public commentary thus far has been somewhat mixed and
inconclusive. Generalists and specialists alike appear to have veered from
being outright dismissive of the proposal as a perceived attention-getting
gimmick, to being perplexed as to whether it is serious and, if so, why.
On the other hand, as many others have
professed to being confounded as to
whether the initiative, even if acknowledged as unprecedented, is likely to
make any difference. A frame of reference is the Israeli Likud Party’s
decision last month to reject outright any idea of an independent State of
Palestine. Some commentators confess to being dumbfounded as to why Prince
Abdallah introduced the proposal when he did. Still others are uncertain
as
to whether, for any reason, it ought to be dignified with the serious
discussion and debate that its author clearly intended, and clearly still
intends, for it to receive.
In the essay that follows, Dr. Anthony
takes a different tack. He provides
essential context and background as to why the proposal surfaced at this
time. He also contributes a range of insight and analysis regarding the
Crown Prince’s initiative that, for the most part, have not appeared in
other published commentary to date. In response to such questions as,
“Where’s Saudi Arabia coming from with regard to this proposal?” and “What’s
driving the Kingdom to take such a position, especially when there are signs
aplenty that this issue is as intractable as ever?” he offers clear answers
and much of interest and value.
Dr. Anthony provides hard-to-come-by
historical facts, strategic viewpoints
shared by the Kingdom’s policymakers to which he is privy, and matters
pertaining to the country’s Arab and Islamic identity. All this and more
is
integrated into Dr. Anthony’s assessment of Prince Abdallah’s initiative.
On balance, he argues that, for a period far longer than many are aware, in
terms of what he has offered as a way out of the Arab-Israeli impasse, the
Saudi Crown prince is serious in his hopes of being taken seriously, first
and foremost, by Israel and its American supporters.
Patrick Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire
===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================
PASSING BRAVE: CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH’S
PEACE INITIATIVE
by
John Duke Anthony
[Washington – June 24, 2002] The world
eagerly awaits President Bush’s
Mideast peace speech. Who is not eager to know what the President will say
about how he intends to bring the new State of Palestine into being and,
thereby, travel such a meaningful distance further along the road to peace
between Arabs and Israelis?
Until the President delivers his speech,
the main peace offer to Israel on
the table is one advanced by Saudi Arabia that enjoys extraordinary pan-Arab
backing. Following is an analysis of much of the hullabaloo that has
transpired regarding the proposal.
On March 28, a summit of the 22-member
League of Arab States in Beirut
unanimously endorsed an Arab-Israeli peace initiative submitted by Saudi
Arabian Crown Prince Abdallah. The proposal requires that Israel withdraw
from all Arab territories it has occupied since June 4, 1967, that it
recognize an independent State of Palestine with its capital in East
Jerusalem, and that it agree to a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee
problem through repatriation, compensation, or a combination of the two.
In exchange, the proposal includes
everything Israel has asked for.
Included are peace and normalization of diplomatic and commercial ties with
the Jewish state, pan-Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist and to
security, and a guarantee of regional defense in which there would be no
attacks against Israel, or by Israel against an Arab country, of any kind.
The Saudi Arabian initiative, according to
innumerable published accounts by
analysts far and wide, is the most momentous and far-reaching one ever
offered Israel, the more so for its having been presented by what many
believe is the world’s most important Arab and Islamic country.
THESIS
Notwithstanding widespread international
acceptance of the proposal, a
discordant chorus of American and Israeli voices has arisen against it since
it was introduced, claiming specifically, that:
o Saudi Arabia has seldom
before interjected itself into the Arab-Israeli
peace process and should not do so now;
o The Kingdom’s intentions and timing are deceptive;
o Riyadh’s real motivation is to deflect public attention from the
fact
that its citizens comprised 15 of the 19 hijackers in the
September 11
attacks;
o The proposal is a public relations ploy for the Kingdom to repair
its
image by shifting public attention from the fact that its
citizens are
numerically the most prominent among those imprisoned at
Guantanomo Bay;
o The Kingdom’s leadership manipulatively identifies with the
Palestinians’ plight so as to divert its citizens’ anger
and frustration
from itself; and
o The Saudi Arabian ruling family’s situation is fragile, its
leadership
fears being overthrown, and this is why the Crown Prince is
trying to
please the United States at this time.
COUNTER-THESIS
However plausible these statements may
appear on the surface, whether viewed
individually or collectively, it is this writer’s view that nothing could be
further from the truth. Indeed, all of these assertions, and many others
similarly unsubstantiated, are bogus. There are many reasons, but none has
anything to do with the six spurious rationales noted.
One reason derives from the conflict’s
consistently adverse impact on the
region’s well being. To wit: the conflict has generated half a dozen wars.
It is the oldest, largest, and most pervasive factor explaining why regional
peace is likely to remain elusive for sometime yet to come.
A second reason flows from the Saudi
Arabian leadership’s deep understanding
of the conflict and its implications from the outset for the region’s
legitimate quest for stability and prosperity. This stems from the intricate
and compassionate identification of the Kingdom’s citizens with the
conflict’s international and domestic repercussions.
The latter include two closures of the Suez
Canal, the spread of regional
radicalism as well as anti-Americanism and terrorism, three oil embargoes,
the perpetuation of an atmosphere disfavorable to inward flows of foreign
investment, and the fact that many of the wounded and disabled Palestinians
who have sought to end the Israeli occupation are in the Kingdom’s
hospitals.
A powerful third reason is imbedded in the
observation that many Americans
are fond of stating that Israel is the United States’ only friend in the
region, forgetting or overlooking the fact that, before the establishment of
the State of Israel, American had no enemies in the region.
A formidable fourth reason is rooted in a
unique facet of the Kingdom’s
history, about which most critics apparently know very little. Especially
important in this regard is that, among the world’s 140 developing
countries, Saudi Arabia is the only one both to have become an entirely new
state and entered into the community of nations in the last century not by
having achieved its independence from a Western power.
The Kingdom’s special perspective of
having viewed the unfolding saga of
Palestine from the beginning through unfiltered lenses has not been lost on
specialists. Yet despite the abundance of evidence demonstrating the
Kingdom’s extraordinarily close monitoring of the ongoing debate about
Palestine’s sovereignty, political independence, and territory since the
debate’s inception, generalists almost always overlook this dynamic.
The latter include three American groups
that regularly bash Saudi Arabia:
namely, the mainstream print media, major television and radio talk show
hosts and participants, and most Members of Congress.
A PRESCIENT SAUDI ARABIAN: PRINCE FAISAL
…
A fifth reason why so few Americans know
much about Saudi Arabia’s deep and
broad identification with the Arab-Israeli conflict from the very beginning
is rooted in their not being aware of the lasting and profound educational
impact of the late Saudi Arabian King Faisal (r.1965-1975) regarding this
issue in the minds of many of the Kingdom’s citizens.
Very few generalists appreciate the extent
to which Faisal never tired of
emphasizing to Saudi Arabians, Americans, and many others the need to
achieve a just, durable, and comprehensive settlement of the Palestine
problem. Even fewer are aware that Crown Prince Abdallah’s peace proposal is
anchored in, and an extension of, the same strategic objective.
Regarding what he and many others have long
regarded as the core problem of
the Middle East, Faisal, together with Prince Abdallah and numerous other
Saudi Arabian leaders, knew longer and better than most about that which he
spoke. Little wonder why: he grew up with the unfolding tragedy of
Palestine.
Barely in his teens, Faisal was sent by his
and Prince Abdallah’s father --
King Abdalaziz bin Abdalrahman Al Sa’ud, “Ibn Saud” – as the Kingdom’s
Special Envoy to London prior to the League of Nations’ post-World War One
decision to award a Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain.
Subsequently Faisal spent more than three
decades as Minister of Foreign
Affairs before becoming king of Saudi Arabia. Carrying on as Foreign
Minister for the past quarter century has been Faisal’s son, HRH Prince Sa’
ud Al-Faisal, who is as close to Prince Abdallah as any within the Kingdom’s
Cabinet and ruling family. Like the current Crown Prince and many others
among the Kingdom’s leaders, Prince Sa’ud equally acknowledges an
intellectual debt to his father regarding this issue.
In short, two generations of Saudi Arabian
king father and son, not to
mention four kings in succession and one presently in waiting, have searched
for over three quarters of a century for a just, durable, and comprehensive
resolution to this conflict. This fact alone negates all assertions that the
Kingdom is newly and deceptively embarking upon a path it has not traveled
previously.
Regarding pan-Arab and pan-Islamic
considerations related to Palestine,
Faisal was more than a clear thinker and an astute analyst. He was
prescient. From the 1920’s onwards, Faisal foresaw the looming tragedy
that
lay in store for the Palestinian people. Along with many others, he
envisioned the inevitable negative effects upon his own and other countries’
national, regional, and international interests in the event the Mandate
were to be terminated at the expense of legitimate Palestinian rights and
aspirations.
…AND A PRESCIENT AMERICAN: GEORGE
MARSHALL
In this way, Faisal was not unlike another
statesman, an American, George
Catlett Marshall, winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, Secretary of Defense,
architect of the Allied War effort in World War Two, and author of the plan
bearing his name that restored Europe’s economy and material well being.
As Secretary of State in 1947, Marshall
emphasized to Truman that American
support for an unjust partition of Palestine would be calamitous. From his
vantage point as America’s top foreign policy strategist, Marshall was
certain that, if Truman put narrow domestic self-interests above the
dictates of realpolitik, above the determinants of a foreign policy that
among other things took into consideration ground zero realities, no good
and much that was bad would follow. He firmly believed that a decision to
divide Palestine unfairly would be the cause of endless regional tensions.
Marshall also knew that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the
United States to be able to contain such tensions. And he was fully aware
that failure to do so would pose mounting threats to American national
security interests not only in the immediate region, but elsewhere, given
the vastness of the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Marshall and three other high-ranking U.S.
foreign policy makers who agreed
with him -- Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Undersecretary of State
Robert Lovett, and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Warren Austin –
spoke the truth as they saw it, and as high-ranking public servants, they
felt compelled to convey it, at the time. Hindsight reveals they were
prophetic.
But whereas Marshall and his colleagues
failed in their efforts to move
Truman to do right by America’s interests, Faisal, in contrast, was more
effective in counseling his head of state.
In a meeting with President Roosevelt on
February 14, 1945 aboard the USS
Quincy, King Abdalaziz, who had been advised ahead of time at length by
Faisal, spoke extensively about Palestine.
It bespeaks volumes that Roosevelt claimed
afterwards that he learned more
about Palestine in five minutes of talking with the Saudi Arabian monarch
than he had during his entire life up until then.
As a result, the American President
promised the Saudi King that he would do
nothing that might unduly affect a just solution to the Palestine problem
without consulting him first.
BROKEN PROMISES
But such was not to be. Truman, who
succeeded President Roosevelt, had
different views and broke Roosevelt’s pledge.
In Washington, Truman met with all of
America’s ambassadors to the Arab
world, whom he had recalled to the nation’s capital. Without so much as
saying so, he openly admitted that he would be putting partisan political
purposes above national welfare and vital national security interests.
Secretary of State Marshall, an eyewitness
to this exchange, informed Truman
that, if he did so, he himself would vote against Truman in the 1948
election.
Reflecting the fact that he was behind in
the electoral polls at the time,
Truman, in a statement much quoted in later years, said, “Gentlemen, as you
are aware, I am running for the highest office in the land.
“As such, I am responsive to the wishes
of thousands of Americans who are
anxious for the success of political Zionism. I have no Arabs among my
constituents. I am sorry.”
Strategists and historians ever since have
frequently sparred about the
moral and realpolitik merits and demerits of that decision. However, few
specialists differ in the view that Americans, Israelis, Palestinians, and
others have paid dearly and, while they await what President Bush has
further to say on the Arab-Israeli conflict that ensued, are still paying,
for that decision.
It remains an open question as to what
American lessons, if any, have been
learned from the past. Of interest in this regard is that President Nixon,
more than a quarter of a century later, would make a similar pledge to King
Faisal, and, like Truman before him, he would break it.
In the midst of the October 1973 War,
Nixon, without consulting King Faisal,
as he had promised he would do in the event he intended to do anything that
would tilt the balance between Israel and any of its Arab neighbors, asked
Congress for 2.2 billion dollars in emergency aid for Israel.
Nixon did this despite the fact that Israel’s
armed forces remained deeply
and illegally entrenched in Egypt from its June 1967 invasion and
occupation. And he did so, as specialists in international law have noted,
in spite of the fact that Egypt was not attacking Israel per se, but
exercising its lawful right to forcibly resist Israel’s occupation of
Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.
Upon learning this, Faisal considered his
pledge broken by Nixon, and he
joined the Arab oil embargo. Contrary to myth, the oil embargo had been
declared earlier by nearly every Arab oil exporter but Saudi Arabia, which
had remained true to Faisal’s word to the American President.
Daily supplies in the form of 550,000
barrels of Saudi Arabian oil were
instantly removed from the international market as a result of Nixon’s
breach, and the world changed forever.
PUTTING PAID TO THE PAST
At issue in the present circumstance is not
the possibility of another Arab
oil embargo. That issue is dealt with below. Rather, the issue is a quite
different matter, albeit, like several of the others, one of no small
moment.
At issue is the degree to which Arabs and
Israelis have been led to believe
President Bush’s oft-stated vision of a two-state solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, whereby a State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as
its capital, will be brought into being and enabled to exist side by side
with an Israel, with each having secure and recognized boundaries, is the
equivalent of a similar promise.
If so, many wonder whether this promise,
too, will be broken or, if not,
whether its implementation will be indefinitely delayed, which, at the end
of the day, might have the same effect.
With this as background, and despite
critics’ claims to the contrary, it can
more easily be seen that the urgency and immediate relevance of Crown Prince
Abdallah’s peace proposal has hardly emerged from out of the blue, nor can
it be fairly interpreted as either diversionary or insincere in intent.
Rather, the timing and intent of the
proposal have their origins elsewhere.
They stem as much as anything else from a wish by Prince Abdallah, other
Saudi Arabian decision makers, and the leadership of practically the entire
world to put this seemingly endless morass as decisively and effectively in
the rear view mirror.
This, plus the hope of thereby avoiding a
repeat of the kinds of costly
mistakes noted that have repeatedly resulted from the world’s inability, or
rather its leaders’ unwillingness and timidity, in face of the challenge of
doing whatever is necessary to settle the conflict.
It is in this light that Saudi Arabia’s
de facto top leader and his
supporters, which include many Americans, Arabs, and Israelis, reason that
only thus can one effectively address the legitimate Arab and Israeli hopes
and aspirations of the present pursuant to laying this conflict to rest.
ADDED ASSURANCES
Even in the decades-long absence of peace,
it cannot be said that the
Kingdom has failed to continue to seek new means of bringing the conflict to
an end.
In the 1980s, the Kingdom offered the Fahd
Peace Proposal, which also was
unanimously endorsed by all the League of Arab States and became the Arab
Peace Plan. The plan acknowledged the right of all states in the region to
live in peace and security.
In endorsing the proposal, the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO)
foreswore armed struggle as a legitimate means of ending the Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab lands seized in the June 1967
War. What the PLO and other Arab resistance groups did not count on,
however, was continued Israeli expropriation of Palestinian and Syrian land
and Israel’s prolonged occupation of Lebanon.
In the 1990s, the Kingdom broke Saudi
Arabian tradition, and, in the eyes of
many of its citizens, bent principle in order to demonstrate a willingness
to do the unexpected and, in this case, walk an extra mile along the path
towards peace. To this end, Riyadh hosted numerous high level delegations
of American Jewish organizations’ leaders who visited, toured the Kingdom,
and met with key Saudi Arabian officials.
In this way, it was hoped that the offer of
an Arabian olive branch would
help to assuage some of the anxieties about Saudi Arabia and its leaders, as
well as the Saudi Arabian citizenry, that have long been prevalent among
anti-peace leaders inside Israel and their compatriots in the United States.
The idea was for the pro-Israel visitors to
see for themselves the eagerness
and sincerity of Saudi Arabian government officials, the Kingdom’s private
sector leaders, and many others to explore the prospects for peace between
Arabs and Israelis. A related goal was that these American Jewish leaders
would share what they saw, heard, and experienced in Saudi Arabia with their
friends and associates in Israel.
SYNCHRONIZING STRATEGY
In the first decade of the 21st century,
Riyadh has been similarly active
and creative on still other strategic policy fronts. For example, it has
been at pains to demonstrate on an ongoing basis how its energy policies
underscore its support for Arab-Israeli and broader regional peace.
To this end, Prince Abdallah and the
Kingdom’s highest-ranking energy
officials have gone out of their way to acknowledge repeatedly to President
Bush and the American people that the engine of the United States economy,
and the economies of America’s allies, rely on the energy resources of Saudi
Arabia and other Arab and Islamic nations more than on any other
collectivity of peoples and countries.
A corollary to this reliance is the pivotal
strategic role of the United
States and Saudi Arabia as major pillars of the world’s material well being,
and of international stability, both now and in the decades to come.
It is with this in mind that, for more than
a quarter of a century, the
Kingdom has consistently called within OPEC for moderate oil prices and
uninterrupted levels of production commensurate with meeting world economic
needs and demands.
Similar considerations prompted Prince
Abdallah, at an international energy
conference in Riyadh two years ago, to offer to establish a permanent
international secretariat that would be headquartered in Riyadh. He also
offered to pay for all the front-end design, procurement, and construction
costs of such an organization.
The Saudi Arabian Crown Prince made the
offer as a means of addressing the
legitimate desires of consumers and producers to have an additional means of
ongoing discussion on matters pertaining to their respective energy and
energy-related economic interests.
These and other Kingdom-driven economic,
energy, and international political
initiatives are ones from which the United States, the industrial nations,
and the entire world, including Israel, have been, today are, and in the
future will continue to be net beneficiaries.
Moreover, contrary to popular mythology,
the Kingdom, for the past two and a
half decades and counting, has repeatedly assured the world that the option
or likelihood of its politicizing oil to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict
is a strategic, economic, and political non-starter.
This past spring, the substantive veracity
of these assurances materialized
in a matter of minutes after Iraq threatened to embargo oil sales to the
United States. The Kingdom declared that it would instantly replace any
Iraqi oil removed from the market, and it did.
THE BOTTOM LINE
From the foregoing, it should be clear
that, from the outset, other than
Israel’s immediate neighbors, Saudi Arabia has been the one Arab country
more intricately involved than any other in trying to end the Arab-Israeli
dispute.
It is in this context that the Kingdom can
be seen as having been, and in
remaining to this day, among America’s closest and steadfast friends and the
source of undeniable benefit to innumerable U.S. strategic, economic,
political, commercial, and defense interests.
In pursuit of vital U.S. national needs and
concerns, and those of its
allies, Saudi Arabians and many others the world over have an abiding hope.
That hope is that the Bush Administration will not lose sight of, or view
lightly, this abundant evidence of the Kingdom’s responsible international
policies and positions, that it will spare no effort in leveling with the
American people on how the Kingdom has contributed positively on these and
related issues, and that it will lead by leading.
In the eyes of more than one Saudi Arabian
leader, one key additional way to
exercise responsible leadership in this regard would be for American and
Israeli critics, especially at the level of their respective executive and
legislative branch leaderships, to cease casting aspersions on the
intentions and substance of the most seminal Arab peace proposal ever
submitted to Israel.
Especially when, as in this case, the
initiative, which offers peace and
normalization in exchange for peace and normalization, has the full,
unqualified support of all 21 Arab countries, the Palestine Authority, a
great many Israelis, and, except for key elements within the Israeli
leadership to date, practically the entire world.
Especially when, at the end of the day, as
though through a glass seen
darkly, reality brooks no illusions, and there is no good reason for
America’s leaders’ to refrain from pointing their fingers at the truth.
===========================================================================
o Dr. John Duke Anthony, Publisher of
GulfWire, is also President and CEO
of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and Secretary, U.S.-GCC
Corporate Cooperation Committee. All three are Washington, D.C.-based
nonprofit and non-governmental organizations dedicated to educating
Americans and others about the Arab countries, the Middle East, and the
Islamic world.
===========================================================================
GULFWIRE 2002 RESOURCE CD
A HIGHLY INTERACTIVE INFORMATION CD-ROM
PROVIDING BACKGROUND AND REPORTING
ON THE GULF ARAB STATES. A key information tool for your understanding
developments in the Arab Gulf States and the Gulf region. Thoroughly
indexed CD providing: News, business reports, analyses, articles,
commentary, specialists’ insights and more from 30 months of reporting in
the highly acclaimed GulfWire Family of Newsletters PLUS exclusive access
to a premium content area on GulfWire’s companion web site. The GulfWire
family of newsletters is a service of the National Council on U.S.-Arab
Relations/U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee.
** GulfWire 2002 Resource CDs Are Ready For
Shipment To You Now **
JUST ORDER YOURS VIA A SECURE ON-LINE
SHOPPING BASKET:
CLICK
HERE
============================================================================
CLICK
HERE TO SUBSCRIBE TO GULFWIRE
============================================================================
*************************
CALENDAR
*************************
CALENDAR - A LOOK AHEAD
Check the GulfWire Calendar for upcoming events, conferences, and other
dates of significance. For the complete GulfWire calendar CLICK
HERE.
To get your event added to the GulfWire Calendar CLICK
HERE.
*************************
LAST LINES
*************************
Independent commentary provided in
‘GulfWire’ and materials contained in the linked Internet sites do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations or
the U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee. News extracts and links
contained in GulfWire have been reported in various media. GulfWire and
the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations/U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation
Committee have not independently verified the accounts referred to and do not
vouch for their accuracy or the reliability of Internet links.
Internet links were active the day of
publication in GulfWire. Some
hyperlinks are longer than one line of text and may not properly ‘wrap
around’ in your email. You may need to cut and paste these links to your
Web browser.
The ‘GulfWire’ is an information
service of the National Council on
U.S.-Arab Relations and the U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee
Secretariat. Please feel free to forward this edition of the
‘GulfWire’ to
your friends and colleagues, and suggest additions to our mailing list.
CLICK HERE
For more information on the National
Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and the
U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee visit the web sites of the National
Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and the U.S.-GCC
Corporate Cooperation Committee or call (202)293-0801.
****************************************************************************
National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations
President and CEO: Dr. John Duke Anthony
U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee
Secretary: Dr. John Duke Anthony
1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1210
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202.293.0801
Fax: 202.293.0903
PATRICK W. RYAN
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire
mailto:gulfwire@ArabiaLink.com
C. R. TRISDALE
Deputy Editor, GulfWire
mailto:CRTrisdale@ArabiaLink.com
PETER M. WALTON
Contributing Editor
mailto:Pete@ArabiaLink.com
|
The GulfWire
e-newsletter and Web site are developed, produced and
maintained by Ryan &
Associates.
|
 |
Copyright © 2002, GulfWire
All rights reserved.
The contents of this newsletter may not be reproduced in any commercial
document or in any material sold, nor used in any other manner without
permission of GulfWire. Links to Internet sites should not be seen as an
endorsement of the sites, or the information contained in them.
|
