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INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION
COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT
PERSPECTIVES
WEEK OF JANUARY 28-FEBRUARY 3, 2002
REFORGING THE U.S. AND SAUDI
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
A key "GulfWire" objective is to
help keep you abreast of the challenges to the relationships between the United
States and its strategic partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council member
states. The September 11th attack on America and Operation Enduring
Freedom have focused new attention on U.S. foreign relations - across the Middle
East in broad terms, and specifically with U.S.-Saudi Arabia ties.
"GulfWire Digest" and
"GulfWire Voices of the Region" have chronicled for you the drumbeat
of reporting, analysis and commentary on the challenges to the U.S.-Saudi Arabia
relationship in recent months. Today we are pleased to add to the dialogue
with Dr. Anthony Cordesman's thoughtful essay, "Reforging The US And Saudi
Strategic Partnership." It follows close behind his "Fix the
Saudi Relationship," in the January 24, 2002 "Christian Science
Monitor." [Link below]
Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the
Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, provides herein an insightful discussion of the challenges to the
U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship. A veteran of more than thirty years of
U.S. government services in the U.S. executive and legislative branches, and a
popular media commentator, he has authored numerous cutting-edge works related
to the strategic dimensions of Mideastern civilian and defense challenges.
In this essay, he focuses on the strategic relationship in terms of the current
challenge, why it must be repaired and how to move forward.
Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire
NOTE:
Additional tables accompanying “Reforging
The US and Saudi Strategic Partnership” can be viewed on-line at:
CLICK HERE
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REFORGING THE US AND SAUDI STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
February 1, 2002
It is all too easy for the US and Saudi
Arabia to lash out in anger at a time when the impact of September 11th, the
Second Intifada, and the problems of dealing with Iran and Iraq divide us. It is
easy to talk of withdrawing US forces, and breaking up a partnership that is
more than a half century old. We need to remember that the US and Saudi Arabia
have been friends and allies since the end of World War II. We fought the Gulf
War together, and the US uses Saudi bases daily to contain Saddam Hussein. Saudi
Arabia depends on US military equipment, advisors, and technical support for its
military strength. We are major trading partners. We are using Saudi oil
to expand our Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Saudi Arabia has often played a
major role in stabilizing oil prices and in increasing oil production to deal
with cuts in production in other countries.
Yes, the Saudi leadership could and should
have done more to fight terrorism before September 11th. It should have paid
much closer attention to the flow of private money to Islamic
"charities," and to what some 10,000 young Saudi men who had received
some kind of religious extremist and paramilitary training as
"Afghanis" were doing. It should have paid much closer attention to a
pattern of "Islamic education" in Saudi Arabia that often violated the
basic principles of Islam by teaching xenophobia and distrust of Christians and
Jews.
Months have gone by since September 11th,
however, and we should move beyond the stage of venting our anger. The
friendship and mutual interests that have been the hallmark of a strong Saudi-US
alliance should, once again, distinguish America's relationship with Saudi
Arabia. Both sides can reassert the primacy of these mutual interests by
focusing on what we share: the experience and understanding that extreme
fundamentalism of any kind endangers both civilization and civility.
Strengthening Our Strategic Partnership
What we need to do is to strengthen our
partnership with Saudi Arabia, not weaken it. We need to preserve our military
ties. It is all too easy to talk about withdrawing US forces from Saudi Arabia.
The fact is, however, that the de facto US-Saudi military alliance now consists
primarily of: US advisors which are absolutely critical to Saudi Arabia's
military development and effectiveness; one relatively small mix of air units
that help enforce the Northern "no fly zone" from Prince Sultan Air
Base in an unpopulated area south of Riyadh; a very small number of US personnel
that work with the Saudi Air Force in maintaining an ultra-modern command and
control facility in Riyadh; and a small number of US Army personnel that can
operate Patriot units providing Saudi Arabia with its only ability to counter
theater ballistic missiles in an emergency.
A few reality checks: Iran and Iraq are
both major proliferators with chemical and biological weapons and which are
seeking nuclear weapons. Iran has over 500,000 active military personnel,
350,000 reserves, some 2,500 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, a significant
navy and nearly 300 combat aircraft. Iraq has over 400,000 active military
personnel, 650,000 reserves, some 3,500 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, a
significant navy and over 300 combat aircraft. Saudi Arabia has only 126,000
regular soldiers plus 75,000 men in a lightly mechanized national guard.
It has about 1,900 operational armored vehicles and around 350 combat aircraft,
but its readiness and combat readiness is still low. In part because it is still
absorbing some $65 billion in weapons deliveries since the Gulf War, which
includes nearly $30 billion worth of very advanced US arms.
The Critical Impact on the Global Economy
Iran and Iraq not only pose a potential
threat to the entire Gulf region, with some two-thirds of the world's proven oil
reserves, Saudi Arabia alone is critical to ensuring the flow of world oil and
supporting the global economy. Estimates of the size and importance of
Saudi oil reserves differ slightly according to source. The US government
estimates that Saudi Arabia proper (excluding the Saudi-Kuwaiti "Neutral
Zone") contains at least 262 billion barrels of proven oil reserves or
25.4% of the world supply. This compares with 11% for Iraq, 9.6% for the
UAE, 9.2% for Kuwait, 8.6% for Iran, 13% for the rest of OPEC, and 22.6% for the
rest of the world. It's the fact that Gulf oil reserves are so large that
explains why the US Department of Energy estimates that Gulf oil exports will
rise by 125% between 2000 and 2020 to meet the world's need for energy and from
30.6% to 47.9% of all world oil exports. It's the fact that Saudi oil reserves
are so large that explains why some estimates indicate that Saudi oil production
capacity will rise from 14.5% of all world capacity in 2000 to 19.2% of the
world's total capacity by 2020.
Dealing with Military Threats and Terrorism
Defending the most critical source of the
world's oil exports and reserves requires at least several thousand Americans to
help train and support the Saudi forces, and it requires constant joint
exercises and planning to prepare both Saudi and US forces for war. A relatively
token US presence in Saudi Arabia allows Saudi and US forces to develop
interoperability and ensures the US can rapidly and massively reinforce from
over-the-horizon in a major crisis. Deterring Iraq requires tangible American
presence, and dealing with Iranian and Iraqi proliferation will require new
forms of US and Saudi cooperation in the future. It is all too easy to ignore
military realities; to give way to the protests of those Saudis and Americans
who simply do not understand the benefits of our alliance; or to over-react to
the Saudi Islamists and other ideologues that have opposed our military ties
since the time of Nasser. The US and Saudi Arabia need to do a much better job
of explaining their military relationship to both the Saudi and American people.
At the same time, we need to develop more
effective cooperation in the war on terrorism:
First, we must cooperate in replacing the
Taliban government in Afghanistan with a government that has the aid and support
to evolve towards a modern state serving the needs of all its peoples.
Afghanistan must no longer be a nation that breeds or harbors terrorists.
This requires more than US and European efforts at nation building. It requires
Saudi aid and the support of a major Islamic nation that can help to heal the
tension between Afghan and Arab that grew out of the cruelty and extremism of Al
Qaida and the Taliban. Saudi Arabia has already taken important steps in this
direction and much deeper cooperation should be possible.
Second, we must work together to root out
Al Qaida and other violent terrorist groups that pollute the very name of Islam
throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, and ensure the financing and
support of Islamic causes serves faith, not murder. Saudi Arabia can do much in
the Gulf and the Arab world, as well as inside Saudi Arabia, to ensure that
funds the flow in the name of Islamic charity are not actually used to serve
extremist and terrorist causes. There is a need for Saudi diplomatic and
political pressure on Gulf and Arab states to put an end to the activities of
all of the remaining cells and elements of Al Qaida, and for Saudi religious
leadership that makes it clear that murder, suicide bombings, and acts of mass
terrorism cannot be justified in the name of Islam.
Third, we must cooperate in a broader
strategy to isolate terrorist regimes worldwide. Several such regimes are in the
Middle East. We can only deal with the regimes with a minimum of conflict and
violence if the United States and Saudi Arabia work together, rather than work
against one another.
The Problem of Iraq
Such a cooperative effort will probably
allow us to deal with states like Iran, Libya, and Syria without violence. They
are all evolving in ways that are at least somewhat positive. More marginal
supporters or "tolerators" of terrorism like Lebanon, Somalia, the
Sudan, and Yemen are already taking at least some steps to crack down on Al
Qaida and other extremist groups. Concerted US and Saudi diplomatic and economic
action can do even more to make it clear that none of these nations will
tolerate groups that target and kill innocent civilians of any faith or
indoctrinate and send Arab young men to a pointless death.
Such a broader strategy does, however, mean
developing a common approach to either truly defanging or removing Saddam
Hussein. The regime of Saddam Hussein is just as bad now as it was at its birth.
It still shows no real concern for the Iraqi people except as political and
military tools. It still continues to threaten Kuwait, and to covertly
proliferate in ways that will eventually pose a threat to Saudi Arabia's very
existence if allowed to continue. Too many years have passed while we have tried
to deal with Saddam Hussein by setting "redlines" that gave him ways
to avoid truly accepting the key terms of the UN resolutions. Iran, the
Gulf countries -- and most of all the people of Iraq -- have suffered enough at
the hands of this lethal regime.
Saudi Arabia and the US share common
concerns about civilian casualties and the costs confronting us in the
elimination of Saddam Hussein. However, compromise and temporizing has failed.
It is barely possible that we can work together with our other allies to force
Iraq into a form of containment where he accepts UN efforts demanding enough to
actually seek out and destroy its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and
long-range delivery systems. If not, the US and Saudi Arabia need to quietly
agree on how to remove Saddam from power and on military cooperation to do so.
Such cooperation will be difficult, but not
impossible. We will need to convince Saudi Arabia we are serious this time, we
will not rely on empty facades like the Iraqi opposition and we will use enough
US air and land power to ensure a quick and decisive victory. We need to
persuade Saudi Arabia that Iraq's territorial integrity will be preserved, that
pro-Iranian Shi'ites will not dominate it, and that Saddam's departure will be
followed by the kind of nation building effort that will create a stable
neighbor on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia's border. Saudi Arabia fought with us
against Saddam's aggression. It has been a constant critic of Saddam's
regime, and Saudi Arabia has many incentives to at least quietly cooperate in
Saddam's removal.
The Challenge of the Second Intifada
The US and Saudi Arabia must work together
to address several broader causes of terrorism. One is the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Both sides in the Second Intifada are spinning out of control,
and need help to create a meaningful future. The US cannot deal with a war
between two peoples, and the hatreds it engenders, simply as if one side were
guilty of "terrorism," or by standing aside because there are no easy
opportunities or options that will satisfy either side. It must not
sacrifice Israel's vital interests, but it must also understand the overwhelming
pressures on the Arab peoples and their governments created by Palestinian's who
are stateless.
We need to ask moderate Arab states like
Saudi Arabia to join us in a continuing effort to create a ceasefire and then a
peace that truly gives Israel security while creating a truly viable Palestinian
state. Both nations may disagree on who deserves blame for the Second Intifada
and many details of a peace. Both should be able to agree on the need to
cooperate in replacing the war process of the Second Intifada with a peace
process that gives Israel true security while creating a true Palestinian State.
This will - as senior Saudi officials suggest - mean more US pressure on Israel.
The US must make a more serious effort to put an end to the expansion of Israeli
settlements and ensure Israeli flexibility in accepting a cease-fire on
realistic terms. Such cooperation also, however, means Saudi Arabia must put
pressure on the Palestinians. They must provide more open support for the
kind of peace proposals made at Camp David and Tabah and make it clear that such
a peace can be acceptable to Islam. It means a concerted Saudi effort to
persuade Arafat and the Palestinians that the tolerance of terrorism in any form
will block a lasting ceasefire indefinitely or make such a peace
impossible.
The Critical Importance of Saudi Economic
Development
Finally, both governments need to address
the key economic and demographic causes of terrorism. They must frankly and
honestly recognize that oil wealth alone can no longer sustain even
"rich" oil states like Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia's case, this
means the Saudi leadership must cut back further on arms purchases and actually
implement its economic reform plans. The Saudi regime must take on the Islamists
and conservatives to create a modern educational system that will educate young
Saudis for real jobs. It means more realistic efforts to reduce dependence on
foreign labor and reduce the Saudi birth rate to reasonable levels.
In the case of the US, the US needs to work
closely with Saudi Arabia - as well as Egypt, Jordan and other moderate Arab
states - to support their efforts at economic reform and diversification. The US
must make a far more proactive effort to ensure the steady flow of private
investment, the expansion of trade, and the kind of joint ventures that create
jobs for young men and women. It needs to support Saudi Arabia in creating a
solid and well-institutionalized dialogue between energy importers and exporters
that can help stabilize prices and supply.
We are scarcely responsible for the
economic and demographic problems of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East that are
reducing per capita income and creating unemployment and instability. Saudi
Arabia does, however, have valid economic reform plans and a real interest in
joining the World Trade Organization. It seeks to create an
importer-exporter dialogue to stabilize oil prices and create a secure source of
exports, and in opening up its economy to foreign investment. We cannot fight
terrorism successfully unless we fight the causes of terrorism. The key is
not abstract theoretical efforts to export our political system but rather
economic reform that will aid the region's people, modernize their society and
economies, and prepare the way for political evolution.
Americans also need to understand that it
is the Saudi royal family, Saudi educators and technocrats, and key Saudi
businessmen who are trying to modernize a very conservative clergy and people.
Calls for more representative government, more open media, and better human
rights make sense. Calls for instant democracy are virtually mindless. Saudi
Arabia is evolving its own path towards modernization, but it is being led
towards that process in the face of opposition that could divide the country and
block progress just as badly as did Khomeini's revolution in Iran.
We have been very clear over the last few
months about what we intend to do to the bad guys. We now need to become
just as clear about what we can do 'with' the good guys. Our challenge is not a
clash between civilizations or between the West and the Islamic world. It is
rather a clash between those who work to build civilization and those who work
to destroy it. Saudi Arabia is a key ally in this battle and we need each other
- now and for years to come!
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman is Senior Fellow
for Strategic Assessment at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and Co-Director of the
Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown University. He directs
the assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments,
and CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East.
Dr. Cordesman is the author of books on the
military lessons of the
Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli military balance and the peace
process, a six-volume net assessment of the Gulf, transnational threats, and
military developments in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S. strategy and force
plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms transfers, Middle Eastern
security, economic, and energy issues.
Dr. Cordesman served as a national security
analyst for ABC News for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has
served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence Assessment,
Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department of Energy,
Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's representative
on the Middle East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of the
U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff, working
on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. He has been an
advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled
extensively in the Gulf and North Africa.
HAVE
YOU READ THESE BOOKS BY DR. ANTHONY CORDESMAN?
CONTACT INFO
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 775-3270
Acordesman@aol.com
RELATED MATERIAL
"FIX OUR SAUDI PARTNERSHIP"
Op-ed by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
[From the Jan. 24, 2002 "Christian Science Monitor"]
…a US presence - vital in helping Saudi Arabia modernize its forces,
containing Iraq, and defending a region with two-thirds of the world's proven
oil reserves - is well worth keeping… …the US and Saudi Arabia need to
reassert the primacy of their mutual interests by ending their counterproductive
public feuding and working together to fight terrorism…
Complete column…
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0124/p11s01-coop.html
OTHER GULFWIRE APPEARANCES
"The West and the Arab World: Partnership or a
'Clash of Civilizations?'"
"Strategy in the Middle East: The Gap Between
Strategic Theory and
Operational Reality"
"A Firsthand Look at Saudi Arabia Since 9-11"
"Iraq: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and Its Weapons of Mass Destruction"
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional
Military Balance"
"Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli and
Palestinian Strategic Failures"
"Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Strategic
Partnership"
CSIS GULF IN TRANSITION PROJECT
"The CSIS Gulf in Transition Project is a major CSIS study, funded in part
by the Smith Richardson Foundation. The project builds on the work done for the
CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative, the CSIS Net Assessment of the Middle East,
and the Gulf in Transition Project. It is being conducted in conjunction with a
separate - but closely related -- study of Saudi Arabia - and Middle East Energy
and Security Project. The Gulf in Transition project is being conducted by
Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, and has developed
a series of reports recommending US polices towards the Gulf states. The core of
these reports consists of a Policy Report that summarizes the recommendations
made in the analysis, and a Main Report that provides the detailed analytic
rationale for each recommendation."
SAUDI ARABIA ENTERS THE 21ST CENTURY
"Project Introduction - CSIS is undertaking a new project to examine the
trends shaping the future of Saudi Arabia and its impact on the stability of the
Gulf. This project is supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and builds on
the work done for the CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative, the CSIS Net Assessment
of the Middle East, and the Gulf in Transition Project. It is being conducted in
conjunction with a separate - but closely related -- study called the Middle
East Energy and Security Project."
For more information on these projects,
including links to a treasure of analytical reports, see:
CSIS GULF IN TRANSITION PROJECT
http://www.csis.org/burke/gulf/index.htm
http://www.csis.org/gulf/index.html
SAUDI ARABIA ENTERS THE 21ST CENTURY
http://www.csis.org/burke/saudi21/index.htm
MIDDLE EAST ENERGY AND SECURITY
http://www.csis.org/burke/mees/index.htm
THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE
http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/index.htm#mid
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